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The object of inquiry of this thesis is the military as a constitutive component of 
state institutions in the Central African sub region. Its aim is to identify whether and to 
what extent the military has been and can be instrumental to the process of state-
building and state formation in the region, and whether and under which conditions it 
is an obstacle to that process. This thesis is built upon two assumptions: the key 
conceptual differentiation between the state formation process and the state-building 
project, and the relevance of political culture in explaining military development and 
the military relationship to the state. A shaping parameter of the analysis is whether, 
and in which conditions, it is possible to “accelerate” state-building in the context of a 
given political culture. Lessons for Africa are drawn from historical analogy and the 
limits of classic civil-military theory in interpreting Africa’s experience analysed on the 
basis of the example of three states, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
and Rwanda. Each national situation and each period is examined from a dual 
historical and sociological perspective so as to pin down the articulation between 
political decisions and cultural constraints, and the positioning of the military at key 
turns in those countries development. Clarity is cast from this analysis on the degree 
and characteristics of “quasi-ness” of each state, and correspondingly, the level of 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
In 2010 a caravan of Central African heads of states toured the capitals of 
the sub-region, celebrating the first half century of their countries’ 
independence. The celebrations came in the form of pompous military 
parades, at times including the entire national armed forces. Modern fighter 
jets, reserved for such festive occasions, were performing impressive 
manoeuvres over the tribunes of a select audience, bearing witness to the 
potency of the heads of states – seven out of ten being former senior military 
figures. Shiny SUVs were criss-crossing the major cities, lavishing the 
population with baseball caps and t-shirts displaying a laurel-framed ‘50’. On 
est grand, on est adulte – we are now grown up – was a headline of the 
Gabonese semi-official daily newspaper L’Union, referring to 50 years of 
independence. 
All states of francophone Central Africa gained their ‘political kingdom’ – 
to use Kwame Nkrumah’s famous phrase – the sovereignty of statehood, 
between 1960 and 1962.1 From that moment on, this sovereignty was taken as 
a given, not only by the concerned African states themselves, but by all 
existing members of the international community, including former colonial 
powers. Uncontested, the newcomers were seen as representing simply a 
quantitative addition to the international society of states and were accepted, 
one by one, as members of the United Nations. The decision of the 
Organisation of African States (OAU) in 1963 not to question the borders 
inherited from colonialism completed the process of state creation. In each new 
                                                             
1 See Mazrui, Ali A (1999), Seek Ye First the Political Kingdom, in Africa since 1935 
University of California Press, Berkeley, 105–26 
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national capital, the public display of an army, no matter how small, became 
the most visible attribute of political legitimacy and undisputed sovereignty.  
In contrast to this demonstrative exhibition of statehood, the reality of the 
Central African sub-region reveals an immense discrepancy between the 
prominence of the state’s symbols on display and the latter’s empirical 
presence. Contrary to Nkrumah’s inspiration (and aspiration), political, 
economic, infrastructural and institutional progress did not follow automatically 
from political independence and international sovereignty. Rather, African 
countries belong to a group characterised since the early 1990s as ‘failed’, 
‘failing’ or, today, ‘fragile’ states by practitioners in the field of development,2 
whilst academics have gradually built on the original ‘quasi-state’ terminology 
coined by Robert Jackson to develop more accurate, nuanced and 
differentiated descriptives.3 This applies in particular to Central Africa, where 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has been billed ‘a territory in search 
of a state’,4 whilst the Central African Republic (CAR) has been called a 
‘phantom state’5 and even Cameroon, despite its apparent stability, has earned 
the ‘fragile state’ qualifier from some analysts.6 One group of scholars has 
                                                             
2 See in particular the ‘International Dialogue on Fragile States’ supported by the OECD 
since 2008, In that context, several Central African states (DRC, CAR, Burundi, Chad) belong 
to the so-called ‘G7+’of self-designated ‘fragile and conflict-affected states’ demanding special 
treatment in international development assistance, OECD (2008), International Dialogue and 
Partnership 
3 Jackson, Robert H (1987), Quasi-states, Dual Regimes, and Neoclassical Theory, 
International Organization, 41, 4, 519-549. Other scholars have used the terms ‘limited 
statehood’, ‘para-statehood’, ‘shadow states’, ‘rhizome states’, ‘lame Leviathan’, ‘holes in the 
fabric of international society’, political entities at a ‘tenuous stage of state formation’, ‘states, 
where state-building and territorial integration are ongoing projects’, see also Clapham, 
Christopher S (1998), Degrees of Statehood, Review of International Studies, 24, 2, 143-157; 
For a comprehensive treatment of the definitions and typologies, see Mcloughlin, Claire (2010), 
Topic Guide on Fragile States 
4 Pourtier, Roland (1997), Du Zaïre au Congo: un territoire en quête d’État, Afrique 
Contemporaine, 183, 7-30. On the DRC, see also ICG (2010c), Congo: A Stalled Democratic 
Agenda, Africa Briefing, 73,  
5 ICG (2007), Central African Republic: Anatomy of a Phantom State, Africa Report, 
136, p.2 
6 ICG (2010a), Cameroon: Fragile State?, Africa Report, 160 
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added Rwanda to the lot.7 As a general tendency, terms like ‘weak state’ and 
‘criminal state’ developed to find an explanatory pattern for the ‘otherness’ of 
political African conditions, ubiquitously populate the literature, explaining 
African polities in terms of an unintended anomaly to the ‘normal’ state 
trajectory.8  
Central African states are characterised by the lack of effective capacity 
to collect taxes to provide basic ‘public goods’ such as physical and social 
infrastructure and security; their inability to control fully a national territory 
demarcated by clear boundaries; a lack of domestic consensus to define and 
modify the rules of the political game; weak institutionalised systems of conflict 
resolution (such as Parliament and the Judiciary); and shallow identification of 
the population with the state. Indexes commonly used today to rank state 
stability and resilience indicate that the Central African states rank amongst the 
worst performers, the DRC, Burundi, the CAR and Chad invariably falling at 
the bottom of the statistical scale, with Congo, Cameroon and Rwanda coming 
just above.9  
 
Given the wide consensus about the ‘quasi-character’ of Central African 
states, what did those militaries proudly paraded on Independence Day 
                                                             
7 Straus, Scott and Lars Waldorf (2011), Remaking Rwanda: State Building and Human 
Rights After Mass Violence, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison 
8 Kaarsholm, Preben (2006), Violence, Political Culture and Development in Africa, 
James Currey, Oxford; Keen, David (1996), Organised Chaos: Not the New World Order, The 
World Today, 15, January, 14-17; Mehler, Andreas (2009), Hybrid Regimes and Oligopolies of 
Violence in Africa, in Fischer, Martina and Schmelzle, Beatrix, Building Peace in the Absence 
of States Berghof Research Center, Berlin, 57-64; Reno, W (2007), Patronage Politics and the 
Behavior of Armed Groups, Civil Wars, 9, 4, 324-342; Reno, William (1998), Warlord politics 
and African states, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder; Rummel, Rudolph Joseph (1994), 
Death by government, Transactions Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ 
9 Failed states index: www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive, 
retrieved on 14 July 2012; see also Marshall, Monty G and Benjamin R Cole (2011), Conflict, 
Governance, and State Fragility, Global Report 2011, Centre for Systemic Peace, Vienna, VA, 
and UNDP (2011), Regional and National Trends in the Human Development Index 1980-
2011, United Nations Development Programme, New York 
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actually represent?10 Further, what role, if any, has the military played in those 
states over the past 50 years in defining, consolidating, and maintaining the 
prevailing political order – beyond mere political symbolism – and where is its 
place, and function, within society? Is it possible that, being organic parts of 
those quasi-states, the Central African militaries actually constitute no more 
than ‘quasi-armies’?11 
This dissertation aims to answer these questions by examining the 
development of the Central African military in the context of post-
independence state evolution. It provides an account of the role of the military 
as one of the key social and political players in Central Africa, in order to help 
identify whether and in which conditions it has been, or can be a vehicle for 
state-building in the modern, ‘Weberian’ sense of the term, and where and how 
it is an obstacle to achieving this aim. The research interest grew during my 
five years of living and working and doing research in Francophone Central 
Africa. Equipped with knowledge of African conditions that resulted from mere 
theoretical engagement with the topic, the experienced reality check on the 
ground opened up this researcher’s mind to a better understanding of the 
subject than desk research would have allowed for. After intensive research 
and ever widening access to the African military world it became apparent that 
there were two possible perspectives to approach African civil-military 
relations: an official one claiming representativeness of reality, and the actual 
truth. The hidden but, as it became obvious over time, violently strong tension 
between these perspectives resulted in a research question this thesis 
                                                             
10 Clapham (1998) goes even farther, denying even quasi-statehood to sub-Saharan 
African states which had lost their empirical sovereignty because they could only survive 
through external support. Like many observers, Clapham confuses here regimes with states 
11 The terms ‘quasi-military’, and ‘quasi-police’, were first used by Iliffe, John (1979), A 
Modern History of Tanganyika, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.77, to describe the 
additional military, para-military, and secret services in parallel to the national armies 




crystallised around: Can the African military play a constructive role in building 
modern and even democratic states or must it vitiate the foundations of state 
construction, as there is a mismatch between its function as a social group and 
the standard role it is supposed to play as an anchor of state institutions?  
1 Key Concepts: The State and the Military 
1.1 Forms of States 
Conceptually and to some extent historically, it is possible to distinguish 
three types of states: the pre-modern ‘natural state’, to use a concept coined 
by North et al.,12 or ‘Tillian state’ in the words of Abdel-Fatau Musah13; the 
‘modern’ Weberian/Westphalian model; and the ‘post-modern’ democratic 
state.14 To each form of state corresponds a form of the military.  
The ‘natural state’ is a pre-modern form of political organisation, 
characterised mainly by personal power relationships and unaccountable elites 
permanently seeking to expand their unlimited predatory rule. Such states are 
marked by dispersal of control over both the means of violence and personal 
power relationships (patron-client). Although there is no overarching order to 
limit intra-elite competition, such Tillian states may achieve some degree of 
stability by the creation of dominant elite coalitions whose rents increase if 
general violence is limited.15 Natural or Tillian states correspond to ‘limited-
                                                             
12 North, Douglass C, et al. (2007), Limited Access Orders in the Developing World: A 
New Approach to the Problems of Development, World Bank Publications, Washington DC 
13 Musah, Abdel-Fatau (2002), Privatization of security, arms proliferation and the 
process of state collapse in Africa, Development and Change, 33, 5, 911-933, pp.916f. Musah 
deduced the concept of ‘Tillian predatory power structure’ from Charles Tilly’s description of 
Early Modern European state formation as ‘organised crime’ 
14 The designation of the three standard models as ‘pre-modern’, ‘modern’ and ‘post-
modern’ is most clearly made by Cooper, Robert (1997), The Post-modern State and the World 
Order, Demos, New York, p.43 
15 Buzan, Barry (2010), Culture and International Society, International Affairs, 86, 1, 1-
25, p.15; this description dovetails with Charles Tilly’s of state formation as a form of organised 
crime, see Tilly, Charles (1985), War Making and State Making as Organized Crime, in Evans, 
Peter B, et al., Bringing the State Back In Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 169-191 
16 
 
access order’ societies16 or what authors such as Karl Popper and Ralf 
Dahrendorf describe as ‘closed societies’.17 Common features include the 
unfinished historical process of state formation across the successive pre-
colonial, colonial, and post-colonial eras and the fundamental features of 
African patronage-based political culture, which acts as a powerful force of 
resistance against the establishment of direct rule. 
Whilst open society allows change of political leadership in a peaceful 
manner, and individuals may personally decide on their affairs, in closed 
societies, a person will rarely find him/herself in the position of doubting how 
s/he ought to act. The ‘right way’ is always determined, even if difficult to 
follow, and can never become an object of critical consideration. One can 
generalise that the combination of closed society conditions with limited access 
order forms the political culture of the natural state. In such proto-states, both 
the civilian and the military parts of the bureaucracy remain underdeveloped. 
As a rule, the upper echelons of the armed forces are either identical with the 
political elite, or they form its uniformed wing. Usually composed of 
mercenaries, the military rank and file functions as a tool in the hands of the 
elite in its strategy of resource extraction from the wider population.  
Secondly, the ‘modern’ Weberian state is based on institution-building 
and the gradual limitation of the powers of the ruler as the latter is replaced at 
the centre of political gravity by the legal rational bureaucracy, of which the 
military is a part.18 Historically, the modern state developed incrementally, with 
                                                             
16 According to North, et al. (2007), a limited access order creates economic rents 
through privileged access to political influence, and then uses these rents to sustain the 
political order via a patronage scaffolding holding it together. Access to rents remains a 
privilege 
17 See Popper, Karl R (1957), Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde: 1 Der Zauber 
Platons, UTB/Francke, München, Schmidt, Heike (2001), Transkript einer Diskussion zwischen 
Ralf Dahrendorf und Robert Menasse, in Dahrendorf, Sir Ralf and Schmidt, Heike, Die offene 
Gesellschaft und ihre falschen Freunde Institut fuer eine Offene Gesellschaft, Wien, 35-59  
18 Weber, Max (1957), Politics as Vocation, in Gerth, H H, From Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology Routledge, London, p.78 
17 
 
almost four centuries separating the early manifestations of centralised states 
under autocratic or despotic monarchies from the late 19th century (more or 
less) accomplished nation-states. Weberian states are in transition from limited 
access order to open-access order. In terms of political culture, this 
corresponds to an alteration from Early Modern rational thought, such as 
Machiavellism, to late modern concepts, such as nationalism, and to the 
emergence of increasingly participatory and more open societies. In other 
words, the ‘idea’ of the state develops from a sense of belonging to a sense of 
participation, responsibility, and entitlement. Three key properties characterise 
the military in the accomplished Weberian state: first, it is no longer the tool of 
a personal ruler but it becomes the armed wing of the state; second, it is 
increasingly professionalised, with more and more standardised training and 
promotion according to objective performance criteria; and third, limitations 
bearing on executive power apply to the institutionalised military, which is 
gradually subjected to civilian control, even if it remains a privileged policy tool. 
As the contribution of the masses to the war effort becomes more and 
more demanding (financially or via conscription), mass involvement in public 
affairs opens the stage for the third model of statehood. 
The contemporary democratic state centres on the well-being of the 
citizens and, in more recent understandings, their ‘human security’.19 Political 
leaders and office holders at all levels are accountable to the people via a 
variety of channels (elections, the courts, etc.). A participatory political system 
and an ‘open society’ form the basis for such an ‘open-access order’. The rule 
                                                             
19 New understandings of the role of the state developed at a quick pace as of the early 
1990s under the dual impact of the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, the Balkan wars 
and the Rwandan genocide, see the seminal article by Franck, Thomas M (1992), The 
Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, American Journal of International Law, 86, 1, 46-
91, and the debate leading to the declaration United Nations (2009), Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect, Report of the Secretary-General, General Assembly, New York, 
A/63/677; see also Evans, Gareth (2009), The Responsibility to Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity 
Crimes Once and for All, Irish Studies in International Affairs, 20, 1, 7-13 
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of law, institutional balancing of power, and structures for an institutionalised 
dialogue between the state and social/economic groups are defining 
elements.20 This logic also applies to the military realm, whereby democratic 
control via Parliament and civil society extends over the armed forces. In some 
cases (but not all), the military includes the direct participation of citizens as 
Bürger in Uniform,21 thus representing the modern form of alignment of the 
constituted community with its statutory military. In the context of the 
democratic state, the use of the military to serve the predatory policies of the 
political elites is impossible. No civilian or military oligarchy can impose itself 
because the state is under multiple forms of checks and balances.  
Against the background of such a state typology, it is important to realise 
that ‘the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends 
of policy as determined by civilian authority’,22 which is often dubbed as the 
‘Huntingtonian’ model of objective civilian control over the military, has 
imposed itself only recently in the West, whereas historical reality varies from 
case to case and from period to period. The yet more demanding concept of 
‘democratic control of the armed forces’ has achieved even less universal 
recognition, although it has been a core aim of state-building activities carried 
out by the international community for more than a decade.23  
 
 
                                                             
20 Under favourable economic conditions, this state will become a welfare state, Offe, 
Claus (2001), Staat, Demokratie und Krieg, in Joas, Hans, Lehrbuch der Soziologie Campus, 
Frankfurt/Main, p.417 
21 Slogan of the German Bundeswehr: citizen in uniform 
22 Huntington, Samuel P (1957), The Soldier and the State; the Theory and Politics of 
Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA see also Feaver, Peter D 
(1996), The Civil-Military Problematique: Huntington, Janowitz and the Question of Civilian 
Control, Armed Forces & Society, 23, 2, 149-178 
23 On democratic control and security sector reform (SSR) see Cawthra, Gavin and 
Robin Luckham (2003), Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security 
Establishments in Transitional Democracies, Zed Books, London; New York; from a 




1.2 State Formation Versus State-building 
The relevance and the role of the state have had a come-back in 
academic literature as well as in policy programmes over the past two 
decades, driven by the peaceful or violent disintegration, emergence, re-
emergence or reconstruction of states that has accompanied the end of the 
Cold War.24 A broad range of themes has been addressed in that context, 
including such key questions as whether the state kept any relevance at all in 
an increasingly globalising world25 and what kinds of ‘public goods’ should be 
provided by the state as opposed to goods that would be better generated by 
the private sector, sub-state public collectives, or supra-regional organisations. 
Much of that literature, however, employs a static treatment of the state 
concept, implicitly taking the accomplished Weberian state as an immutable 
reality. A dynamic perspective does exist in the literature discussing the future 
of states, for example in the context of a gradually integrating European Union 
or in a globalised economy.26 However, the same dynamic approach is mostly 
absent from the literature on failed/failing/fragile states, in other words, those 
that have not yet attained the ‘Weberian minimum’. An exception is found in a 
relatively new stream of literature depicting developments at play in such 
states as ‘multi-layered governance’ or ‘hybrid state-building’.27 However, even 
                                                             
24 Pioneer work was already done in the mid-1980s, see Evans, Peter B, et al. (1985), 
Bringing the State Back In, Cambridge University Press Cambridge 
25 See for example Mann, Michael (1997), Has Globalization Ended the Rise of the 
Nation State?, Review of International Political Economy, 4, 3, 472-496 
26 See Busch, Andreas (2000), Unpacking the Globalisation Debate: Approaches, 
Evidence and Data, in Hay, Colin and Marsh, David, Demystifying Globalisation Macmillan, 
London, 21-45, Hay, Colin, et al. (1999), Globalisation, European Integration and the 
Persistence of European Social Models, Economic and Social Research Council, Swindon 
27 The concepts of ‘multi-layered governance’ and ‘hybrid state-building’ are promoted 
by the University of Sussex under the direction of David Leonard, the Research Centre of 
Potsdam, Berlin-based Universities, and the SWP, see for instance Fischer, Martina and 
Beatrix Schmelzle (2009), Building Peace in the Absence of States: Challenging the Discourse 
on State Failure, Berghof Research Center, Berlin, p.8; see also Mehler (2009); Vlassenroot, 
Koen and Timothy Raeymaekers (2005), The Formation of Centres of Profit, Power and 
Protection: Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern DR Congo, Centre of African Studies, 
University of Copenhagen, Copenhagen; Jackson, Paul (2003), Warlords as Alternative Forms 
of Governance Systems, Small Wars and Insurgencies 14, 2, 131-150 
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if this literature is considered as a useful analytical tool by some, it has failed to 
gain political traction, especially in the security domain.28 Further, although it 
does adopt a dynamic perspective of the future of fragile states, it fails to 
analyse the roots of the present situation and the policy dilemmas that context 
creates. In other words, the existing literature lacks historical depth.  
The present research aims to fill this lack of historical depth by 
introducing an important distinction between the concepts of ‘state formation’ 
and ‘state-building’. State formation is a long, incremental, non-directed, and 
rather ‘organic’ development. It is not a single long-term event, nor a 
predictable uni-linear process. Rather, state formation ‘happened’ and could 
only be recognised retroactively, in a historical perspective. As Charles Tilly 
has concluded from his masterly analysis of the emergence and consolidation 
of European states, and Victoria Tin-Bor Hui has confirmed by applying the 
Tillian methodology to the case of China, there is ‘no single standard process 
each state passed through’ to achieve its existence as a sovereign political 
entity.29 Besides, the outcome of this process was in no case a foregone 
conclusion: as Tilly demonstrates, the history of state formation is also largely 
the history of state-disappearance. Historically, the ability or inability of political 
rulers to take ‘state-strengthening’ measures, to use Tin-Bor’s terminology, 
was crucial in determining which entities aspiring to sovereignty would actually 
survive. Those that yielded too many ‘state-weakening’ policies were doomed 
to disappear.30 In a context in which, to paraphrase once again Tilly, state-
                                                             
28 Recommendations made in 2011 by a group of scholars to the European Union to 
consider non-state actors as important security providers in its SSR programmes have 
reportedly met a lot of scepticism 
29 For the quote see Tilly, Charles (1992), Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 
990-1990, Wiley-Blackwell, Bognor Regis, p.194; for the concept see Tilly (1992) and Tin-Bor 
Hui, Victoria (2005), War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
30 Tin-Bor Hui (2005), pp.50f; most states have disappeared, and only the successful 
survivors are being looked at. The 400 states of 15
th
 century Germany are covered by four 
states in 2013, for a discussion see Herbst, Jeffrey (2004), Lets them Fail: State Failure in 
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making was war-making, the constitution of a professional, increasingly 
organised, centralised and permanent military was a core ‘state-strengthening’ 
measure.31  
By contrast, state-building is a purposeful, deliberate operation, driven by 
a plan, usually following strict rules and sequencing, and aiming to achieve a 
desired specific outcome. Attempts at state-building only became possible 
once the ‘basic’ Weberian model had been sufficiently stabilised, in other 
words, as of the late 19th century. This distinction between state formation and 
state-building is all important in the analysis of the African military and its 
relationship to the state. In the former, there is a concomitant organic 
development of the state and its military in a process of mutual consolidation, 
whereas in the latter, the adjustment must be purposeful and pursued with 
great care so that by strengthening themselves, the state and the military do 
not undermine each other.  
On the face of it, it looked evident that the relationship between war and 
the weakness of states could be transposed to analyse post-1990 
developments in African (and other) states. This led to prolific discussions, the 
common denominator of which was to associate state ‘collapse’ or ‘failure’ with 
conflict and post-conflict situations,32 understandably so, because this failure or 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Theory and Practice, in Rotberg, Robert I, When States Fail Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, pp.302-318, and Davis, Norman (2012), Vanished Kingdoms, Penguin Books, 
London 
31 See Tilly (1985) 
32 Ayoob, Mohammed (2007), State Making, State Breaking, and State Failure, in 
Crocker, Chester A, Leashing the Dogs of War United Institute of Peace Press, Washington 
DC, ; Egnell, Robert and Peter Halden (2009), Laudable, Ahistorical and Overambitious: 
Security Sector Reform Meets State Formation Theory, Conflict, Security and Development, 9, 
1, 27-54; Fukuyama, Francis (2004), State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st 
Century, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY; Bates, Robert H. (2008), When things fell apart : 
state failure in late-century Africa, Cambridge University Press, New York; Clapham, 
Christopher S (2002), The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World, Development and 
Change, 33, 5, 775-795; Milliken, J and K Krause (2002), State Failure, State Collapse, and 
State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies, Development and Change, 33, 5, 
753-774; Reno, W. (2006), Congo: from state collapse to 'absolutism', to state failure, Third 
World Quarterly, 27, 1, 43-56; Trotha, Trutz von (2000), Die Zukunft liegt in Afrika. Vom Zerfall 
des Staates, von der Vorherrschaft der konzentrischen Ordnung und vom Aufstieg der 
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collapse turned into a crucial security issue on the international agenda in the 
1990s. We shall argue, however, that what looks like ‘state failure’ in the 
context of armed conflict is rather a symptom of unfinished state-building, 
representing the collapse of an institutionalised sinecure administration of 
society. Indeed, a closer look at the Central African region shows that countries 
do not necessarily need armed conflict to crumble.33 Instead of engaging in 
state-strengthening policies, as they were described by Victoria Tin-Bor Hui, 
Central African states remain mired in state-weakening measures, engaged in 
a process of (non-directed) state formation, which presents both similarities 
with and differences from the experience of more ancient European and Asian 
states.34  
1.3 The Army and the State 
An understanding of the role and place of the military in different kinds of 
states is essential as a prerequisite to judge different levels of African 
statehood and military professionalism. The military existed before states took 
shape, and it was centrally involved in the formation of states. In the course of 
this formation, the military mutated fittingly. The process of state formation, as 
will be demonstrated, must therefore concurrently be thought of as one of 
‘military-formation’. This does not mean that all states followed a uniform 
development pattern: warfare and bureaucratisation are highly complex 
processes involving rational and irrational motivations, ethically sophisticated 
as well as narrow-minded objectives, and a variety of levels of ambition. 
However, in all convolutions of intention and reason the ‘manager of, or 
                                                                                                                                                                                
Parastaatlichkeit, Leviathan, 28, 2, 253-279; Yannis, A (2002), State Collapse and its 
Implications for PeaceBuilding and Reconstruction, Development and Change, 33, 5, 817-835; 
Zartman, William I (1995), Collapsed States: the Disintegration and Restoration of Legitimate 
Authority, Lynne Rienner, Boulder & London 
33 For the Cameroonian example see ICG (2010a), Cameroon: Fragile State?, Africa 
Report, 160  
34 Tin-Bor Hui (2005), pp.142ff 
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specialist in, violence’ – which is the military – remains at the centre of political 
and social gravity.35  
Historically, state formation and military formation went hand in hand until 
the current combination between the Weberian rational legal state and its loyal 
professional army was achieved. In this process, the military and the state 
were invariably uni-ovular twins in their successive forms and levels of 
materialisation. Thus the military could only become the organised, centralised 
and undisputed holder of the means of coercion when the state had reached 
an accomplished Weberian form. Only from that moment on could it qualify as 
an army. It is therefore a fundamental premise of this research that, to have a 
military in the shape of a ‘proper’ army, a state must at least be a Weberian, 
directly-ruled sovereign political entity.36 
Whilst it is important to recognise – including for the study of Central 
Africa – that other forms of non-statutory military formations, including tribal or 
regional militias, play a functional and a social role vis-à-vis the community 
they are part of,37 they cannot qualify as armies as they are either opposed by 
the state or only temporarily tolerated.
38
 Should such armed formations, in 
supporting the conquest of state institutions by a group hostile to the power 
                                                             
35 Reno, William (2000), Shadow States and the Political Economy of Civil Wars, in 
Berdal, Mats R and Malone, David, Greed and Grievance Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 43-68, 
pp.457f: for the concept ‘manager of violence’ see also Huntington (1957), p.15, who originally 
took it from Lasswell, Harold (1941), The Garrison State and Specialists on Violence, American 
Journal of Sociology, 46, January, 455-468, pp.457f 
36 The English language unfortunately does not allow for the distinction between ‘army’ 
in the generic sense of the entire armed forces and ‘army’ as a service distinct from the air 
force or the navy. Unless otherwise indicated, we shall use the term in its generic sense 
37 For a discussion of these functions see Gow, James (1992), Legitimacy and the 
Military, The Yugoslav Crisis, Pinter Publishers, London, chapter 2. See also Bratton, Michael 
(2007), Formal Versus Informal Institutions in Africa, Journal of Democracy, 18, 3, 96-110 p.98 
38 For this reason Robin Luckham has pointed out that SSR must go beyond the 
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calculation, see Luckham, Robin (2004), Military Withdrawal from Politics in Africa Revisited, in 
Kieh, George Klay and Ogaba, Agbese Pita, The Military and Politica in Africa Ashgate, 
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holders, be successful – a development not unknown in Central Africa39 – they 
may then become the core of the new army. However, until their ‘political 
community’ of reference has achieved control of the state, they remain a non-
statutory military. 
For Central Africa this has deep implications. If, indeed, state-building in 
the region has only produced ‘quasi-states’, then, by putting the military in 
relation to the institutional configuration of the state to which it belongs, one is 
likely to come to the conclusion that the military has reached no more than the 
stage of a ‘quasi-army’. In such a condition civil-military relations remain 
relations between armed groups and non-armed sections of society. They may 
also become simply a mode of insertion of uniformed individuals in prevailing 
informal networks of personal and group relationships, as we shall analyse 
below. 
1.4 Civil-military Relations Theory and its Relevance to 
Africa 
Any discussion of civil-military relations in Central Africa must begin with 
the consideration that the African military remains a little studied subject 
overall, with gaps in research analysis being even more pronounced for the 
non-English (mostly Francophone and Lusophone) worlds. As regards 
geographic coverage, for years, English language publications on Central 
Africa remained restricted to translations from French and Flemish studies, 
with little research being carried out in the English speaking world, with the 
exceptions of a 1982 analysis of French military influence on francophone 
Africa by Robin Luckham and of Patrick Manning’s broad overview of a century 
                                                             
39 Special cases, such as the two competing armies of Rwanda and the Congolese FAZ 
and AFPL, will be dealt with in depth in the relevant case study  
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of francophone African history.40 In France, Central Africa is a research area 
only with regard to the questionable role La Françafrique plays in national 
foreign policy.41 The military discussed in this context is the French national 
one as far as it is involved in African domestic politics. Belgian research is 
limited to its former African colony (Congo) and protectorates (Rwanda, 
Burundi), through area research conducted by the Congo Museum in Tervuren 
and the Congo Research network centred at Leuven University.42 
In terms of substance, some anthropological work on the pre-colonial 
warrior cultures of Anglophone Africa is available,43 as well as a number of 
studies on the relevance of colonial campaigns in French historiography44 and 
some historical accounts dedicated to African warfare at the tactical level,45 
leading, in the more recent period, to a few – usually pessimistic – 
assessments of the military value of African armed forces today.46 However, it 
is only as of the mid-1980s, with a large range of works published in response 
to a long decade of coups d’état stretching from the late 1970s to the early 
1990s,47 that authors have begun approaching African military history in a 
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‘Delbrückian manner’, connecting the military history to political, and social 
history.48 This literature has been valuable in that it attempted for the first time 
to cast a light on the relationship between the military and the civilian power in 
Africa. However, it never reached the crux of the matter as most of the works 
were based on the Huntington premise that those two powers constitute 
distinct realms, whereas they do not in the African reality as we shall 
demonstrate below.  
The Rwandan genocide and the two Congo Wars stretching from 1996 to 
2003 have triggered a resurgence of research on the part of francophone 
Central Africa that overlaps with the Great Lakes region. This research, carried 
out for a large part by Belgian and Dutch scholars, has yielded valuable 
empirical findings and clues on armed groups and the questionable role of 
statutory forces in the DRC.49 However, this research, as well as a large range 
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of ‘policy studies’ meant to provide much needed advice to practitioners, 
remains rather narrow in nature and does not relate developments in the field 
to a broader historical analysis of Congolese state formation. By contrast with 
the DRC, the Rwandese military has been the subject of little dedicated 
research, despite the hundreds of books and articles on inter-ethnic relations 
published after the genocide.50 Cameroon, the third country to be covered by 
the present study, is part of a huge sub-region of (mostly) Francophone Central 
Africa – stretching north to south from the Chad/Libyan border to the Zambezi 
River and east to west from Burundi to the Atlantic Ocean – that remains 
utterly under-researched. A (small) number of books in English or French 
works do claim to cover ‘Francophone Africa’, in their research on social and 
political developments51 or coups d’état,52 the role of the military in business,53 
and, more recently, post-conflict security sector reform.54 However, in all of 
these cases, research bears exclusively or overwhelmingly on West Africa; the 
former French Congo, Chad, Centrafrique, Gabon and Cameroon, actually 
constituting the bigger part of Central Africa, remained in a blind spot.55 This 
pattern is part of a broader neglect of Francophone and Central Africa in social 
research.56  
The bulk of the literature on the African military – and in this, there is no 
difference between Francophone and Anglophone approaches – addresses its 
                                                             
50 Part of this gap is currently being filled by the research of Frank Rusagara for his 
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professional and sociological role through the lens of ‘Huntingtonian style’ civil-
military relations (CMR) theory.57 This was true of the 1980s and 1990s 
literature on coups d’état. This remains largely true of more recent, security 
sector reform (SSR)-related work. An otherwise excellent study such as Naison 
Ngoma’s ‘CMR in Africa: Unchartered Waters', seems to suffer from a difficulty 
in explaining why the African military hardly resembles ‘Huntingtonian style’ 
constructs and is searching for a way to achieve a Western style military in 
Africa.58 Similarly, the most recent major study on CMR, which includes a 
chapter on three Anglophone African countries (Botswana, Ghana and 
Tanzania), focusses on civilian control of a separate military world.59  
In Huntingtonian theory, as developed by the master himself in his 
seminal work60 or subsequently refined by other scholars, the military appears 
as a separate corporate group, distinct from the civilian world, and civilian 
control or oversight of the military becomes the core problem to address. The 
boundary between the civil and military realms forms the base of CMR. As 
James Gow puts it, ‘this boundary is contained in the concept itself, and it 
provides for the legitimacy of the military’.61 The ‘Huntingtonian doctrine’ of 
civilian control, based on the theory, derives from this understanding, including 
nuances that were suggested by other scholars such as Morris Janowitz, 
Samuel Finer, Peter Feaver, and more recently Rebecca Schiff.62 To put it in 
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simple terms, all of them agree, and for most cases adequately so, that the 
military must be strong enough to do what civilians want it to do and sufficiently 
obedient to do nothing else. They all define the military as one element of the 
state, but one supposed to implement rather than formulate security policy.63  
Whereas Samuel Huntington set the institutional model for CMR, Morris 
Janowitz and Peter Feaver stressed the sociological perspective, emphasising 
the attitude of the individual performing military service as opposed to the 
institutional component, and the element of agency in the relationship between 
the soldier and the political leader. According to them, institutions can only 
ensure loyalty if the individual officer adopts loyalty as a core value.64 All 
authors agree on the elementary division between the civilian and the military 
realms. Rebecca Schiff, seemingly departing from this classic approach, 
actually maintains it by negating the existence of a bipolar relationship and 
proposing a tripolar one instead. Her model adds one more actor to the 
scenery, to differentiate the civilian political elite, the military, and the citizenry 
as distinct actors. As we shall see below, had she added a further 
differentiation between the officer corps and the rank and file, she would have 
come close to the Central African reality. Unfortunately her broad view from the 
Americas – over Israel, India and Pakistan – did not address the African 
continent.65  
                                                                                                                                                                                
Professional Soldier: A Social And Political Portrait, Free Press of Glencoe, New York; Schiff, 
Rebecca L (2008), The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military 
Relations, Routledge, New York 
63 Houngnikpo, Mathurin C (2012), Africa’s Militaries: A Missing Link in Democratic 
Transitions, Africa Security Brief, 17, p.4 
64 A variant of civil-military integration was offered for the case of former communist 
countries by authors such as Herspring, Dale R (1978), Civil-Military Relations in Communist 
Systems, Westview, Boulder, and Kolkowicz, Roman and Andrzej Korbonski (1982), Soldiers, 
Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies, 
G. Allen & Unwin, London 
65 Ben Meir, Yehuda (1995), Civil Military Relations in Israel, Columbia University 
Press, New York, tried to demonstrate an overlap between the two spheres using the example 
of Israel, where the division may blur but still exists 
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The problem with ‘Huntingtonian type approaches’ for the analysis of 
Africa lies in the underlying assumption of a separation between civilian and 
military actors. Such a separation, as correct as it is for much of the world, is 
neither part of African military doctrine, nor its practice, and nor is a part of the 
self-perception of most African soldiers. The fact that the African military 
publicly claims to adhere to the ‘Huntingtonian’ model obscures the situation. 
Actually, the civil-military division underpinning analyses of the relationship of 
the military to political power holders has little relevance in Africa, where other 
kinds of loyalties and fault lines matter and where the real place of the military 
within the community and the state is far from what it appears to be. This 
problématique is indirectly addressed in the literature on neopatrimonial and 
clientelist structures, where soldiers are occasionally mentioned as examples 
of façade statehood and alternative hierarchical arrangements. The strong 
stand of high ranking officers in patron-client relations within the military has for 
example been described by Alex Weingrod66 and others, who see patronage 
networks as informal structures running parallel to the hierarchical structure.67 
However, this work will rather follow a path initiated by scholars such as 
Shmuel Eisenstadt, who hesitate to recognise patron-client relations as types 
of social organisation, being more inclined to see them as ways to manage the 
flow of resources and of interpersonal interaction and exchanges in society.68 
Eisenstadt’s analysis, however, is not specific to the military.  
                                                             
66 Weingrod, Alex (1968), Patrons, Patronage, and Political Parties, Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 7, 4, 377-400 
67 Austen, Ralph A and Jonathan Derrick (1999), Middlemen of the Cameroon Rivers: 
The Duala and their Hinterland, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; see also Haskin, 
Jeanne M (2005), The Tragic State of the Congo: From Decolonization to Dictatorship, Algora 
Publishing, New York and Chrétien, Jean-Pierre (1982), Féodalité ou féodalisation du Burundi 
sous le mandat belge, in Vansina, Jan, Études Africaines offertes à Henri Brunschwig EHESS, 
Paris,  
68 Eisenstadt, Shmuel N and Louis Roniger (1980), Patron-Client Relations as a Model 
of Structuring Social Exchange, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 22, 1, 42-77 
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Seen in this light, the three-digit number of successful or failed coups 
d’état on the continent in the last 50 years does not indicate a rivalry between 
the civilian part of the elite and its military peers, but that it is the expression of 
a constant intra-elite struggle for power and wealth.69 If military takeovers 
hardly ever produced military regimes in Africa, it is because most juntas had a 
strong civilian component. Actually, many of those who wore military uniforms 
as they acceded to power swapped them for civilian clothes and titles at a later 
date, or combined civilian and military titles and uniforms, or even alternated 
between them according to needs and expediency.70 Soldiers were pursuing 
their interests, but they had allies as well as opponents, both within and without 
the military. Authoritarianism in Africa was based on an intra-elite ‘civilian-
military alliance’.71 In sum, coups d’état were and are the expression of intra-
elite struggles, not of a civil-military standoff.72 Further, the dominant pattern at 
the top is reproduced at the bottom of the social ladder where rank and file 
soldiers constitute a kind of ‘Lumpenmilitariat’, which is often sociologically 
closer to the ‘Lumpenproletariat’ from which it stems than to its commanding 
officers.
73
 Loyalties, therefore, do not go primarily to the army corps, but to 
                                                             
69 Andreas Mehler describes this as the fundamental African ‘insecurity trap’, see 
Mehler, Andreas (2008), Breaking the “Insecurity Trap”? How Violence and Counter-violence 
are Perpetuated in Elite Power Struggles, GIGA Working Paper Series, Hamburg  
70 For Central African examples, Pierre Nkurunziza of Burundi, Denis Sassou-Nguesso 
of Congo Brazzaville, François Bozizé of CAR and Idriss Déby Itno of Chad swiftly change 
between Western suits, folkloristic head gear, and uniforms 
71 Thiriot, Celine La place des militaires dans les régimes post-transition d’Afrique 
subsaharienne: la difficile resectorisation, Revue Internationale de Politique Comparee, 15, 1, 
15-34, p.17 
72 A few voices, such as Valenzuela, Camilo (1985), A Note on the Military and Social 
Science Theory, Third World Quarterly, 7, 1, 132-143, hinted at this permeability at the tip of 
the wave of coups d’état, but this stream of thought was not pursued
 
73 Lumpenmilitariat as a deduction from Marx’s Lumpenproletariat, including: 
‘vagabonds, discharged soldiers, discharged prisoners, escaped galley slaves, swindlers, 
pickpockets, tricksters, gamblers, brothel keepers, porters, beggars, in short the whole 
indefinite, disintegrated, tossed mass’, Marx, Karl (1972 (1852)), Der 18. Brumaire des Luis 
Bonaparte, Dietz Verlag, Berlin (DDR), p.161, paraphrased from the German 
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other forms of community: in this case the chain of command becomes, as will 
be explained in chapter two, a private dyadic relationship.74  
Another basic differentiation made throughout CMR thought is between 
the two roles of the military: one functional (combat) and one socio-political. As 
Mathurin Houngnikpo argues, this differentiation is only partly valid for sub-
Saharan Africa where a long lasting warrior tradition among the carriers of 
arms, both high and low, is responsible for an overlapping of the two roles 
through the non-combat functions of the military.75 Accordingly, the African 
warrior was more integrated in his community both politically and economically. 
His specialisation on the use of force did not estrange him from his people. 
This feature has a direct implication for the understanding by Africans of the 
role of their armed forces. In Central Africa, like in most other parts of the 
continent, the military is expected to fulfil core tasks in supporting economic 
development for the benefit of the (national) community.76 In addition to the 
already ambitious technical objectives of ensuring security in adverse 
conditions, the African military’s role thus extends even beyond that of Western 
regular forces. This obviously reflects a cardinally different understanding of 
the role of the military from what Western ‘Huntingtonian’ comprehension 
would allow. Consequently, the yardstick that must be applied to judge the 
                                                             
74 Bangoura, Dominique (1993), Armées et défis démocratiques en Afrique, Afrique 
2000: revue trimestrielle, January - March, 12, 111-122, p.116 
75 Houngnikpo, Mathurin C (2010), Guarding the Guardians: Civil-Military Relations and 
Democratic Governance in Africa, Ashgate, Farnham 
76 For the Congo see the Loi Organique du portant Organisation et Fonctionnement 
Des Forces Armées N° 11/012 of 11 August, an army of development ‘that contributes to the 
creation of national wealth, namely through production, and work of public interest’; the 
Rwandan Loi Fondamentale n° 11 du 1er juin 1995, defines in her preamble, p. 3, national 
reconciliation, tolerance, and solidarity in the pursuit of the re-construction and development of 
the country; in Cameroon, without reference to a law, the status as an army of development is 
the standard claim of the MoD, see l’Armée Camerounaise: un outil au service du 
développement de la nation, http://mindefdivcom.com  
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Central African armed forces against their own claims must take the measure 
of both their military professionalism and their collective social role.77 
Those key sociological features of the (Central) African military are 
compounded by contextual and policy realities, two of which are particularly 
important here. First, in francophone Central Africa, everyone who dons a 
uniform and carries a gun is indiscriminately called a homme habillé, a ‘liveried 
man’, but even if he statutorily belongs to the regular armed forces, this does 
not mean that he can perform as a soldier. And even if he is well-trained at the 
tactical level and can fight individually, this does not mean that the organised 
whole to which he belongs – the national army – can properly fulfil its 
functions.78 It is therefore important not to generalise too quickly from the 
attitude of an individual soldier to the role that the army plays in the state and 
society as a whole.  
The military’s raison d’être in Central Africa, in sum, characterised by the 
importance of individual over group relationships, the permeability of the 
civilian and military realms, and a mission that goes beyond security, is at quite 
a variance from what Huntingtonian theory would postulate. The implications of 
such a different understanding for the possibility of consolidating Weberian (or 
even democratic) forms of states in Central Africa have to be thoroughly 
investigated.  
 
                                                             
77 The prevalence of this view is reflected by the literature, see Bruneau, Thomas C. 
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2.1 Case Studies 
Three case studies will help us to understand the dynamics of state-
military development in Central African countries and the differences between 
them. They bear on the DRC (also designated in this work as ‘Congo’),79 
Cameroon and Rwanda. Those three countries have been selected as 
representing a good cross-section of situations to be encountered in the region 
as their trajectories of state formation and state-building differ substantially, as 
does the role of their military in relation to the political institutions. 
Alone among the states of francophone Central Africa, Rwanda harbours 
a pre-colonial history of both state formation that continued until the 
construction of European imperial empires of the late 19th century and of a 
professional military. As the parenthesis of colonial times and the early years of 
independence were closed by the 1994 genocide, the military has assumed a 
key role in Rwanda’s modern state-building, largely combining political and 
security functions in the hands of the same elites. 
At the other end of the spectrum, state-building has been a much more 
untidy process in the Congo, a country that had no pre-colonial history of state 
formation. Fifty years after independence, the DRC remains the symbol of a 
‘fragile state’, kept in intensive care by the international community for that 
reason. It is only a period of about half of the years under the reign of 
President Mobutu that Congolese veterans describe with nostalgic dazzlement 
and pride as a ‘Golden Age’ of their military. Events in the East of the country 
since the mid-1990s have demonstrated how tenuous a process military 
                                                             
79 As the country has changed names several times since independence, the term 
‘Congo’ will be used to refer to characteristics or developments that are not specific to a 
particular phase of its history. Otherwise the respective names of the period under discussion 
will be used (ex. DRC, Zaïre). The DRC is not to be confused with the much smaller Congo on 
the northern bank of the river, the Republic of Congo 
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formation remains in the Congo. A large number of diverse military actors have 
in the meantime played a variety of roles from keepers of the regime to 
sources of outright chaos in the country.  
Cameroon represents yet a third kind of configuration, sharing Congo’s 
absence of pre-colonial state experience but, like Rwanda, boasting an 
uncontested ‘national army’, at least since the early 1970s. Its relative stability 
since independence appears to indicate success in its state-building 
endeavour, although some analysts caution against too optimistic an 
assessment.80 Closest in appearance to the ‘Huntingtonian model’ as regards 
its structures and professionalism, the Cameroonian armed forces have 
nevertheless been subordinated to the political leadership in a significantly 
different way from what Western standard civil-military theory would suggest. 
2.2 A Two-pillar Approach  
War Studies is by nature interdisciplinary. The present study is no 
exception, drawing in particular on two branches of knowledge: history and 
political sociology. 
The historical foundation of the approach is based on one essential 
distinction made above between state formation and state-building. As Charles 
Tilly has demonstrated, and scholars like Victoria Tin-Bor have confirmed, 
there is no single path to the creation, disappearance and shape of states. 
There are, however, two interdependent constants in the process of state 
formation, which lie in the ability of the political leadership to respond to 
external and internal threats by adopting gradually cumulative ‘state 
strengthening’ measures, and in their ability to muster for that purpose a more 
and more coherent, unified, responsive and obedient military. The external 
                                                             
80 ICG (2010a); ICG (2010b), Cameroon: the Dangers of a Fracturing Regime, Africa 
Report, 161, np 
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dimension has taken the form of militarisation and conquest; the internal one 
that of domestic administration and institution-building. The same two 
parameters will be used to analyse the development of Central African state 
systems and their military. 
The approach in terms of political sociology is based on two intellectual 
currents. The first one is characterised by a now fairly large body of literature 
describing the dynamics of social and political relations in African states as 
‘patronage systems’, where a person’s ability to access a job, money, favours 
and consideration is not due to his or her performance in a particular art or 
trade according to objective standards, but on his or her loyalty to the ‘chief’ 
who decides on promotions and demotions, rewards and punishments.81 The 
system is steered from the top, but is cascaded at each level of society, each 
person being at the same time the client of someone and the patron of others, 
down to the lowest level. The impact of this politico-cultural context on military 
ethics and professionalism will, in most cases, be determinant in explaining the 
army’s relationship to the political authority.  
The second current is that branch of political sociology which, on the 
basis of the pioneer work done by Almond and Verba immediately after World 
War II,82 has convincingly demonstrated the importance of political culture in 
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Company, Boston,see also Lezhnev, Sasha (2011), Facts and Opportunities on Conflict 
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explaining collective political behaviour. Political culture is defined by Lucien 
Pye as a steady and persistent pattern of conduct to which all social actors are 
highly attuned. According to him it represents a  
 
set of attitudes, beliefs and sentiments, which give order and meaning to a 
political process and which provide the underlying assumptions and rules 
that govern behaviour in the political system.83  
 
Authors such as Ian Taylor and Paul Williams, but in particular Ali Mazrui, 
have demonstrated the resilience of politico-cultural patterns which 
simultaneously result from and maintain a very strongly hierarchic and 
exclusionist political culture among African elites.84 Having said this, Mazrui 
has in the same breath cautioned against interpretations suggesting that 
actors’ behaviour only responded to cultural path dependencies,85 highlighting 
instead the cross-cultural effects of colonialism on post-colonial political culture 
and suggesting that the two heritages had merged into something new, 
negating cultural determinism in the course.86 Hence, it would be thoroughly 
erroneous, according to Pierre Bourdieu, to reduce the leaders’ choices of their 
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habitus merely in terms of rational strategy and cynical calculation.87 Political 
culture is as much an outcome of continuity as it is a result of political learning. 
Political learning happens at the individual level as socialisation and at 
collective level as institutional adaptation.  
 
2.3 Epistemological Boundaries  
 
History is a clock that people use to tell the political and cultural time of the 
day; where they have been, what they have been, what they are [and] 
where they still must go and what they still must be.88 
 
The linear approach of history encapsulated in this often quoted image by 
John Hendrik Clarke, the bedrock of modernisation theories, endeavours to 
measure political development along a linear model of development, which is 
chronologically ordered and knows starting points and logical endings. 
However, it remains a model, comfortably attuned to the human desire to 
simplify the understanding of one’s intricate politico-cultural milieu, but which 
may block sight of a reality comprising immense variability. As soon as such 
problematic simplification becomes the guiding star of decision-making, it risks 
narrowing the observer’s thought processes rather than opening his/her mind 
to broader and deeper understanding. If everything is perceived as happening 
in a natural sequence, everything must have an origin, a relative status, and an 
aim. The origin is then explained by causality: everything that ever had the 
slightest impact on a certain outcome must have been causal to it. The status 
is what one arbitrarily declares to exist relative to one’s aims, suggesting that a 
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final result has not yet materialised; and the result only exists in the form of 
uncertain predictions, or – for past events – with the benefit of hindsight. 
Predictions rarely come true if they are specific, hindsight always knows best, 
and Chronos becomes the prison guard of imagination. 
Modernisation theorists, starting from Karl Marx, had a point as long as 
economic, political, and cultural change appeared to proceed in concert, and 
as long as this hypothesis was not universally tested. The advent of 
increasingly complex post-industrial societies in the West and the spread of a 
post-modern political culture have already largely undermined the linkage 
between the economic infrastructure and the political superstructure at the 
heart of the theory. African developments query the theory even more as the 
region has experienced a delay in the development of modern states relative to 
other parts of the world that had suffered from comparable difficulties when the 
states there emerged from colonial rule.89  
In contrast to modernisation theories, this thesis starts from the 
assumption and demonstration that the reality on the ground may not represent 
a mere step of development on a known road towards a pre-defined ‘end of 
history’.90 Instead, an assessment of African affairs should rest on a detailed 
collection and analysis of empirical observations of what we find on the ground 
– not what we should expect to find from a liberal-democratic perspective.91 
This approach will enable us to demonstrate the result of the ‘persistence’ or, 
depending on the standpoint adopted, of the ‘resilience’ of cultural values in 
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spite of political and economic changing environments.92 Therefore, if 
modernisation occurs, this will be a severely limited process because the 
‘broad cultural heritage of a society leaves an imprint on values that endures’ 
despite modernisation.93  
Like Mazrui, this dissertation will adopt a ‘non-essentialist’ view of political 
culture, in other words, it considers (political) cultures as changeable over time 
and largely permeable to one another. It is indeed undeniable that African 
political culture as it is observable today is a hybrid of traditional, specifically 
local forms of political cultures and of Western political culture transmitted 
initially by colonialism and increasingly by the globalisation of communications. 
This also means that different groups in African societies will be more or less 
deeply affected by changes in value systems, or even that the same groups – 
or even the same individuals – can be affected at one level but not at others. 
This may result in patterns of behaviour that may seem schizophrenic for 
outside observers, but that are well-captured in the Blochian concept of ‘non-
simultaneity’.94 Non-simultaneity applies both to inter-subjective relations 
between individuals and to relations between polities. It is a condition that 
transcends political reality, even if often unnoticed. Accordingly, individual or 
communities’ behaviour can respond to a pre-modern rationale, at one 
particular moment, and to a modern or post-modern one a moment later, 
without them perceiving this as an aberration. It can also mean that some 
communities on a particular territory remain entirely impermeable to modern 
ideas, whereas others embrace at least some features of modernity. This of 
course opens the question of whether Western ideas of modernity are the only 
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and universally valid ones. If a coexistence of different modules of political 
agency is possible, then there is a possibility that alternative manifestations of 
modernity may exist in parallel. In this study, we shall therefore refrain from 
suggesting, as Robert Cooper did in a hotly debated piece in 2002, that some 
states are forever trapped in their situation as ‘failed States‘, that others have 
become ‘modern states’ but can transform no more, and that yet others have 
safely reached the stage of ‘postmodern states’.95 
To give appropriate consideration to this reality, this work reflects political 
history as a system of modules that may be found in a potentially infinite range 
of combinations. If anything, a more modular approach to history enables 
analysts to deconstruct social configurations as the results of deliberate 
discreet choices of their target communities. From there, it is actually 
straightforward to accept that Early Modern forms of warfare can coincide with 
the use of satellite phones and machine guns. In this understanding, the so-
called ‘New Wars’ in Africa are actually no more than Early Modern forms of 
warfare transplanted in a late 20th - early 21st century context.96 This down-to-
earth comprehension needs to be translated into politico-historical analysis, 
demonstrating that pre-Cleisthenesian political culture can be combined with a 
neo-patrimonial political order and post-modern liberal ideology.97 In 
geographic areas that do not have functioning states or never had them, one 
cannot assume that there is an ‘order’ in its Western specific sense.  
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Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass, p.120. A linear view of history resulted in a 
misinterpretation of such wars as ‘New Wars’, see for a discussion Ellis, Stephen (2003), The 
Old Roots of Africa’s New Wars, Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 2, np; Newman, 
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African states, in this context, may nevertheless be judged by the 
standards they have set for themselves. Via their original demand for 
membership in the United Nations and their more recent espousal of the 
international state-building agenda, all of them, including Central African ones, 
have confirmed their claim to be, or at least their desire to become, at minimum 
Weberian states. They can therefore be held accountable to the modern state 
standards.98 At declaratory level, African states have taken a further important 
step in 2007 by adopting the landmark ‘African Charter on Democracy, 
Elections and Governance’, which entails a binding commitment to the 
principle of democratic statehood.99 Many of them, however, have yet to 
transform this political engagement into a legal commitment.100 The 
declaration, therefore, provides us with a benchmark, but one to be used 
cautiously.101  
In this study, the use of norms related to the democratic state and the 
characteristics of civil-military relations will therefore be used as an analytical, 
rather than a normative tool, taking into account the evolving reality of the 
African continent. Examining how far the aspirational commitment to the 
democratic state has been transformed into practice will enable us to more 
closely reflect the reality of Central Africa.  
 
 
                                                             
98 See Ayoob, Mohammed (1995), Third World Security Predicament, State Making, 
Regional Conflict, and the International System, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, p.3 
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2.4 Access to and Interpretation of Sources  
Access to resources for the present research has been a challenge. As 
discussed above (section 1.4), studies on the military in Francophone Central 
Africa are few and far between. Material had to be extracted piecemeal in 
tangential fields such as area studies and recent policy work on SSR. Primary 
data for the countries chosen for this study were similarly scarce and difficult to 
access, given the sensitivity of the subject. Written and systematically ordered 
material on the colonial, the immediate post-independence period and, in some 
cases, even more recent times is only available in archives in France and 
Belgium, the former colonial powers who are still the key security partners of 
the respective countries. The Archives militaires in Château de Vincennes and 
the Foreign Ministry Archives in Brussels have been systematically exploited.  
Research in Cameroon yielded a few sources held by the National 
Archives and to the extent practical the University II in Yaoundé, but no 
additional official archives since the Cameroonian Ministry of Defence does not 
hold historic or organisational documentation – or at least the latter is not 
accessible.
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 Neither Rwanda nor the DRC could provide significant official 
sources as, in the former, much of the archives were deliberately destroyed by 
the retreating governmental forces in 1994 and, in the latter, the two great 
lootings of 1991 and 1993 liquidated many of the few documents that had been 
collected, in a more or less systematic way, after 1960.  
In the three countries themselves, research therefore had to rely primarily 
on interviews with competent persons, many of them directly involved. For 
instance military or former military personnel or police officers, civilian 
authorities in security ministries, parliamentarians, Western and international 
                                                             
102 Officially there is one officer in charge of historic documentation, located in the MoD 




military and conflict advisors, and, to the extent possible, members of local 
communities. Other interviews were carried out with local academics in the 
three countries. Semi-structured interview techniques were used. All interviews 
were both a tool for oral information gathering and for the collection of 
unpublished written sources, some of them belonging to the grey literature not 
authenticated by the post-1994 regime, others being private papers, and still 
others official documents that had ended up in private hands. A lack of reliable 
written documentation could thus fortunately be compensated for by the fact 
that many actors and eye witnesses from as far back as the late colonial period 
are still alive. In the case of Cameroon especially it was fortunate for my 
research that founding members of the national armed forces were still in 
commanding positions, or had just retired. In the case of Rwanda and the 
Congo the interviewees were identified and met both in Europe and in the 
country itself.  
The difficulty in carrying out such research includes the fact that relevant 
interviewees are not always easy to identify. Beyond the practical difficulty of 
detecting who the actors are, and of contacting them, lies the question of their 
representativeness, as some may have an interest in underplaying or, on the 
contrary, overplaying their role in particular circumstances. In practice, the so-
called ‘snowball technique’ was used, in other words, the identification of as 
diverse a range of key persons as possible representing different categories of 
interviewees or presumably different perspectives as points of entry, who could 
then recommend other interviewees and help establish contact.103 The method 
is clearly qualitative, its success hinging on a patient approach very much 
                                                             
103 On the ‘snowball technique’ see Cohen, Nissim and Tamar Arieli (2011), Field 
Research in Conflict Environments: Methodological Challenges and Snowball Sampling, 
Journal of Peace Research, 48, 4, 423-435; Fujii, Lee Ann (2010), Shades of Truth and Lies: 
Interpreting Testimonies of War and Violence, Journal of Peace Research, 47, 2, 231-241; on 
methodological constraints see Faugier, Jean and Mary Sargeant (1997), Sampling Hard to 
Reach Populations, US National Library of Medicine, 26, 790-797, especially pp.793-795 
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attuned to confidence-building. This was made possible by the fact that the 
author was able to enjoy an extensive stay in Central Africa. As other 
researchers working in sensitive environments have demonstrated, a highly 
personalised approach is sometimes the only way to gain access to crucial 
actors who would have remained out of reach via official channels.104 This 
approach is very helpful in mitigating the high levels of secrecy and political 
suspicion that may cause distrust of the researcher in such environments. As 
this author experienced repeatedly, the researcher often then becomes, as 
described by Daniel Bar-Tal, a welcome psychological ‘valve’ for the 
expression of long subdued grievances or too long held secrets.105  
One risk often identified with the snowball approach is that the researcher 
may become the prisoner of the perspective of a particular ‘clique’, introducing 
a bias in his/her findings. This risk is particularly high in such conflict-ridden 
societies as those of Central Africa. It was mitigated in the present case by 
dedicated efforts to cover as broad a spectrum of perspectives as possible, 
including, for example, for Rwanda, both governmental representatives in 
Kigali and Europe-based oppositional groups or, for the DRC, both the 
European-based diaspora and Defence Ministry officials in Kinshasa. In the 
case of Rwanda, moreover, informing both sides of contacts with the other (in 
general terms) was essential in building trust. Without such openness contact 
would have immediately broken down, even if this made the initial moments of 
each interview more difficult. In terms of substance, in the case of Rwanda, the 
difficulty was almost the opposite of that usually feared from critics of the 
snowball technique: whether among local or international actors, views remain 
                                                             
104 In one case, it was possible to interview the highest commanding general of the 
national Army only working through informal channels, as the official meeting request had 
remained stalled in the ministry’s bureaucracy 
105 See for similar examples See Bar-Tal, Daniel (2000), From Intractable Conflict 
through Conflict Resolution to Reconciliation, Political Psychology, 21, 2, 351-365  
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with little exception so polarised that there is no agreement on a historical 
narrative of the first two republics. Judgments remain filtered by interpretations 
of how a particular action or inaction may or may not have contributed to the 
1994 events, making it extremely difficult for the researcher to identify ‘the truth 
in the middle’.  
Whilst the ‘snowball’ technique proved an effective tool for access to a 
sufficient number of representative actors, in the atmosphere of fear still 
prevailing in Cameroon, the DRC and, to some extent, Rwanda, the quasi-
totality of the interviewees preferred that their encounter with the researcher 
left no visible trace. The fear of being connected with the ‘wrong’ ideas is 
strong in the three countries. This applies to oral testimony as well as to the 
sharing of print material including documents that were published earlier and 
distributed by the government but now belong to the realm of grey literature 
and can only be obtained if the source is protected from discovery. Thus, the 
vast majority of interviewees asked to remain anonymous and the invitation to 
sign an ethics research form met with complete misunderstanding. Following 
its obvious deterring impact on contacts’ willingness to proceed with interviews, 
a verbal procedure was used instead to communicate the content of the 
departmental consent form. The difference between research adhering to the 
formal requirement, and no research at all, was decisive. In this regard it has to 
be noted that the reluctance to sign whatever document was not only 
prominent among civil servants and the military, who may fear for their career 
(or their pension), or even their lives, but also among local academics. In some 
cases, interviewees specifically requested that their confidences be kept off-
the-record. Their will has been respected and such information has not been 
used to document facts in the present dissertation; however it has proven 
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useful to cast light on the atmosphere of a particular period and key actors’ 
motivations, interests, and trepidations.  
The method described above should provide sufficient protection against 
the risk of bias in interpreting events. Three types of imbalances, however, 
could not be fully protected against. The first relates to the at times large 
discrepancies in the documentation available for each period of state and 
military development in each of the three countries separately. There is 
therefore the risk of overestimating the importance of a period simply because 
more information was available on that period. The second is one of 
comparability of sources across countries, as actors are organised differently 
and do not produce information in a standardised way. Those risks have been 
mitigated as much as possible by the use of a strong theoretical framework 
(see ‘Key concepts’ above) and an effort to relate each case study to the core 
themes of the framework. Finally, openness towards attitudes that do not fit 
one’s own expectation of modernity is vital for research that depends on the 
collaboration of people who show a strong tendency to secrecy, as they fear 
being judged as non-modern. That such complications can be overcome was 
eloquently proven by the writings of authors like Ryszard Kapuscinski.106 The 
‘non-simultaneity’ epistemological approach described above has been a key 
tool in addressing the cross-cultural pitfalls of such research, which is in itself 




                                                             
106 See for example Kapuscinski, Ryszard (2002), Ebène, Pocket, Paris 
107 See for a discussion Werner, Michael and Bénédicte Zimmermann (2006), Beyond 




3 Dissertation Outline 
Building on the concepts outlined in the present chapter, chapter two will 
plant the context for the later analysis of the African military and its relationship 
to the state. Part of this context lies in the benchmarks set by the experience of 
longer existing states on other continents. For analytical purposes, and at the 
risk of simplifying reality somewhat, three scenarios of state formation and 
state-building can be identified: the long process of state creation in the more 
ancient polities on other continents, the late 19th early 20th century experiences 
of authoritarian state-building, and post-World War II democratic state-building. 
Those three scenarios will be scrutinised for clues about two main aspects: 
firstly, the relationship between stages of state formation and the evolution of 
political cultures; secondly, the role and place of the military in connection to 
both elements. Particularly important questions are whether, and in which 
conditions, it is possible to ‘accelerate’ the process of state-building or state 
transformation on the basis of a political culture which is obviously not in tune 
with the institutional model to which it aspired. In this, Japan, Germany and 
Turkey yield profound lessons for Africa. Another core aim is to identify the 
conditions in which the military, as part of a culturally-marked social and 
political body, is able to distance itself from the latter to act primarily according 
to its institutional role in a state-strengthening fashion. These are the 
conditions that enable us to differentiate those cases where the military is an 
instrument for state-building from those where it is an obstacle thereto. 
On the basis of these historically-driven parameters, the creation and 
development process of African states and their armies is sketched out to 
highlight a number of crucial differences from existing European and Asian 
models. I argue that a local political culture characterised by patronage 
systems and closed or limited access orders, and reinforced by a strong impact 
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of mysticism, is a central explanatory factor for those differences. Taking into 
account the historical context of state creation in Africa, military immersion in 
traditional political cultures, and particular aspects of states’ policies regarding 
the role of the military in post-colonial national development, Chapter 2 
concludes with a set of key questions that serve as a roadmap with which to 
examine the subsequent case studies with an overarching concern: to identify 
whether and how, and explain why the military has, or has not, contributed to 
the consolidation of a Weberian and/or democratic state in a selection of 
Central African states. In this context it is possible to demonstrate that classic 
Huntingtonian civil-military theory is unsuitable to Central African conditions. 
The three case studies in Chapters 3-5, on Cameroon, the Congo and 
Rwanda, constitute the core of the empirical research. As they are geared 
toward answering the same question, they share a common thread and have a 
largely similar structure, although slight variations have been necessary to take 
account of different realities, in particular in post-Cold War developments. Each 
national situation and each period is examined from a dual historical and 
sociological perspective so as to pin down the articulation between political 
decisions and cultural constraints and also the positioning/role of the military at 
key turns in those countries’ development. Differences and communalities in 
the shape of the military and its relationship to the state/political authority are 
highlighted in order to identify later in the work (Chapter 6) the parameters of 
those differences.  
In terms of its logic, each chapter starts with a description of the 
traditional military heritages of pre-colonial and colonial times as key 
determinants of the shape of the respective national military after 
independence. Post-independence years are then analysed according to a 
country-specific periodicity, in order to take into account differences in national 
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trajectories, however, with the overarching concern of pinpointing the 
role/attitude/task of the military at key junctures of state-strengthening/state-
weakening initiatives. Whilst the three countries show a similar pattern of 
instrumentalisation of military by the political power holders in the 30 years 
following independence, it is possible to observe sharp differentiation as of 
1990: whereas Cameroon continued more or less on the same course, the 
collapse of the Mobutu regime in the mid-1990s revealed the weakness of the 
state-building process in the Congo, and its relapse into a form of state and 
military that is more akin to the ‘natural/Tillian’ than to the Weberian model; 
Rwanda, for its part, after the cataclysmic events of the genocide, began an 
entirely new state-building phase, in which the military took a leading role.  
Chapter 6 exploits the results of the empirical case studies in order to 
check and refine the initial assumptions. A clarification arises from this analysis 
as regards the degree and characteristics of ‘quasi-ness’ of each state and, 
correspondingly, the level of ‘quasi-ness’ of its armed forces. Similarities and 
differences across cases are identified and related to interlinked historical and 
cultural factors, as Central African states are at various stages of transition 
from Tillian to Weberian to democratic states and from closed to open 
societies.  
On this basis, tentative conclusions suggest that the military in the sub-
region can, in exceptional circumstances, be a vehicle for the advancement of 
state-building. As was the case in Turkey and Japan, and as the study of 
Rwanda demonstrates, these exceptional circumstances reside in the 
presence of a strongly-motivated political leadership that is determined to 
make state-building its absolute priority and has succeeded in mobilising the 
support of the military to that end. In both other cases, as the bearers of 
traditional political cultures sustaining institutional fragmentation, with higher 
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ranks being part of a ruling elite that has little interest in political change, the 
military can only be an obstacle to state-building.  
4 Value Added by the Research 
The present research has added value for academia as well as for the 
policy world. Academically, first, it contributes to filling the very wide gap in 
empirical knowledge on the military in the little accessible and little understood 
societies of Francophone Central Africa. Second, it explores the little 
researched field of military sociology in Africa, providing findings on the identity 
of the military as social actors that may have validity beyond the specific region 
of Central Africa or at least may be pursued by further investigations in other 
parts of the continent. Third, it relates those findings to the development of the 
state in Central Africa, providing analytical tools to understand the underlying 
reasons for the weakness of states on the continent and how they can be 
explained in relation to the long process of historical state formation. 
Casting such a light on historical development and their sociological 
underpinnings will be valuable to policy makers. For a number of years, 
international assistance efforts to Africa have been focussed on ‘bringing the 
state back in’.108 At the centre of state building policies have been efforts to 
reorganise and rebuild the security system as a crucial pillar of the state’s ability 
to deliver its core functions.109 Initially carried out in ‘post-conflict’ settings, 
security sector reform (SSR) programmes have, however, borne the stain of 
their origins as they have been implicitly cast in terms of ‘rebuilding’ states along 
the ‘Westphalian model where these never really existed’.110 Gradually, a 
broader understanding has developed as it has become clear that not only ‘post-
                                                             
108 The phrase was already coined as early as 1985 by Evans, et al. (1985). It has 
been mainstreamed in donors’ policies since the mid-1990s 
109 See the OECD-led ‘International Dialogue on Peacebuilding & Statebuilding’ 
http://www.pbsbdialogue.org/ 
110 Chopra, Jarat (2007), Building State Failure in East Timor, in Hehir, Aidan and 
Robinson, Neil, State-Building: Theory and Practice Routledge, New York, p142 
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conflict’ states, but also a range of ‘fragile’ states are in need of SSR 
programmes.111 Those programmes, however, continue to be carried out at a 
mainly technical level, despite a general recognition at the declaratory level that 
they require political engagement to be effective.112 The political sensitivity of the 
subject is part of the explanation, but insufficient consideration of how the 
sociological underpinnings of security services and institutions hamper state-
building is another one. As a result, SSR practitioners have stumbled against 
resistance by many local actors, including the military, whose interest has been 
to keep things as they were, as the rationale motivating their actions has been 
entirely different from the Huntingtonian principles underpinning Western-driven 
programmes.113 Prisoners of their linear conception of social modernisation 
processes, SSR practitioners have failed to understand the ‘non-simultaneity’ in 
which many African actors, and in particular the military, are evolving. Applying 
late 20th century technocratic solutions114 to actors partly living under conditions 
of Early Modern warfare, however, is bound to fail as they are appropriate within 
the ‘political age’ of only one of the actors involved.115 
By looking at the sociological and cultural elements that affect the 
institutional development of the Weberian state, and in particular one of its 
pillars, the security sector, with this research I hope to lift part of the veil on the 
reasons for this resistance. Once they understand better the discrepancy 
between the externally assumed role of armed formations within state and 
society and their actual function within specific politico-cultural settings, policy 
                                                             
111 And at declaratory level at least, willing to accept them. Such is the case of the 35-
40 states considered as ‘fragile’ by the OECD 
112 See for instance OECD DAC (2007), Handbook on Security Sector Reform, 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development - Development Assistance 
Committee, Paris 
113 For a discussion see Donais, Timothy (2008), Understanding Local Ownership in 
Security Sector Reform, LIT, Münster/London; Chabal and Daloz (1999)  
114 Or a ‘capability-enhancing’ activity, as the phrase was originally-coined by Alfred 
Chandler in the mid-1970s. See Chandler, Alfred DuPont Jr (1977), The Visible Hand, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge, MA 
115 For a similar argument see Egnell and Halden (2009), p.40 
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practitioners may conceive SSR programmes with greater context-specific 
sensitiveness.116  
  
                                                             
116 Chanaa, Jane (2002), Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects, 
Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Oxford 
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Chapter Two: Benchmarking the State and the Military – 
Historical and Cultural Determinants 
1 Historical Patterns of State-military Relations 
Historical analogies in state formation and state-building as differentiated 
in Chapter One will enable us both to identify why and in what circumstances 
‘self-strengthening’ measures were taken on other continents with a longer state 
tradition and with what results and then to pin down what kinds of decisions and 
actions have constituted ‘self-weakening’ policies, leading to the decline or even 
the disappearance of the state. In all cases, war and the military are central to 
the argument.  
With the historical analogies of state/military formation at hand we will then 
apply the parameters identified to sub-Saharan African state creation, the 
conditions of which are framed by three key differences from Asian and 
European models: firstly, parts of Central Africa remained stateless societies; 
secondly, state formation where it happened was curtailed by colonialism; and, 
finally, state-building in the region took strikingly varied forms with different 
results, directly depending on the nature of civil-military relations as they 
evolved in the context of a particular political culture before and since 
independence.  
Although state-building is mostly discussed today as a reactive operation 
within a post-conflict context, it is important to realise that it has a history. An 
exploration of Japan’s post-Tokugawa and Turkey’s post-Ottoman state 
modernisation undertakings – two successful experiences of state-building in 
history – will yield fruitful lessons for the analysis of contemporary state-building 
attempts in Central Africa. A brief overview of more recent (post-World War II 
and post-Cold War) experiments in democratic state-building will provide further 
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insights for the study of African cases, if one assumes that such aims were 
actually being pursued in good faith.  
1.1 State Formation and the Military  
In practice it took a long time before the state reached the level of 
abstraction that made it a ‘legal person’.1 The first of three main steps in this 
process was the reorganisation of the community away from the concept of the 
genos, the right of blood, to the demos, the right of the people, in the course of 
eradicating tribal power structures in favour of promoting a more inclusive 
concept of the polity.2 The medieval ages were marked by a large number of 
different territorial polities, cities, and parochial, monastic and ecclesiastic 
communities competing for available power sources. These were weak states in 
which standards of governance were yet to be developed, and military 
organisation was based on personal affiliation.3 Actually, European composite 
monarchies ‘came to be called states only during the first half of the 
seventeenth century'.4 In a further step of abstraction of statehood, a distinction 
emerged between the ruler and the state or, more precisely, between the state 
treasury and the monarch’s private purse. This, however, did not happen all of a 
sudden and not everywhere simultaneously.5 It is the systematic state-building 
endeavours resulting from the French-driven revolutionary wars, the 1860-70 
                                                             
1 Van Creveld, Martin (1999), The Rise and Decline of the State, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge  
2 Van Creveld (1999), p.56; This reform of the political organisation of community came 
with general military service directly related to political rights in a relatively strong state, see 
Mossé, Claude (1999), Les Institutions Grecques à l'Epoque Classique, Armand Colin, Paris 
3 Delbrück, Hans (2000), Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen 
Geschichte, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin/New York, p.11 
4 Van Creveld (1999), p.106; Rubinstein, Nicolai (1971), Notes on the Word Stato in 
Florence Before Machiavelli, in Ferguson, Wallace K, Florilegium Historiale University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 313–326 pp.313-326; on the term ‘composite monarchies’ see the 
seminal article by Elliott, John H (1992), A Europe of Composite Monarchies, Past & Present, 
48-71 
5 William III of England in 1698 is considered ’the first monarch in history who could not 
be held personally liable for his government’s debts’. A formal separation of the English king 
and the state as distinct institutions was achieved only in 1770 and it became the undisputed 




European wars of unification, and the US civil war that signalled the final 
demise of princely rule and the rise of the institutionalised state.6 In terms of 
political culture, the nation became the basis of the state in the early 19th 
century, setting the stage for mass participation in war as well as in politics.7 
The omnipresent Western state that we now take for granted finally ‘emerged in 
the nineteenth-century absorption of the population into the state’.8 This 
absorption functioned via a balancing of compulsory general military service 
against the growing political participatory rights of the people.  
Hence, state formation and military formation were intertwined processes 
that proceeded in step. Only with policies strengthening the state relative to its 
external competitors was the state-military apparatus gradually established. 
Every twist in the development of the state led to the adjustment of its military.9  
Firstly, there is the model of non-directed state formation that was 
deliberately transformed by some rulers into an efficient state-building policy via 
the application of a determined state-strengthening policy.10 Victoria Tin-Bor Hui 
generalised the conceptual differentiation between state-strengthening policies 
and state-weakening measures as happened in East Asia. The second 
template, and Tin-Bor builds her argument on it, refers back to Charles Tilly’s 
critical interpretation of Early Modern European state formation as a process of 
the gradual sophistication of organised crime. Among them, our Central African 
case studies, Cameroon, Congo and Rwanda, display all of those elements of 
                                                             
6 Bayly, Christopher A (2006), Die Geburt der modernen Welt, Campus, Frankfurt, p.175; 
see as an example Friedrich II von Preussen (1987), Das politische Testament von 1752, 
Reclam, Stuttgart 
7 Anderson, Perry (1974), Lineages of the absolutist state, New Left, London, p.198 
8 ‘Population’ here is not identical with ‘nation’ because non-nation states are not 
unknown among Western states of the 19th and 20th centuries, Tilly (1992), p.65; see also 
Migdal, Joel S (2004), State Building and the Non-Nation State, Journal of International Affairs, 
58, 1, np, online edition 
9 In some cases, the impulse came from the military side of the equation – what 
happened especially after big leaps in military technology – and it was the state that adapted. 
10 For example, mercantilism became the prevailing state policy in the Early Modern 
period when warfare necessitated a reliable income of rulers. This economic strengthening of 
the country allowed for the strengthening of a central administration. 
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state/military-formation to different degrees, whereby the whole spectrum from 
stateless society (pre-colonial Cameroon, pre-colonial and modern Congo) to 
the strong state (Rwanda) is covered.  
According to Tilly and Tin-Bor, the state’s crucial elements are the 
monopolisation of the means of coercion, regular taxation, and the creation of a 
professional, apolitical administration. The driver of state formation was the 
power holder’s need, or desire, for warfare. To be successful in war, princes 
had to increase their military strength by building powerful armed forces and to 
enhance their administrative and legal grip on economic capabilities to finance 
these forces. Financing war – or just the maintenance of fleets and fortresses – 
elicited the requirement to secure reliable extractive capacities for resources 
within the princes’ reach. To be met efficiently, this requirement called in turn for 
the creation of a professional administration.11 Administratively, the state’s 
efficiency increases through the self-perpetuation and expansion of its 
bureaucratic tools involving a ‘regular process for recruiting and training 
bureaucrats’, both military and civilian, who preferably ought to be protected 
against political interference.
12
 Such professionalism is best realised by systems 
of meritocracy, which simultaneously and beneficially prevent the creation of 
‘hereditary’ power structures competing with those of the ruler.13 
Ensuring the legitimacy of these efforts was decisive for their outcome 
because the requisite support from society could not simply be commanded – it 
had in most cases to be bargained for.14 As warfare became increasingly 
expensive, access to increasingly large pools of capital and tighter 
                                                             
11 Bayly (2006), p.339; Tin-Bor Hui (2005), pp.30f; Wendt, Reinhard (1984), Die 
Bayerische Konkursprüfung der Montgelas-Zeit, PhD History, Universität München, München  
12 Gurses, Mehmet and David T Mason (2010), Weak States, Regime Types, and Civil 
War, Civil Wars, 12, 1, 140-155, p.141 
13 Van Creveld (1999), p.42 
14 Few princes could afford war without political consent: Charles II’s 1670s Dutch wars 
were financed by Louis XIV, exposing him to the latter’s blackmailing, Rodger, N. A.M. (2004), 




administrative control became necessary. In exchange, the political costs for the 
princes had to be paid in the political participation of the contributing society. 
The formation and development of the military was part of this process, which 
could be described as a ‘state/military-formation’ process. 
Unlike ancient China, where direct rule over time facilitated the creation of 
a strong state, Early Modern Europe followed a path of state formation that tried 
to maintain indirect-rule configurations as long as possible. In both cases the 
sovereign territorial polities developed (increasingly centralised) administrative 
authority, a monopoly of coercive means, and general taxation.15 The disparity 
between the two paths of state creation lay in the higher European levels of 
domestic intermediary power structures, which could seriously compete against 
the state. Hence, the European path to state formation was constrained by the 
main power broker’s acceptance of a larger number of different stakeholders. 
As a result, with the more radical domestic reform strategies of 
bureaucratisation,16 steady territorial military expansion and conscription,17 the 
typical Far Eastern state-strengthening policy caused a demise of the archaic 
aristocracy/knighthood, and the military became an army, a well-defined body of 
regular forces, exclusively loyal to the state. European state-strengthening 
policies or, rather, policy attempts to create an all-dominating Empire, failed.18 
Accordingly, the military remained for a long time at an organisational level fit 
for indirect rule settings. No European state made a serious attempt to institute 
direct rule from top to bottom until the era of the French Revolution. Before then 
all but the smallest states relied on some version of indirect rule, thus running 
serious risks of disloyalty, dissimulation, corruption, and rebellion. Indirect rule 
                                                             
15 Tin-Bor Hui (2005), p.6 
16 fùguó 富国 ‘to enrich the state’, 
17 qiángbīng 强兵 ‘to strengthen the military’; on ‘conscription’ see Tin-Bor Hui (2005), 
p.35 
18 Barudio, Günter (1985), Der Teutsche Krieg, 1618-1648, S. Fischer, Frankfurt; Parker, 
Geoffrey (1984), The Thirty Years' War, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London ; Boston 
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made it possible to govern without erecting, financing, and feeding a bulky 
administrative apparatus, but it enabled intermediates’ predation, which in turn 
‘incited resistance and recalcitrance by the population, increasing political costs 
to the ruler’.19 Certain degrees of betrayal, corruption and rebellion were seen 
as preferable to a policy of erecting, financing and feeding a bulky 
administrative apparatus.20 With a growing need for financial predictability for 
expanding warfare, however, these circumstances encouraged some rulers to 
establish ‘durable domestic military administrations [which then] bypassed 
intermediates, and led the way from indirect to direct rule’ – the main condition 
of a strong institutionalised state.21 
However, it should take somewhat longer to produce armies, which could 
non-ambiguously be considered part of a viable state. European princes 
‘increased military strength by using mercenary units and enhanced economic 
capabilities by contracting loans and selling public offices’.22 For centuries 
indirect rule provided the means for the sustaining of weak princely states. Only 
with the Napoleonic wars did a swift succession of self-strengthening policy 
reforms address the question of survival against the onslaught of the levée en 
masse in one state after another. Napoleonic France itself represents the 
closest a European state ever came to forming a dominant, directly-ruled, 
empire as a result of self-strengthening policies.23 It is in direct reaction to the 
military threat represented by the modern French state and its revolutionary 
                                                             
19 Tilly (1992), p.21 
20 Tilly (1992), pp.21, 25, 104 
21 Tilly (1992), pp.105f 
22 Tin-Bor Hui (2005), p.36 
23 However, France’s inherited national debt and her reliance on her allies hampered this 
trajectory decisively. Self-weakening policies of Napoleon’s predecessors had eroded his 
advance from day one. 
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armies that other states begun enforcing decisive self-strengthening policies all 
over the continent.24 
Although accelerated state-strengthening policies in view of a dangerous 
international situation were sometimes intended to be temporary only, since the 
19th century they have almost always proven irreversible. Returning to post-
Napoleonic Europe, when the rulers of the Anciens Régimes resumed office 
after 1815 in France, Italy, the Rhine Valley, Poland, and Egypt, the state 
remained forever modified as a result of the state-strengthening policies 
implemented over the few years of French rule. The Bill of Rights, like the code 
civil, once given to the emerging bourgeoisie, was impossible to recapture from 
them once their political weight had increased with their economic and political 
bargaining power. The bargaining of duties against rights had long been a part 
of European political culture, with parliaments having a history going back to the 
Spanish Cortes de Léon.25 Now it increasingly became the dominant feature of 
political culture.  
Similarly, when, for example, the Confederate States broke away from the 
US central polity, this was possible because the government in Washington was 
by design a weak state. Abraham Lincoln was dependent on the individual 
Northern states to support him and his Union forces, and as a result the 
Northern United States developed an efficient, (half-) nationwide, bureaucracy 
to wage the civil war. After 1865, most of the states kept the bulk of these 
bureaucratic mechanisms in place, by free decision for some, by rule of 
                                                             
24 See Delbrück (1985), book 4, chapter 4, and Ertman, Thomas (1997), Birth of the 
Leviathan: Building States and Regimes in Medieval and Earls Modern Europe, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, p.125 
25 Merriman, Roger B (1970), The Cortes of the Spanish Kingdoms in the Later Middle 
Ages, The American Historical Review, 16, 3, 476-495 
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occupation for others.26 In the same period, the unification wars of Italy and 
Germany had fairly similar results.  
With warfare becoming increasingly costly – with big fleets and dockyards, 
standing armies and Vauban fortifications, mass armies, and aerial warfare – it 
could not be sustained through plunder and racketeering. The state/military 
structure increasingly had to seek the support of society for funding and 
manpower. As a result the tax payers’ bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
state/military structure was strengthened and the administration itself became 
increasingly civilianised and democratised. Hence, Western state formation was 
a process of state-society bargaining.  
A tendency to ever more subsume parts of society under the strong state’s 
rule was accompanied by the military’s desire increasingly to subordinate the 
state, and at some point in the Janus-faced state/military structure the army 
apparently gained a dominant position.27 In the course of this development, the 
primordial relationship between society and the state/military structure as 
representing two conflicting realms had receded, gradually being substituted by 
the new state-military dialectic. Below the surface of the militarised state the 
civilian bureaucracy expanded fast, owing much of its growth to material gain (in 
terms of access to taxable territory and population) achieved by the military. 
The split of coercive power, between domestic judicial and police forces and 
mainly externally oriented military forces, further shifted the centre of power-
gravity back to the civilian realm. Over time the civilian state and its 
accompanying element, the regular standing army, imposed itself on the 
                                                             
26 The ‘implicit social contract’ of military service in exchange for political rights was 
already present in the contemporaries’ conscience: for black volunteers to the Union’s forces 
the ‘ultimate goal had been equal rights with whites’, Dolman, Everett Carl (2004), The Warrior 
State: How Military Organization Structures Politics, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, p.10  
27 The Prussian Soldatenkönig Frederic William I, for instance, ruled a state that was for 
good reason described by contemporaries as ‘a military owning a state rather than a state 
having an army’ – this although he also invented the vocational civil service, the loyal 
Berufsbeamtentum, see von Berenhorst, Georg Heinrich (1797), Betrachtungen über die 
Kriegskunst, Fleischer Leipzig  
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Western world. Such was the way in which the struggle for control between the 
armed element of the state and the non-military element moved back and forth, 
resulting in the pendulum swinging away from militarist dominance towards 
civilian supremacy during the 19th century.  
In Europe, with the gradual establishment of direct rule, bargaining with 
merchants, entrepreneurs and sub-state power holders progressively gave way 
to forms of direct bargaining between the ruler and the people, mediated by the 
bureaucracy and intermediate institutions (e.g., Parliaments, départements, 
town councils). The state had to bargain in order to obtain the means of war – 
financial resources, raised via taxes, and the conscription of soldiers – 
conceding in return that it had to share a part of its power with others 
(Parliaments, governors, mayors), to be accountable for its acts (Parliaments, 
justice systems), and to provide an increasing range of services to the people 
(e.g., infrastructure, schools, healthcare). As Charles Tilly has pointed out: 
 
The core of what we call “citizenship”, indeed, consists of multiple bargains 
hammered out by rulers and ruled in the course of their struggles over the means 
of state action, especially the making of war.28  
 
Once modern mass armed warfare had made it necessary for the state to 
be politically inclusive of those who should fight these wars, democratic mass 
participation could no longer be held at bay. Over time each group in society 
that contributed to the war effort was eventually allotted suffrage, and mass 
citizenship was created via mass participation in war. The emergence of total 
war in the early 20th century opened the way for universal suffrage and the 
recognition that every national had to be endowed with all the rights and duties 
                                                             
28 Tilly (1992), p.102 
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of citizenship.29 In step with this development, the military culture changed 
character from a coercive apparatus, made of political subjects, into a body of 
self-confident citizen-soldiers endowed with democratic rights and duties. This 
process was in step with a similar change of the civilian bureaucracy, evolving 
from an extractive apparatus to a provider of services to its citizens. Gradually 
the contentious relationship within the dual state-military construct levelled out, 
and it became a symbiotic win-win equilibrium. The democratic state was born 
and its army established, even if the political civil-military divide was not 
consistently honoured.30  
In the recent past, the personal union of the citizen and the soldier lost 
importance with the wane of mass armed forces. Military service could again 
become a mere profession; however, it remained essentially bound to the 
citizenship of the armed forces’ state.31 The coherent military body of citizens, 
loyal to a state, committed to rules of engagement in accordance with 
international law, is the most advanced form of the army. Military conscription 
had been the core tool to achieve this to a degree that all-volunteer forces of 
nationals can now be established.
32
  
1.2 State-building and the Military 
Although Joel Migdal insists that state-building along a set master plan 
would be impossible, some historical examples support the notion that state-
                                                             
29 Women achieved these rights at various times between the end of World War I and 
World War II 
30 Generals Franco, Giorgios Padadopoulos, and Ibrahim Firtina being some examples 
31 See Burk, James (1992), The Decline of Mass Armed Forces and Compulsory Military 
Service, Defense Analysis, 8, 1, 45-59 
32 Buzan (2010), pp. 16,18 and North, et al. (2007), p.261, North et al describe this 
transition as one from so called limited access orders to open-access orders. This incremental 
process of a social constituency first achieving a status of a ‘doorstep order’ to then proceed to 
a proper liberal order. The stepping stones of progress were the Tillian state, followed by the 
Weberian state, developing steadily through nationalism and popular sovereignty into fully 
fledged democratic orders. Whilst in Europe a positive-law legal system based on the principle 




building can be learned and implemented.33 Nineteenth century Meiji Japan and 
post Great War Turkey provide examples of successfully designed and 
performed state-building, in the former case transforming an Early Modern 
indirect-rule order into a directly-ruled strong state and in the latter executed 
mainly through the dual strengthening of state and military.  
It is not surprising that Japanese and Turkish state-building policies 
(begun in 1868 and 1919, respectively) are regularly cited as constructive 
examples for African state-building. In both cases the antecedent political 
orders had developed in incremental ways similar to their European 
equivalents, and then deliberate state-building provided the fast-forward mode 
towards a strong state.34 It was frustration with political weakness and military 
crises that paved the way for state-strengthening policies, with Japan realising 
its incapacity to defend its capital against a siege from a squadron of American 
warships, and Turkey having to endure a Greek and French invasion.35 Both 
countries’ state-building policies led to the creation of modern bureaucratic 
states, which were purposely designed after western European examples.36 In 
both cases state-strengthening measures had to be enforced against internal 
and external resistance.37 State-building had been decided on, planned, and 
successfully executed.  
                                                             
33 Migdal, Joel S, et al. (1997), State Power and Social Forces: Domination and 
Transformation in the Third World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, p.9 
34 In Japan the underlying ideology was expressed by the slogan slogan fukoku-kyôhei, 
‘rich land and strong army’ 
35 Withney Hall, John (1968), Das japanische Kaiserreich, Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt, 
especially pp.246ff, and Wendt, Reinhardt and Jürgen Osterhammel (2006), Vom Umgang mit 
dem Imperialismus: Konzepte, Kontroversen und Lösungswege auf den Philippinen, in China 
und in Japan, in Dabringhaus, Sabine, Europa und die Welt im langen 19. Jahrhundert Open 
University Hagen, Hagen  
36 See Beasley, William Gerald (2000), The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic 
and Social Change since 1850, St. Martin's Press, New York; Yildirim, Metlim (2010), 
Türkischer Nationalismus Gestern und Heute, Grin Verlag, Norderstedt, p.79 
37 See Schwentker, Wolfgang (1992), Anfänge der japanischen Modernisierung: Vom 
Tokugawa-Shogunat zur Meiji-Ära, Open University Hagen, Hagen, p.50, Paine, S C M (2003), 
The Sino-Japanese  War of 1895-1895, Cambridge University Press, New York, p.150 
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There is no doubt that the military was part and parcel, and even the 
driving element, of this state conversion. From the outset, civilian and military 
reformers sought to adjust the military according to their design of the state, and 
it was modified and used as a means to press through intended change. 
Military, political, and religious institutions that were considered outdated were 
rigorously limited or abolished; and with conscription every soldier obtained the 
dignity of citizenship.38 The soldiers that followed their leaders to modernity 
became the ground stock of an ‘unprecedented broadening of the circle of 
political participants’ in the establishment of a new order.39 Other elements of 
successful state-strengthening policies included separation of the military from 
the political spheres and also setting in motion a politico-cultural revolutionary 
process by a complete secularisation of the constitution.40 By these means 
direct rule was vigorously established and the nation was introduced to the 
bargain for political power. 
Four conditions seem to have combined for these two historical examples 
of state-building to succeed:  
 
 Firstly, reformers could build on the formerly existing structures and personnel 
of organised central states;  
 Secondly, the reforms were initiated entirely under conditions of effective ‘local 
ownership’, implemented by a determined leadership willing to succeed at the 
necessary political costs;  
 Thirdly, this leadership did not hesitate to sweep aside traditional political 
cultures – isolationist-Confucian-Shintoist in Japan, conservative-Islam in 
                                                             
38 In Japan obtaining a family name and thus an individual identity was traditionally 
restricted to carriers of arms, and became possible to people other than Samurai with military 
service 
39 Atabaki, Touraj and Erik J Zürcher (2004), Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization 
under Atatürk and Reza Shah, Tauris, London, p.189 
40 Lewis, Bernard (1961), The Emergence of Modern Turkey, Oxford University Press, 
London, p.276; Schwentker (1992) 
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Turkey – and to impose new political values that were foreign to large parts of 
their societies; and 
 Fourth, state-building included the creation of a modern army, either by 
designed reform or through the inclusive dynamic of a national war of liberation. 
 
1.3 Democratic State-building and the Military 
Democratic state-building has occurred at an accelerated pace during two 
periods in recent history, one immediately after World War II, and one that 
begun immediately after the end of the Cold War and is still on-going.41 The 
best-known experiences are the most spectacular examples after World War II, 
those of Germany and Japan, which were actually characterised as democratic 
state-building only in hindsight. In reality, the aim of the project was primarily the 
de-nazification of Germany and the de-militarisation of Japan. The negative 
forces of fascism and militarism had to be eradicated from the two countries’ 
societies during the retrogression to pre-war constitutionalism. What had to take 
place was state re-building rather than state-building since, in both cases, the 
basic underpinnings of a state apparatus and a (relatively) pluralist political 
order had been in place prior to the conflict. In Germany, the democratic 
tradition was mature: parliamentary elections had brought the first oppositional 
(social-democratic) relative majority to the Reichstag in 1908, and it remained 
the biggest single faction until 1933, at times alone forming the government. In 
Japan, the political parties that had entered Parliament in 1889 were only 
merged into a single fascist organisation – following the particularly liberal 
                                                             
41 This periodization dovetails with the second and third Huntingtonian waves of 
democratisation, although this scholar sets the third wave as beginning with the mid-1970s Latin 
American developments, see Huntington, Samuel P (1993), The Third Wave: Democratization 
in the Late Twentieth Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 
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Taisho-democratic period – as late as 1940.42 In both countries, the 
constitutional standards and democratic foundations were there; they only had 
to be resurrected. Precisely what part indigenous leaders and what part the 
Allied victors of World War II played in steering Germany and Japan toward the 
democratic path remains a matter for debate. It is clear, however, that external 
pressure, prodding and assistance had a degree of influence.  
As regards the military in this process, for good reason both the victors 
and the vanquished in the war were hesitant to rearm the newly emerging 
polities too soon. Interestingly, although it took ten years at least for post-war 
West Germany to recover its sovereignty (5 May 1955), the founding of the 
Bundeswehr then occurred only six months later. The post-war Japanese Police 
Reserve, founded to replace US occupation troops during the Korean War, was 
transformed into the Japanese Self Defence Force in 1954. The Japanese 
forces have since been the nationally accepted ambassador of Japanese 
defensive pacifism.43  
Apart from Germany and Japan, democratic state-building occurred in very 
few countries post-World War II, at a time when the policy agenda was framed 
in terms of ‘nation building’ and liberation from colonialism. Democratic state-
building only occurred in India, where a long history of Hindi, Mogul, and mixed 
British colonial/indigenous rule had facilitated institutionalisation. Here too a 
determined elite was willing to cast aside traditional political and social values, 
by the abandonment of the caste system in 1950.44 The newly imposed values 
of modernity were equated with democracy. According to this view state-
                                                             
42 See Peukert, Detlev (1993), The Weimar Republic: the Crisis of Classical Modernity, 
Hill & Wang, New York; Tipton, Elise K (1997), Society and the State in Interwar Japan, 
Routledge, London 
43 Britt, Thomas W, et al. (2006), The Psychology of Serving in Peace and Combat, 
Military Culture, Praeger Security International, Westport CT. Only 60 years later has the SDF 
principal been called into question, but by an internationalist desire to participate under arms in 
UN peace keeping forces 
44 The three years delay of this policy after independence is not due to a lack of urgency, 
but to India’s difficult circumstances during the first Indo-Pakistan war. 
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building is not yet completed with the establishment of formal statehood and a 
regular army; this is rather the moment where it begins in earnest.45  
Successful democratic state-building after the Cold War has only been 
witnessed so far in the part of Eastern Europe that was closer culturally to 
Western Europe and that wished to enter the ‘democratic clubs’ represented by 
NATO and the European Union. The experience of Eastern Europe is similar in 
one way to that of post-World War II Germany and Japan, in the sense that the 
institutions of the state were already there for the most part; they just had to be 
democratised. It is similar in another way to Japan, Turkey or India where 
change was driven from a very strong domestic (in that case, popular) will, 
rather than happening under the wings of a watchful ‘patron’.46  
1.4 Conclusion 
A review of various historical examples brings forward useful keys to 
interpret the current situation in Africa as regards state formation, state-building 
and the democratic state. Those keys can best be spelled out by distinguishing 
methodologically between processes and outcomes. 
As a process, state formation is a long development, in which the external 
dynamics of conquest and border creation are inherently linked with the internal 
dynamics of state self-strengthening. State-building can only succeed if a 
number of conditions are met, which are best exemplified by the case of Meiji 
Japan and Kemalist Turkey: pre-existing institutional underpinnings, such as 
elements of a trained bureaucracy; and a strong domestic leadership 
                                                             
45 Egnell, Robert (2009), Complex Peace Operations and Civil-military Relations: 
Winning the Peace, Routledge, Milton Park, p.46 
46 The decisive impact of a domestic consensus, an idea of the common good, and 
broad-based legitimacy of the bureaucratic and governmental order, as opposed to - inevitably 
deficient - foreign assistance, had already been highlighted by Samuel Huntington as 
indispensable to successful state-building in general, see Huntington, Samuel P (1968), Political 
Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven, and more specifically for Africa 
by Mamdani, Mahmood (2002), When Victims Become Killers, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, and Bastian, Sunil and Robin Luckham (2003), Can Democracy Be Designed?, Zed 
Books, London, p.51 
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determined to impose a new regime at the cost of traditional cultural and 
political values. As a rule, local ownership of the process is essential.  
As an outcome, state formation leads to state-building. At minimum, it 
leads to the legitimate monopoly of force on a given territory, the establishment 
of a professional, apolitical bureaucracy and other institutions organising and 
managing the direct relationship between the ruler and the ruled. It includes a 
constant relationship of give-and-take between the ruler and the ruled, at best 
with a variety of control mechanisms in place to check the decisions of the ruler.  
Building states means to establish systems of direct rule, in other words, 
parting away from existing indirect rule patterns based on clientele and 
patronage arrangements and replacing them with meritocratic bureaucracies. 
To build democratic states on the basis of Weberian states means accepting 
the constant bargaining with citizens, represented by elections; parliamentary 
oversight; and the rule of law as an expression of an open society.  
 
2 Africa’s Curtailed State Formation Experience 
A polity abstracted from the demos rather than the genos and evolving 
from an instrument of a ruling person or caste to a state as a legal person did 
not develop in sub-Saharan Africa before pre-colonial state formation was 
aborted at the end of the 19th century.47 One can easily detect a discrepancy 
between reality on the ground and repeated claims of contemporary African 
politicians’ willingness to establish a modern state, built on rational and 
accountable legality. Where state formation did advance, however, the role of 
the military was decisive in the outcome. 
                                                             
47 See Illy, Hans F (1982), Nation und Nationalismus in Afrika. Die Verlockungen eines 




2.1 The Pre-colonial World 
Undetected by the Europeans of the 16th and 17th centuries, large-scale 
warfare among various African polities, or states, was rampant. The list of 
African states and empires that rose and died between the 9th and 19th 
centuries is impressive.48 All of them had a distinct military history, fighting civil 
wars, wars of succession, and intra-state wars.49 Some were military conquest 
states, some mercantile polities, and others jihadist theocracies.50 Yoruba 
states such as Benin and Nupe and Haussa states such as Kanem with their 
long history saw their power decline in the 18th century, when the trans-Saharan 
slave trade, one of the principal sources of these states’ income, shifted away 
from the caravan routes to the coastal depots of European contours – very 
much to the advantage of emerging states such as Asante and Dahomey.51 
Europeans in the 19th century encountered states with a core under the tight 
control of a monarchy.52 Standing armies were well known in the Great Lakes 
region, in Rwanda, Bunyoro and Toro, whilst other relatively strong states never 
developed standing armies.53 Joseph Smaldone argues that just before the 
                                                             
48 Gana, Kanem, Songhay, Fulbe, Jolof, Timbuktu (a city state without hinterland), the 
Sokoto Caliphate, and Segu Bambara (Middle Niger Valley), Yoruba, Dahomey, Asante 
Buganda, and Rwanda 
49 Bertaux, Pierre (1999), Afrika von der Vorgeschichte bis zu den Staaten der 
Gegenwart, S.Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt, pp.46-50; Many of these geographically scattered 
communities resemble Elliott’s model of European early modern ‘composite monarchies’, see 
Elliott (1992) 
50 Young, Crawford (1994), The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, Yale 
University Press, New Haven, p.15; his list of forms of social organisation includes such states 
and many stateless societies in pre-colonial Africa 
51 Bertaux estimates that over time up to two million slaves were sent North via these 
caravan routes, and according to other research another estimated one million European slaves 
were sent south the same way between 1500 and 1830, see Davis, Robert C (2003), Christian 
Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in the Mediterranean, the Barbary Coast and Italy, 1500-
1800, Ohio State University, Columbus; see also the research by Wolfgang Krause (Sorbonne), 
and of Martin Rheinheimer, who found evidence for Arab slave hunts in 1627 as far North as 
Island  
52 See Kandt, Richard (1901), Bericht des Forschungsreisenden Dr Richard Kandt aus 
Ruanda, Mitteilungen aus den deutschen Schutzgebieten, and Turner, Thomas (2007), The 
Congo Wars: Conflict, Myth, and Reality, Zed Books, London; New York, p.59 
53 See Reid, Richard (1999), War and Militarism in Pre-Colonial Buganda, Azania, 34, 
45-60 and Reid, Richard (2012), Warfare in African History, Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, pp.66f; for a more comprehensive overview of Bugandan warfare see Reid, Richard 
(2002), Political Power in Pre-Colonial Buanda, James Currey, Oxford 
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Western conquest, the Sokoto state, for example, was even going through an 
embryonic revolution of a Weberian type founded on centralised control over 
firearms via the creation of standing armies developed around a monarchist 
system.54 In general, the African military played a role in state formation similar 
to their European counterparts. Usually their supreme commander ‘was held to 
be second only to the king’.55  
The Central African equatorial rainforest, however, does appear in the 
annals of interstate relations.56 Surrounding it were the states of the Great 
Lakes region: Ankole, Rwanda, Burundi and Buganda to the North and East; 
the Zambian Bembe, Lunda and Luba to the South; and Kongo and Loango to 
the West (South and North of modern Cabinda).57 These states were either 
quickly defeated when their supply of arms stopped with the abolition of the 
slave trade, or they disintegrated into decades of civil war, as did Kongo and 
Luba, after having basically sold much of their population into slavery.58  
                                                             
54 Smaldone, Joseph P (2008), Warfare in the Sokoto Caliphate: Historical and 
Sociological Perspectives, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge  
55 Thornton (1999), 88f 
56 See Vansina, Jan (1990), Paths in the Rainforests: Toward a History of Political 
Tradition in Equatorial Africa, University of Wisconsin Press, Madison; for a rare exception, see 
Ropivia, Marc Louis (2007), Batailles Navales Precoloniales en Afrique: Geopolitique du 
Buganda et du Manyema au XIXe Siècle, Economia, Paris; Reid (1999); there is much literature 
on Anglophone southern Central Africa (Zambia, Malawi) 
57 Well known African Empires such as the (Angolan) Kongo Ngola, Rwanda, Buganda, 
Bunyoro, Ankole, Bemba, or the Luda and Lunda empires (loosely organised federations of 
chiefdoms), or short lived states like the Yeke of King Msiri and the trader-empire of Tippu Tip 
did not, except in the most shallow way, rule the heart of Central Africa. The example of the 
Kongo Ngola region of Central Africa indicates that the process of state formation, strongly 
interwoven with the slave trade, was also accelerated, and eventually ruined, by the trade as 
well, see Peers, Chris (2005), Warrior Peoples of East Africa 1840-1900, Osprey Publishers, 
Oxford ; on Tippu Tip see Ndaywel e Nziem, Ididore (1998), Histoire générale du Congo: De 
l'héritage ancien à la République Démocratique, Editions Duculot, Paris ; on Kongo see Hilton, 
Anne (1985), The Kingdom of Kongo, Clarendon Press, Oxford, p.33 and Manning (1998), p.65; 
on Lunda see Reid (2012), p.85  
58 Hilton (1985), pp.5 and 33; Mann, Kenny; (1996), Kongo Ndongo, Dillon Press, 




Table 1: Pre-colonial state formation in Africa 
The large scale Atlantic slave trade had for centuries provided the income 
from which much of their military and other hardware was purchased.59 With an 
African agrarian population not bound to their soil and able to evade easily any 
power imposed on them, people had to be taken under control in the most 
proximate way: ‘Indeed, ownership of slaves in Africa was virtually equivalent to 
owning land in western Europe or China’.60 Hence, African campaigns for 
                                                             
59 See Law, Robin (1978), Slaves, Trade, and Taxes: The Material Basis of Political 
Power in Precolonial West Africa, Research in Economic Anthropology: An Annual Compilation, 
1, 37-52; Adamu, Mahdi (1979), The Delivery of Slaves from the Central Sudan to the Bight of 
Benin in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, in Gemery, Henry A  and Hogendorn, Jan S 
The Uncommon Market: Essays in the Economic History of the Atlantic Slave Trade Academic 
Press, New York, 163-180; for a more recent account see Okafor, Obiora Chinedu (2000), Re-
defining Legitimate Statehood: International Law and State Fragmentation in Africa, The Hague, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, p.27 
60 For the quote, Thornton (1999), p.16; see also Reid (2002), p.114; on ‘gunpowder 
revolution’ see McNeill, William H (1982), The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force, and 
Society Since AD 1000, University of Chicago Press, Chicago; Parker, Geoffrey (1996), The 
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slaves were the strategic equivalent to European warfare for territory. Even 
without direct European involvement, an African ‘gunpowder revolution’  
triggered not only ‘inflation’ in numbers and intensity of slave raids, but also of 
fortification.61 Yoruba, and Benin, built ring walls of five to twelve kilometres in 
perimeter, and Buganda launched a veritable navy campaigning on Lake 
Victoria.62 The militarily strongest states were successful predatory economic 
entities along the lines of a Tillian state. The ability to obtain luxury goods and 
firearms became central to the economic order, and violent conflict over the 
sources of wealth became ubiquitous, ending in spiralling warfare.63 The fate of 
stateless warrior nations east of the great lakes was alike: Masai, Kimbu, Ngoni 
or Hehe waged tactically sophisticated, yet limited-in-scale cattle raid wars 
among each other. They too were rather quickly brought under colonial control 
by British or German forces that never exceeded two or three companies, 
mostly composed of recruited Africans trained by European non-commissioned 
officers.64 In spite of stronger military resistance against the European 
expansion, West African embryonic states were eventually defeated before the 
start of the First World War.  
2.2 The Colonial State’s Civilian and Military Governance 
The emerging colonial state’s dependence on intermediaries and native 
allies, usually described as colonial indirect rule, created new privileged groups 
within African societies or allowed established local power holders to sustain 
                                                                                                                                                
Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge  
61 Thornton (1999), p.50; Wrighley, Christopher (1996), Kingship and State: The 
Buganda Dynasty, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; Bayart, Jean François (1999), 
L’Afrique dans le monde: une histoire d’extraversion, Critique internationale, 5, 1, 97-120  
62 See Ropivia (2007); Reid (1999) 
63 Vansina, Jan (1965), Les anciens royaumes de la savanne: les Etats des savanes 
méridionales de l'Afrique centrale des origines à l'occupation coloniale, Institut de recherches 
économiques et sociales, Léolopldville, pp.146ff 
64 Short-lived states, like the Yeke of the Arab King Msiri (who had taken over the Lunda 
savannah kingdom) and the trader-empire of Tippu Tip, did not, except in the shallowest way, 
rule the heart of Central Africa, Peers (2005); on Tippu Tip see Ndaywel e Nziem (1998), p.289 
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their status and wealth. Collaborators were able to ‘use their position in the 
colonial system to their own advantage’, even if the latter was at times 
inconsistent with colonial ambitions. The colonial project was escorted by the 
intermediaries, who made this indirect rule system workable. Violence was a 
constitutive element of the colonial state that enabled both the intermediary and 
the colonial allies to maintain themselves in power.65 
Colonial recruitment patterns used by the British in India were 
subsequently repeated in Africa: members of ‘martial races’, in other words, 
warrior tribesmen from remote places, preferably illiterate, were the main source 
of personnel. Units were thus grouped around tribal affiliation, if possible in 
hostile relationship to the colonised population among which they were 
deployed. For example, both Britain and France, the states with the most 
enlisted African soldiers, carefully chose Christians to control Muslims and 
Animists.66 All of these units remained in a way officer-less, because higher 
ranks, even NCOs, were as a matter of standard assigned to metropolitan 
forces.67 Large numbers of African colonial forces were enlisted to fight the 
independence movements in Malaya and Indochina. In francophone countries 
many World War II veterans had actually been recruited into the French army 
proper and were thus French soldiers fighting French wars. Hence, the 
recruitment for the Indo-China War and for the Algerian War led to an unusually 
high number of returning veterans, just at the moment of independence.68 
These soldiers had fought independence movements and considered 
themselves part of the French Grande Nation.  
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The idea of La Grande Nation, underlying the French philosophy of 
nationality, and the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, made francophone 
Africa a part of the French community. Hence, a distinction between French 
Soudan (modern Mali and Niger) and Guinea or between Gabon and Ivory 
Coast only made sense geographically, and colonial units found themselves as 
putative soldiers of the state where they were garrisoned at the moment of 
independence.69 Under such circumstances it was even more difficult to transfer 
the soldier’s allegiance from the colonial power to the new state, and to 
establish a truly national identity for former colonial soldiers.70 Despite the facts 
that most of the colonial troops had most of the time a coercive role within the 
colonial state, and African soldier’s contributions ‘in the achievement of 
independence was nil or minimal’, the orderly process of decolonisation 
facilitated their integration as new armed forces.71 The military in Africa 
remained detached from the change of European armies. Under the conditions 
of the colonial-state it remained what it ever was: an apparatus of armed 
subjects or mercenaries.72 
Consequently, in the same way as colonialists benefited from autocratic 
African rule to establish their colonial systems of government, African 
leadership at independence could easily step into the shoes of the authoritarian 
colonial leadership, as it matched indigenous patterns of social and political 
authority and of patronage as a way of perpetuating obedience and 
subordination. In a way, colonialism provided a structure which enabled African 
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elites to continue their amorphous control over society and sometimes to 
transform some sectors, especially the security forces, to more powerful tools of 
command. In spite of some positive aspects of a more benign late-colonial 
European administration, autocratic systems of government have persisted right 
through pre-colonial societies, colonialism and on into early independence, and 
they remain the preferred form of rule of most of the African elites today.73 It is 
thus possible to argue that, from the point of view of the African people, 
independence only meant a change of overlords, not a change of ruling 
patterns. The exploitation of Africa, during the colonial period a joint venture of 
European and African elites, was now under the sole command of Africans, 
making little difference to ordinary people. Indeed, an accumulation of the 
legacy of autocratic colonial tradition and bad leadership after independence 
has left Africa, according to Paul Williams’s reckoning, with eight of the world’s 
ten most failing states, and with eight of the world’s most repressive regimes.74  
The former British and French colonial territories in black Africa inherited a 
pool of under 90,000 men (including white cadres) at the time of their respective 
independence between 1957 and 1964. This number actually declined in the 
francophone territories due to budget pressure and the ensuing demobilisations 
from the French Army. This heritage – the forces of newly independent Africa – 
was meagre in absolute size by any standard, lacking in indigenous skills and 
the specialities necessary for the effective functioning of armed forces, and in 
many cases lacking those supporting armaments and services which make it 
possible to operate and deploy armed power against military opposition.75 
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Roger Murray generalised that, very much in contrast to Latin America and 
South East Asia, in Africa owing to the generally pacific character of the transfer 
of sovereignty, rather small and undistinguished armed forces had been 
inherited from the colonial regimes. The military estate, excepting Algeria, 
lacked an active tradition in the national independence movement.76 In contrast 
with other regions and with few exceptions – such as Zimbabwe – in Central 
Africa the military has not been the ‘primus motor of state-building and 
consolidation […] as it was in Europe’.77 
Unfortunately, much of the effort towards this aim was handicapped by 
both the lack of material traces of pre-existing statehood to build on and 
immaterial traces of statehood in the conscience of the populations, including 
on the perception and function of the armed forces. As an outcome, the 
domestic legitimacy of the state suffered even while its external sovereignty was 
being enhanced. As regards the armed forces, expatriate officers, anachronistic 
equipment, inglorious responsibilities, and a paucity of authentic tradition – such 
was the general legacy left by the colonial formation of African armies.78 
One can summarise that the colonial construct was a state-like structure 
without sovereignty. The sovereignty was only defended by its carriers, the 
foreign powers. The populations were thus not a part of this defence; hence 
they had no means to bargain for political rights. In the post-independence 
decades, clientelist systems, both domestic and in relationship to external 
powers, stabilised the situation to the benefit of local elites as well as ‘external 
patrons’.79 In the post-colonial/Cold War international era, African governments 
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used foreign assistance provided by competing donors ‘to finance the growth of 
the state apparatus and to secure political stability’.80  
In Central Africa, historical state formation ended, if it had ever started, 
with the advent of the imposed colonial state. Hence, the bargain for a social 
contract was omitted, because the ‘state’ did not have to rely on the 
populations’ consent, but rested entirely on violence and on indirect rule via 
cooperation with local elites. The only bargains were political covenants 
between the foreign powers and the local leadership, and the subservience of 
the people bought through the informal mechanisms of patronage systems. 
2.3 State Institutions in African Political Culture 
To understand the politico-cultural environment in Central African 
countries one needs to look at their specific politico-cultural heritage, and their 
political and military history. The political culture of a country includes its formal 
and its informal political systems, as well as its economic power structure. It has 
to be asked: how far is the state involved in the transfer of wealth, and what 
factors other than legal rational ones play a role in governance. 
When Carl Rosberg and Robert Jackson discussed the phenomenon of 
the persisting weak African polities, they cited external factors responsible for 
their survival as entities81 lacking empirical existence yet being recognised by 
the international community as states.82 Their internal weakness is aggravated 
by the enduring pre-independence political culture of informal clientele power 
systems, whilst their public shell is maintained from outside. The resulting 
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African elites’ relentless ‘pursuit of immediate gains’ to fund patronage networks 
is consequently another, whether intentional or non-intended, state-weakening 
behaviour.83 The strong tendency of neo-patrimonial systems to favour 
consumption over investment in institutional capacities results in the ‘ruin of the 
state itself’.84 The support from external actors to the elites, often motivated by a 
quest for a diffuse stability, legitimises the very forces that erode the state, or 
even prevent it from coming into existence. The strongest advantage of central 
patrons vis-à-vis their highest clients, is their access to external resources, be 
this on the local level through access to national players or, as François Bayart 
characterised those African leaders, through a system of “extraversion” based 
on the international patrons as warrants of system survival.85 By this means the 
central African political-cultural feature of clientelism is extended into 
international society. Many observers call these ‘patrimonial states,’ meaning 
that patron-client ties rather than legal-rational relationships form the basis of 
the polity.86 The patron is the state. 
The Central African political culture is shaped by a handful of very 
important features: personalised rule and extreme hierarchism, a lack of civic 
culture, and a closed society condition. In a context of individuals’ boundless 
exposure to legally non-restricted political and economic power, a constant fight 
for status, or even survival, and an atmosphere of mistrust and suspicion frame 
inter-subjective relations at all levels of society. No matter what public position a 
‘strong man’ holds, be this as minister of sports, or defence, or ministre délégué 
au tourisme, there is no sphere he could not reign over, as long as his peers, or 
superiors, do not mind. Accordingly, without an effective rule of law, everyone 
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has to live a precarious life of débrouille, in which only privileges count. The 
idea of a separation between official budgets and personal property is alien to 
Central Africans, to whom any aspiration for taking up a public position and not 
to exploit it economically is pointless. The resulting ‘personalisation of the state’ 
ensures that political support is built around personalities and individual favours, 
rather than policies. It also implies that the state represented by an office holder 
takes on the role of a patron rather than of an employer, in the course distorting 
the important ‘accountability link’ between the leaders and bureaucrats and the 
public. A systematically maintained non-distinction between state assets and 
personal property of the ruler is at the heart of this system. An all-embracing 
extreme hierarchism in a closed-society setting, monarchist tendencies in 
political organisation hand in hand with a hyper-consumptions attitude, and a 
surprisingly strong influence of irrationality in decision making infuse any aspect 
of life. All this together forms a certain political culture. 
2.3.1 Patronage and Its Political Implications 
According to Carl H Landé, clientelism in developing countries is one 
organising system of society, which may or may not be affected by the official 
political order, organised groups, class identification, or ideological affinity. At 
the core of clientelism is a multiplicity of personal relationships; and, even if 
identifiable groups appear within such patronage systems, they ‘operate less as 
disciplined collectivities than as clusters of personal relationships’.87 The direct 
personal character makes the patronage relationship dyadic, reciprocal yet 
hierarchic and unequal, unlike a theoretical relationship system based on an 
alliance between peers and on parties to a contract. The latter, contractual 
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relationships, involving ‘the enlistee in a modern army, the Weberian 
bureaucrat, and the factory worker’, are non-dyadic.88 They would be the result 
of negotiated social confrontation, sometimes of violent or political struggle, 
which did over time soften the hierarchical relationships through the application 
of checks and balances to political and economic power. But this mitigated 
social contractual relationship did not develop in Central Africa. Rather the 
pursuit of particular private aims binds the individual client to the patron who. in 
Landé’s words, ‘reserves for himself the right to set his own goals’ and chose 
the patron, or client, who best fits his strategy.89 The clientele ‘contract’ is 
implicit as opposed to formal and explicit contracts.90 Given the personal 
relationship, the inequality between master and client becomes more manifest 
as the relative dependency of the client grows, especially in African neo-
patrimonial systems, where the more or less institutionalised coercive apparatus 
of the state is interconnected via personal union with the patron’s networks. For 
the military of each of the three countries subject to this study we have to 




2.3.2 The Competitive Character of Clientele Systems 
Interestingly, the hierarchical cement of Africa’s political culture is 
paralleled and, to some extent, challenged by a highly competitive 
characteristic. This competitiveness, analysed by scholars such as Andreas 
Mehler, Nicolas van de Walle and Michael Bratton, occurs especially in all 
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societies that are ‘based on zero-sum, non-accommodative beliefs’.92 It has 
significant impact on the possibility to establish the ‘social contract’ necessary 
among all social groups including the elites to build a stable state. 
 
Patron-client relations are based on very strong elements of inequality and 
differences in power [and] the crucial element of this inequality is the 
monopolization by the patrons of certain positions that are of vital importance for 
the clients; especially [...] of the access to the means of production, major 
markets and centres of the society.93  
 
The difference from open-access orders is obvious, with little leverage in the 
hands of the client. It would, however, be a mistake to understand this as a one-
sided exploitative relationship, as it remains reciprocal in essence. Whoever has 
experienced being chosen and declared ‘patron’ by hopeful contemporaries 
knows how demanding this relationship can be for the patron as well. As much 
as patrons are seeking clients to improve their social or political standing, 
potential or actual clients immediately change their allegiance if the opportunity 
arises.94 In other words, in multiple social interactions one cannot speak of a 
“specific exchange”. Rather such interaction forms what Emile Durkheim 
originally described as pre-contractual elements in society95 and Talcott 
Parsons eventually conceptualised as ‘generalised exchange’.96  
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Western style individualism is hardly comprehensible to people living in 
multiple and exclusively hierarchical relationships that rarely allow an egalitarian 
relationship. People encountering each other will, without exception, try to grasp 
their hierarchical relationship before they engage each other in earnest. There 
is little social mobility other than that which is at the clemency of a patron, 
or/and at the expense of a competing client. To both patron and client, this 
generalised exchange functions as insurance: to the patron against the risks 
encountered in constant power struggle on his relative level of patronship and to 
the client against the uncertainties of living without legal and economic fall-back 
positions. The exchange is not an egalitarian one but materialises in gift giving 
and tribute payments. Both are seemingly voluntary contributions that are highly 
standardised. The patron has as many clients as possible, and the client is a 
manifold entity, trying in more sophisticated clientelist societies – as we will see 
below in the example of Cameroon – to improve his position by originating and 
developing new ‘elevators’ of advancement. These elevator networks do not 
work against the established hierarchies, but they may open the way to recruit a 
clientele of one’s own.97 The threats to patrons exist mainly from persons in 
comparable positions competing for the same relatively higher patron’s 
patronage, but occasionally a successful client manages to 
 
accumulate resources [political or other] which are not commensurate with their 
relatively low ascriptive standing, and [...] may threaten the patrons' monopoly of 
access to markets and to the centre or centres of the society.98 
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The ‘generalised exchange’ in Central Africa is not between equals. Its 
lop-sidedness was best described by William Reno, in an influential volume by 
Berdal and Malone, and is worth a lengthy quotation: 
 
To make patronage work as a means of political control, the ruler must prevent all 
individuals from gaining unregulated access to markets. A shadow state ruler thus 
logically seeks to make life less secure and more materially impoverished for 
subjects. That is, a shadow state ruler will minimize his provision of public goods 
to a population. Removing public goods, like security or economic stability, that 
are otherwise enjoyed by all, irrespective of their economic or political station, is 
done to encourage individuals to seek the ruler's personal favour to secure 
exemption from these conditions.99 
2.3.3  Access to Political Positions and Personal Enrichment 
“Privatised institutions” without the separation of the private and official 
spheres, produce a political administration that represents a personal affair of 
the ruler, much like in England before the rule of Charles II. Political power 
under such conditions is considered ‘part of his personal property which can be 
exploited by means of contributions and fees’.100 Marc Frontries has linked such 
political power, based on a political culture of hierarchism and consumerism, to 
the military culture of armed forces, which lack capacity and show indifference 
to the plight of ordinary people.101  
The culturally based political habitus of the rich and powerful, including the 
upper echelons of the military, are built both on an extremely hierarchical 
society and on the non-separation between state funds and private wealth. In a 
                                                             
99 Reno (2000), p.47 
100 Weber, Max (1978 (1922)), Economy and Society, University of California Press, 
Berkeley, pp.1028f 
101 Fontrier, Marc (2005), Des armées africaines: comment et pour quoi faire ?, Edition 
Outre-terre, Paris, p.71f 
85 
 
culture where political power is described by the verb ‘to eat’, sharing access to 
power is identical with losing it. Once power is weakened, the opportunities to 
raise funds are diminished, and political power based on a clientele network is 
eroded.  
In behavioural terms the strong connection between social hyper-
hierarchism and ‘consumerism’ impacts strongly on the shaping of the political 
order. The ‘politics of the belly’, an expression coined by Bayart, is the outcome 
of the indivisibility of power and wealth.102 In Central Africa the main channel of 
the distribution of wealth is the state, which in turn is the only public expression 
of the opaque underlying power systems, based on a clientele structure of 
society. 
The constant uncertainties of a system based on privileges rather than 
rights, the lack of security of one’s property, both private and commercial, and 
the constant pressure to either redistribute one’s gain or hunt for precarious 
sources of revenue have had their impact on the Central African political and 
general culture. A tendency towards quick gains and high turnover in 
redistribution has developed, which Ali Mazrui has described as ‘possessive 
individualism’.103 This is true for ‘big men’, but also for their clientele, and it 
applies to all layers of the clientele system, thus rendering it a general 
expression of the political and economic culture. As a result, even in good faith, 
African elites rarely manage to perform even the ‘developmental patrimonialism’ 
which they claim to carry out to the benefit of their countries.104  
The key consequences of the patrimonial configuration include an 
orientation toward the gain and preservation of personal interests, rather than 
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the common good; a political legitimacy based on the ability to control the 
distribution of wealth; and a resulting incompatibility with direct rule. With 
coercion being an imperfect means for efficient rule, and with fair participation in 
discussions being very difficult, corruption becomes a means of social political 
and economic existence.105 Corruption becomes a steady element of justifiable 
behaviour.106  
2.3.4  Some Political Consequences  
First: an absence of public accountability 
Neo-patrimonial systems are incompatible with any form of 
decentralisation of power. To the contrary, in ‘Big Men’ networks everything 
must follow the logic of personal relationships and must be communicated via 
the hierarchic chain that binds patrons and clients. The clientele shadow 
system, which results from this drive to keep total political control in the patron’s 
hands, works in two directions. First, and as intended, it undermines any 
development of flexible, interest-driven, or even cross-ethnic cooperation, let 
alone diversity in competing socio-political options, and it paradoxically 
provokes the creation of competing client systems by those who intend to gain 
influence.107 Among them are ‘secret societies, businessmen, chiefs, the 
military, [and] warlords […] tied together by key persons’ in order to prevent 
another independent carrier of political power to develop. This competitive 
setting also provides the groundwork for zero-sum thinking that does not permit 
the sharing of oversight powers.108 The channels and vehicles of power are not 
bounded permanently nor grounded in territory or other kinds of fixed 
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membership,109 as the ‘fluctuating, changing, and fluid’ character of informal 
networks counters any hopes for accountability of its members.110 As a result, 
the foundation of an effective state system becomes politically too costly for 
incumbent elites because to ‘give up their private wealth and privileges for the 
sake of a distributive logic based on merit and performance would be 
tantamount to political suicide’.111 This is particularly true for the DRC, where 
during the wars of the 1990s and 2000s, the ‘interests of local elites were better 
served through their association with informal and stateless governance 
structures’ than with the Kinshasa administration.112 
 
Second: Patrimonialist hierarchism in a closed society 
The highest position is never under threat because of lagging competence 
or performance, as is the case in democratic systems, but only when it 
becomes unable to gain and provide resources. 
If one measures African political culture along indicators of openness and 
political flexibility one would definitely find that it belongs to ‘closed societies’ – 
with all of the associated political implications. Within African political culture, 
this does not mean that political systems necessarily become totalitarian, as 
Karl Popper has assessed in the case of Europe; instead, as Sir Ralf 
Dahrendorf emphasises, within African contexts, local and national elites are 
rather contented if only no one criticises them or cultivates political 
opposition.113 Hence, the subjects of neo-patrimonial systems are expected to 
live in apathy, rather than being actively subdued. African political culture is thus 
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more of an authoritarian rather than totalitarian character, depending in each 
case on the political willpower of the commanding elements of the society.  
This setting boosts a constant social and political intra-elite power contest, 
in which incumbents, as much as opposition leaders, can only accept ‘winner-
take-all’ outcomes. Ultimately, there is no prospect for negotiated 
agreements.114 The middle layer of relatively well-off clients does not fare much 
better than their superior patrons, and the position of inferior clients is under 
constant threat. Depending on a single patron’s intercession and promotion at 
higher ranks in the clientelist system produces a similar level of stress, even if 
the financial situation is less precarious.  
Aspects of African political culture, often off-putting for Western reformist 
aspirations, include firm hierarchical thinking and customs, which have a 
paralysing impact on everyday life and, more importantly, on long term political 
perspectives. From childhood on, hierarchical thinking imprints individuals to 
function in a politically non-permissive environment and reproduces itself 
through a general non-critical obedience to the status quo. The International 
Network for Higher Education in Africa presents the following image of a typical 
Central African university, which seems to this author fairly representative of a 
more general phenomenon: 
The university model that is the legacy of the colonial tradition is a centralized and 
unified institution where powers are concentrated in the hands of authorities. It is 
an institution that cherishes centralization excessively and abhors delegating 
powers. It is conceived in the image of an absolute monarchy, jealous of his 
prerogatives, particularly with regard to conferring degrees and sharing 
knowledge.115  
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Political culture leaves its footprint on competing as well as collaborative 
informal social and political mechanisms. Everything must follow the logic of 
personal relationships and is communicated via vertical channels between 
clients and patrons. Below a central master-patronage network of the most 
powerful, horizontal communication between clientele sub-systems, or peers, 
within a patronage network fuels only competition rather than cooperation. 116 
The resulting muted communication is a very strong feature of such ‘non-
relations’, because everything has to go via the head of whatever organisation 
or community. 
Participation or delegation in any meaningful way represents a threat to 
everyone who has something to lose and this is the reason why the rentier 
states in place are organised according to the principle of ‘no taxation with no 
representation’.117  
Given that Central African political culture does not know any non-
hierarchical relationship – a person is never a peer, he is always either inferior 
or superior to any other member of society – this ubiquitous ‘ranking’ leaves no 
space for mobility, be this intellectually, via constructive criticism, or materially, 
by social mobility, without clashing with other spheres of interest. 118 The 
resulting lack of contractual patterns (Vertragskultur) based on equality in 
reciprocity (there being only dyadic unequal reciprocity) limits relationships to 
two options: to cheat if one holds the inferior hierarchical position or to impose if 
one holds the superior one. 
The non-acceptance of any critique, even in a constructive form, and the 
limitless obedience within the social and political (purely) vertical hierarchy, 
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albeit not absent on other continents,119 are very prominent in the Central 
African sub-region. In many conversations with this author, Africans from other 
regions either claim never to have shared, or alternatively to have overcome 
these cultural characteristics long ago. 
 
Third: The consolidation of patronage as a mode of post-colonial governance 
Whether intentionally or unintentionally, the carriers of the ideologies of 
independence and political self-determination at the same time maintained 
colonial-style governance in their newly emerging states. As it appears, liberal 
thought was never introduced to an extent that could trigger a reform of the 
Central African political culture in a profound way. Rather, patterns of pre-
colonial rule were maintained.120  
The combination of political immobility, weak civil societies, and few 
participatory traditions was part of the colonial legacy which ‘most of the first 
generation of rulers found useful to maintain’.121 The establishment of one-party 
systems, basically repeating the pre-independence ban on organised 
opposition, reinforced the established power relationship between the elites and 
the people, on whichever side of the Cold War contest a country was situated. 
Indeed, the great bipolar confrontation provided a comfortable environment to 
secure domestic power. The resulting states were defined by Neil Robinson as 
non-adaptive structures without infrastructural power, which are based on 
despotism, a policy and form ‘imposed by elites, rather than negotiated, and 
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enforced through the state’s possession of coercive resources, rather than 
accepted and enacted by society generally'.122  
In such a context it becomes easier to understand why personal rulers, 
who are obliged to be to some extent ‘inclusive’ in sharing wealth, rather chose 
compensatory channels via the clientelist scheme to attract loyalty, especially 
the loyalty of carriers of arms. If the stability of rule is based on pure coercion, it 
erodes over time and has to be replaced by the ‘gentler procedures of political 
patronage’.123  
In Central Africa dimensions of neopatrimonialism, including clientelism, 
‘Big Man’ presidentialism and nepotism, are so deeply ingrained in political life 
as to constitute insuperable institutions. Presidentialism is actually a hybrid form 
of what Ali Mazrui has called the African monarchical tendencies.124 He thus 
deduces present political settings from pre-colonial ones, pointing thereby to the 
strong position of the executive inherited from colonialism. 
By contrast, the notion that Africa was ever composed of sovereign states, 
classically defined as having a monopoly on force in the territory within their 
boundaries, was rejected by scholars such as Jeffrey Herbst and Mathieu 
Deflem. If they actually had, so the argument goes, the political structure of 
African states should be fully differentiated and territorially bound. In the Central 
African politico-cultural environment, however, the state could never become 
the all-embracing monopoly-holder of power. Political power systems are highly 
differentiated and the state is only one way to control wealth. The personal 
gains of power brokers are closely connected with the extractive instruments of 
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the pseudo-bureaucracy, and the interests of armed and non-armed members 
of the countries’ elites are strongly interwoven.  
The determined upholding of the institution of chieftaincy as the core of 
indirect rule ended with decolonisation in much of Central Africa. With the 
installation of bureaucracies, local traditional rulers were gradually side-lined. 
However, this policy was only partially successful, because the neo-patrimonial 
structure, as political ‘background noise’, stood in the way of establishing a true 
bureaucracy. Former chiefs’ consent was gained by appointing them to 
prestigious representative sinecure positions. Patronage networks continued 
working in a modern disguise. As a rule, intermediary power brokers were 
subsumed under the master patronage of the political leader, usually heading a 
single party system. In return the president would adopt pseudo-traditional 
insignia of power unrelated to the constitutional order.125 
Since there are hardly any intermediary levels of decision-making within 
the highly hierarchical Central African political structure, rulers often become 
increasingly isolated. The resulting effort to compensate for this isolation 
through alternative channels again strengthens informal systems. The military, 
an established factor within both the formal and informal systems, benefits 
significantly from its dual positioning in terms of networking. Simultaneously, the 
military can traditionally claim a good proportion of the state’s funds, which 
already helps to bribe it into obedience.126 In Central Africa the state is not 
simply a political instrument: it is the key source of revenues necessary to 
gratify one’s clientele. 
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Apart from materialistic reasoning Central African political culture is also 
impacted by a strong element of irrational or mystical beliefs, even if they may 
prompt objectively irrational behaviour based on supernatural ideas. As Michael 
Schatzberg and other researchers have demonstrated, witch hunts and sorcery 
play an important role in an environment where people throughout society 
consider the state as powerful only during daylight. At night, which virtually 
means in Central Africa during 12 out of 24 hours, the state is an impotent 
power as opposed to the creatures of the night. Such assumptions are not 
irrational in the eyes of many Central Africans, including the political elites.127 
On a fairly everyday basis, sorcery and witchcraft play an important role in 
society and politics (especially during election times) and have accompanied 
and expanded with modernity rather than having been wiped out.128  
In sum, the Central African political culture is based on a mixture of fear, 
opportunism, and constant ‘looking over one’s shoulder’ to avert being 
catapulted away from comfortable places within the clientelist order.129 
The formal political system only represents the visible element of the 
political condition. It is still very important as the means of representation and 
legitimacy vis-à-vis the international community. The informal power structure – 
partly existing under the façade of weak institutions, partly operating openly in 
parallel to them – is the scaffolding of the indirect rule order. Indirect rule, in 
turn, is the state-weakening policy par excellence. 
 
                                                             
127 See Schatzberg (2001) Moore, Henrietta L and Todd Sanders (2001), Magical 
Interpretations, Material Realities: Modernity, Witchcraft and the Occult in Postcolonial Africa, 
Routledge, London; Geschiere, Peter (2008), Witchcraft and the State: Cameroon and South 
Africa, Past and Present, 3, 313-335; Ndjio, Basile (2008), Mokoagne moni: Sorcery and New 
Forms of Wealth in Cameroon, Past and Present, 3, 271-289; Parés, Luis Nicolau and Roger 
Sansi (2011), Sorcery in the Black Atlantic, University of Chicago Press, Chicago 
128 Moore and Sanders (2001) 
129 Newbury, Colin (2003), Patrons, Clients, and Empire: Chieftaincy and Over-rule in 
Asia, Africa, and the Pacific, Oxford University Press, New York, p.12 
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2.4 Consequences for the Military 
Robin Luckham demonstrated as early as 1971 how military and security 
institutions link to their wider politico-cultural environment, showing that a great 
proportion of individuals within the security apparatus secure informal power in 
their organisation, irrespective of their formal status.130 In the perception of the 
population, too, informal mechanisms outpaced the state in importance. In order 
to explain this configuration we have to look at the historical process that 
caused the alienation between the military and the people, leading to the 
absence of a social contract as it was meant to be copied from older states at 
the time of independence.  
2.4.1  Inauspicious Beginnings: The Alienation of Soldiers 
from the Community at Independence 
The separation of community and the military, and their alienation from 
one another, was ushered in by the colonial quasi-state between the last 
decade of the 19th and the early 20th centuries.131 The African military no longer 
protected the existing social organisation of the society as their indigenous 
armies but appeared in its new role, shielding the state from alien rule and its 
autochthon bridgeheads.132 In addition, during wars of colonial conquest, 
Tirailleurs Sénégalais, or Askaris133 were essentially Africans making up the 
colonial armies’ rank and file, and these wars then mostly pitted Africans 
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131 See Iliffe (1979), pp.104f; Desforges, Allison (1972), Defeat is the Only Bad News, 
New Haven, Yale University Press 
132 As a rule, so called ‘martial tribes’ from remote marginal regions, who had little 
affinity to the rest of the country, were preferred as soldiers 
133 Arabic word for soldier, adopted to Swahili, and then applied to the native personnel 
of the German colonial Schutztruppe 
95 
 
against one another.134 The resulting symbiosis between foreign and local lords 
ruling the country was deftly described by Jean Pierre Chrétien as 'dual 
colonialism’.135 It is this process of alienation of the African carriers of arms from 
their community that for the first time allows the historian to speak of distinct 
civil-military relations in Africa.  
The new African leaders’ reservations about their prospective national 
forces were not exaggerated; after all, they had seen these soldiers fighting 
independence movements all over the world, in Malaya, Indonesia, and South 
East Asia. 
The multi-racial Troupes coloniales had become a prominent feature of 
French defence policy, as witnessed by the recruitment of over 40 African 
battalions for external service during the inter-war years. Crocker observed: 
 
Multi-racial troop deployment was integral to defence planning worldwide. [...] 
Recruits were fed into units destined to serve in other African territories, in other 
parts of the empire or in Europe, and these units derived their identity as much 
from their place of deployment as their place of recruitment.136  
 
The parallel service of Frenchmen and Africans – as well as French units and 
French-officered black units – blurred the territorial identities of colonial forces 
beyond recognition. 
Some World War II veterans had developed a more self-conscious stance; 
however, they could not provide a distinct form of nationalism such as their 
Europeans peers had learned – as many of them had not done their service in 
their region of origin, even if they had fought in Africa. British King’s Rifle 
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soldiers may have served overseas, but in Africa they would not have to 
differentiate Kenya from Uganda; few among Tirailleurs Sénégalais who found 
themselves as part of the armies of Mali or Guinea would have originated from 
the countries where they had been sent by their colonial masters. In a way, their 
combat experience in successfully formed units had left them as ‘national 
orphans’. Indeed, rather than join in the struggle for independence many African 
soldiers finally mutinied against their ‘own’ new states.137 
2.4.2  The Absence of a Role for the Military in the Social 
Contract 
The African military has not been a driving force of state-building and 
consolidation as it was in Europe.138 Leonard and Samanta describe this 
condition as a consequence of the missing social contract between the African 
peoples and their rulers. Such a social contract normally rests on two different 
bargains, one between the military and the civilian elites, and the other between 
this two-faced ruling elite and the people.139 The colonialist-coercive character 
of the armed forces, and foreign support to the regimes, permitted the omission 
of such a social contract.  
For the military this meant that its character as a purely colonial coercive 
force did not alter from its technical role in the colonial quasi-state to the post-
independence state. Instead, it became a control mechanism for the personal 
rule system, with its own internal clientelist dynamic. In addition, under Cold 
War conditions, the military swiftly transformed from an instrument of the state 
into an instrument of regime security as state and regime were fused in the 
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understanding of both the local elites and their international backers. The 
military was therefore shaped according to the needs of the ruling elites and 
their foreign patrons.140 Accordingly, the personal affiliation of the soldier 
increasingly shifted to his leader rather than to the state as ‘legal person’. 
Hence, in most of Africa the military is a corporate element of the 
neopatrimonial society, or as one observer puts it: ‘the armed wing of the ruling 
elites’,141 rather than an instrument to protect the nation.  
2.4.3  Compounding Soldiers’ Alienation: The Military 
Dependence on Foreign Support  
The end of the Cold War meant the loss of military patrons for many 
African officers.142 The same pattern of patronage networks that could be found 
in any section of the bureaucracy and the parastratal companies, applied to the 
international military world. The military built up their own international intra-
military clientele systems in parallel to the politicians' patron-client relations with 
external powers.143 The strong stand of high ranking officers in patron client-
relations within the military was described in organisational terms by Alex 
Weingrod and others, who provided detailed reports on how officers exploited 
external military aid to provide goods to their clienteles.144 The top military would 
decide on who received which privileges, like being sent abroad for training at a 
foreign military academy, or on a peace-keeping mission, both of which helped 
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increase the client's income and reputation – the foreign military advisor would 
decisively influence respective decision making back home. Via the private 
path, or the military one, or the bureaucratic way to wealth accumulation, 
everyone involved uses the network that shows the best prospects.145 To any 
military officer this may not necessarily be within the armed forces’ career 
path.146 External patrons of the military may become detached from their clients 
once a military ruler decides to civilianise his image; the examples of 
Habyarimana of Rwanda and the arms lobbyist ‘Papamadit’ Mitterrand spring to 
mind. The private international arms industry takes over the patrons’ role, under 
facilitation by former military international patrons. Hence, ‘the disproportionate 
support that outsiders give to Third World military organisations might be 
lending [them] extra strength vis-à-vis their competitors within their state’.147 
This strength adds to the advantages that the military gains from its political 
positioning, as mentioned above. 
2.4.4  The Blurring of Civil-military Distinctions in Africa 
In the 19th century, African CMR knew tensions similar to contemporary 
European ones. In Nigeria, for example, a system of constant checks and 
balances between a highly professional Yoruba military and the civilian ruler 
‘prevent[ed] clashes between the civil and military administrations’.148 There 
was awareness that ‘there would be no peace […] as long as professional 
warriors were allowed to dominate politics’.149 In 1894 this balance failed and 
the British resident governor was asked to arrest the commanding general, who 
was not complying with governmental orders. With this decision Nigeria entered 
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the complex civil military dialectic of parallel systems of local rule and colonial 
power. In general, in most of Africa, as Jane Chanaa has put it, ‘state and 
society are not exclusive domains’.150 She continues:  
Formal and informal boundaries are inherently blurred. Security forces are also 
neither professional nor objective in the traditional sense of the words. Informal 
security communities exist in which security is not just the preserve of the state 
but also a whole multiplicity of actors’  
For decades, African military involvement in politics was interpreted as a 
materialisation of the civil-military tension immanent in Western society and, 
thus, as an anachronistic fall-back to Bonapartism. It was overseen that African 
coups d’état were actually never purely military affairs, but always had a strong 
civilian component, if not predominance – pointing to a constantly smouldering 
rivalry among elite groups of civilian and military peers, rather than to a civil-
military standoff.151 According to Samual Decalo ‘an examination of the 
evidence does not reveal very sharp distinctions between civilian and military 
leadership in African countries’.152  
Scholars such as Eisenstadt and Roninger even hesitate to recognise the 
military as a type of formal social organisation and see it simply as a model to 
structure the flow of resources, of interpersonal interaction and of exchanges in 
society. Unequal power over resources at the heart of this system constitutes 
and maintains ‘an extremely hierarchical inter subjective culture of 
relationships’, and the military finds itself in a position comparable to any 
grouping or individuals fighting for a relative advantage relative to other 
clientelist channels of advancement. 153  
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Its official role as the defender of the state’s sovereignty is non-congruent 
with its actual place in society, which is in fact framed by the intra-elite contest. 
As a result, African soldiers of the same armed forces owe their acquiescence 
to different or similar personal patron officers. The client soldiers’ interpersonal 
relationships are thus indirect, via their patrons. Practically, they are part of 
competing groups of stakeholders with regard to a variety of economic, ethnic 
and personal grievances.154 A particularity of African views of what armed 
forces should owe to society, in other words ‘Une armée pour quoi faire’, is its 
strong involvement in the economic and infrastructural development of 
society.155 Unlike the Western understanding that there should be clear 
separation of army and society at large, African soldiers across the continent 
see non-combat roles for soldiers being realised by constructing schools or 
bridges, or even getting involved in the banking business or the management of 
plantations. The idea that military equipment or personnel should only be used 
to wage war is seen as unpractical and a waste of resources. In a number of 
states this attitude has produced a range of non-combat utilisations of troops. 
Interestingly, even this particularity in the assignment of the role of the African 
military, now rejected by Western military professionals, is part of the military 
inheritance from Europe. The FP annual report for Ruanda-Urundi 1944 
indicates that the military should be employed in the social and economic 
evolution of the colony (dans l’évolution sociale et économique de la colonie), in 
other words, what is normally understood as an original contribution of post-
colonial Africa goes back to doctrinal discussions at the Belgian general staff.156 
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2.4.5  The Military Sub-culture 
The military culture is shaped by this condition and reflected by the 
position of the military with regard to the civilian segment of the state. The 
particular Central African political culture, as will be demonstrated in our case 
studies, finds its expression and carrier-medium in the prevailing personal, 
indirect-rule regimes, in which the military is important.157  
Most obvious seems to be the heritage of a military sub-culture. As 
demonstrated in the volume by Britt et al., the military sub-culture had its own 
distinct space within colonial political cultures.158 Features of political cultures 
also include a variety of interacting sub-cultures. Organisational, bureaucratic 
sub-cultures and the military sub-culture are intertwined with group dynamics at 
the socio-psychological level and with personal survival strategy at the 
individual level. This is where these levels share characteristics that strengthen 
each other: hierarchism; extreme secrecy (mistrust out of fear to show a 
weakness, imagined or real) and self-protection against rivals for access; and 
superstition, which is very much due to the perception of a lack of upwards 
social mobility that can only be overcome by submissive behaviour or by 
plotting against someone (often through witchcraft, a fact that again boosts 
secrecy and reinforces the impression of individual vulnerability).159 The 
repercussion of this combination is a strengthening of closed society conditions. 
The inability to share information – which would probably be a way out of this 
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circulate behaviour, without being suspected of being a conspirator – is hence 
not part of this culture.  
2.5 Conclusion 
To understand the particular African setting that hampered modern state-
building, one needs to understand how African state formation was undercut by 
the import of the colonial façade state, and how African elites within these 
colonies adopted this early ‘quasi-state’ and eventually made it their own, 
thereby avoiding the social contract with the newly created nations. Hybrid 
states are actually what one found in colonial Africa, as they were not entirely 
ruled by colonial powers. This lack of control over the whole territory and the 
entire population continued into independence (rim-states) and until the present 
time represents an obstacle to building directly-ruled states, more so in the 
Congo and Cameroon than in Rwanda, where such efforts are under way. 
Overall, the configuration of African international society resembles European 
pre-Westfalian conditions of state formation. 
What happened in state-strengthening development in Europe was, 
however, not applied to these states’ dependent overseas colonial territories. As 
a result it is necessary to establish the stage of state formation or of state-
building in Central Africa by addressing the most salient features of 
state/military-formation that will help us to analyse African conditions:  
 
 First, rulers’ unwillingness or disinclination and inability or incapacity to impose 
direct rule over a multiplicity of centres of power, including the military; 
 Secondly, the central role of the army in the consolidation of a strong state; and  




Chapter Three: The Congo – the army that never was 
 
We will now apply Robert Jackson’s analytical approach on the quasi-
ness of statehood to assess the quasi-ness of the armed forces of the Congo. 
The quasi-statehood of the Congo is notorious for representing the so-called 
failed state. However, the Congo state, as will be demonstrated, had never 
existed in the first place because it fell back into the stage of state formation 
when state-building failed after independence.  
In 1960 the United Nations (UN) had to deploy a major military operation 
to ensure the territorial integrity of the country against its own mutinous armed 
forces, secession attempts, and foreign infringement. Fifty years on, the 
largest ever UN peacebuilding and state-building operation, MONUSCO, is 
now almost ten years on the ground, with no end in sight.1 This chapter will 
demonstrate that Congolese post-colonial designed state-building was aborted 
instantly after independence, and that the country reverted to a process of 
non-directed state formation. This had implications for the role and function of 
the armed forces in society. Congolese post-colonial history reveals a circle of 
corresponding state-weakening policies and military-weakening measures. 
The national armed forces failed to play both their political function as a pillar 
of the social contract, and their technical military function.  
After a look at the historical development of the Congo to provide 
information to assess the military’s actual role in society, the chapter 
addresses the degree of application of state-strengthening measures or state-
weakening policies and the political culture of which the military is part. This 
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will in turn allow us to address the military’s concrete technical roles in 
comparison to that which it claims to represent. 
 1 Congo Military-Formation  
1.1 Congo Free State and the Belgian Colony 
Two distinct stages divide the period of foreign rule in the Congo: firstly, 
the Congo Free State, and secondly the Belgian colonial construct as of 1908. 
The Congo Free State (CFS) of Leopold II was a private estate with 
international recognition but without external sovereignty, whose existence 
was guaranteed by all of the great powers, which made it unnecessary to 
secure it externally.2 It had no government other than the Belgian King’s 
emissaries. Internally, frequent temporary domestic licenses to exploit defined 
territories, and to police them, were sold to the highest bidder. This move 
materially undermined empirical domestic sovereignty over the colonial state.3 
What Congolese encountered as the state, they called Bula Matari, ‘the stone-
crusher’. Originally this term referred to the detonations of the early track 
building for the railway. It then became a nickname of Henry Morten Stanley, 
Leopold’s first chief inspector, and then evolved as a synonym for the state. 
Hence, whomever the Congolese found in the seat of the most powerful 
became Bula Matari, no matter what this authority’s legal stand as a state.  
Because of the idiosyncrasy of the CFS, it ‘made no sense of 
distinguishing between interior and exterior security functions’4 because the 
protocol of the 1885 Berlin agreement stated that the Congo Free State would 
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have to remain militarily neutral.5 Hence, ‘army’ would be a misnomer for its 
military organisation, the Force Publique (FP).6 The FP was an international 
conglomerate of mercenary officers and NCOs with pan-African soldiers, 
created by the Belgian home secretary.7 One typical example for an average 
FP garrison is given for 1884 as comprising two liberated slaves from Cabinda 
(Angola), seventeen men from Zanzibar, and eleven Nigerian Haussa. In 1905 
120 out of 217 officers were Belgians, seventy-one Italians, thirteen Danes, six 
Norwegians, five Swedes, one Swiss, and an American who became the first 
FP general.8 Civilian district commissioners, reporting only to the General 
Governor [gouverneur général], were direct superiors to the regional company 
commanders. From 1887 onwards Congolese soldiers from around the Haut 
Congo, the later Kinshasa province, were preferred for recruitment, and a first 
company of Congolese privates was created. This marks the moment when 
Lingala, a mix of dialects spoken in the home region of these soldiers, became 
the language of instruction of the FP, as Congolese recruits from other 
quarters of the country joined the force.9 Service with the FP was contracted 
for an initial seven years, which could be renewed several times for a further 
three years each time. At the end of their career soldiers returned home with a 
small pension. Some Africans were given the opportunity to specialise and 
become communication operators, or administrative agents, or gradés (African 
NCOs) up to the rank of adjudant chef.
10 
In general the deployment structure 
                                                             
5 General Act of the Berlin Conference on West Africa 26 February 1885 (1885), Berlin 
6 Vermeersch, Arthur and Félicien Cattier (1906), Opérations police et opérations 
militaires, Hayez, Brussels, p.2 
7 …who in turn retained the Belgian lieutenant Camille Coquilhat with the execution, 
see Newbury (2003), p.89 
8 As a failed experiment in 1886 350 Zulus were hired, to be commanded by a 
Portuguese officer, Etat Major de la Force Publique (1950), Leopoldville, Congo Belge, pp.33-
35 
9 However, officially French was the language of command: ‘Les commandements se 
font en Français’, see Lemarchand, René (1970), Rwanda and Burundi, The Pall Mall Press, 
London, p.204 




of the FP was a dispersal of small units (pelotons of 30 men down to small one 
man outposts) all over the large country.  
Organisational cohesion, professional discipline, or an esprit de corps did 
not develop, because the small units scattered all over the vast land were 
merely used for tax collection11 and domestic services to the local district 
commissioners or chefs de zones, secteurs or postes respectively. Tasks 
included work as blacksmiths, carpenters, masons, or for house cleaning, or 
cooking.12 Everyday tasks included wealth extraction, enforcement of heavy 
duties and coercion and contrasted strongly against a disciplined conventional 
military. Very early into the history of the FP there were concerns at the 
governmental level about local administrators who employed soldiers as 
bodyguards, granting them special privileges. According to Shaw: 
 
This kind of personalized military following drew the ire of the government 
[which] considered the military units as private armies [...] composed in violence 
of the regulations of the FP.13  
 
Accordingly, African NCOs were promoted not according their merits but 
for client services to their superiors.14 In order to limit the putative damage that 
soldiers could cause, an unprecedented ‘de-modernisation’ was ordered to 
exchange the FP’s then modern breach loading rifles for older muzzle loading 
weaponry.15 From the reluctance of implementation of this directive, and other 
routine disobedience like the non-implementation of an order to stop the 
                                                             
11 Tax collection actually means collection of rubber, as lively described in the 
contemporary literature, press, and diplomatic exchange, see for example Twain, Mark (1905), 
King Leopold's Soliloquy: A Defense of His Congo Rule, PR Warren, Boston, and The 
Casement Report, British Parliamentary Papers, 1904, British Parliamentary Papers, 1904, 
LXII, Cd. 1933  
12 Shaw (1984), pp.23ff 
13 Ibid. p.29 
14 Ibid. p.29 
15 Ibid. pp.31f 
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troops’ excessive dispersal, one can deduce the level of mistrust that the 
leadership had against its own inferior chain of command.16 
The history of the FP before the outbreak of the Great War is marked by 
brutality against the population, interrupted only by a chain of mutinies like in 
the first Congo capital Boma in 1900.17 The military was used to physically 
separate the ‘white’ areas from the Africans.18 
The military quality of the forces was fittingly poor. Even a long drawn-out 
campaign from 1892-95 against the Swahili slave traders in the Eastern 
Congolese Kivus could not help remodel the force into a distinct military body. 
In a 1906 report to Leopold’s general governor the inspectors realistically 
arrived at the supposition that ‘the Congo does not need an army. It needs a 
police but not only by name’.19 
The second phase of alien over rule of Congo, the Belgian Congo 
colonial state as of 1908, was an ‘inverted’ quasi-state in the reversed sense 
of Robertson’s definition.20 The Belgian Congo had its own domestic laws, a 
budget, and an efficient administration, but remained without external 
sovereignty (as opposed to the Robertsonian quasi-state, which lacks 
domestic empirical existence but has external sovereignty). A governor 
responsible to the Colonial Commission at the Belgian ministry of foreign 
affairs administered the colony, but its ultimate legislative authority was the 
parliament in Brussels. The colony’s own armed force kept the name Force 
                                                             
16 Ibid. p.36 
17 Verhaegen, Benoit (1967), L'Armée Nationale Congolaise, Etudes Congolaises, 4, 1-
31, p.3 
18 For example Camp Kotokoli in Leopoldville separated the ‘white’ Gombo area from 
the Africans. Before July 1960 indigenous people had to get clear of Gombo before night fell. 
At six o’clock a gun would be fired to make everyone aware of the duty to leave, and the 
means to implement the rule was the chicotte, a heavy whip made of hippo skin. The chicotte 
was abandoned in 1955, testimony of Congolese veteran, interview CO 12 Kinshasa, July 
2011 
19 Quoted by Vermeersch and Cattier (1906), p.260, this author’s translation 
20 Not all colonies were organised as colonial states. German policy under Bismarck 
avoided ‘the flag following the trade’ see Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (1969), Bismarck und der 
Imperialismus, Kiepenheuer & Witsch, Berlin 
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Publique. However, the original mercenary troops of the CFS were gradually 
phased out, and the FP was transformed into an all-volunteer, Belgian 
commanded, colonial military-cum-police. The FP was eventually extended 
into Katanga when Belgium reclaimed her economic monopoly back from a 
British company21, as the value of this province in mineral riches became 
evident.22 Under her Danish commander the Katangan section of the FP soon 
developed a military pre-eminence relative to the rest of the FP.23  
The Belgian colonial government tried to distinguish itself positively from 
the rough Leopoldian regime (with the Colonial Charta of 1908 focusing on the 
protection of the colonial subjects) but failed to do so because its control of the 
armed forces was deficient: armed sorties in 1912 and 1913, which resulted in 
240 and 511 killed African civilians respectively, could neither be prevented 
nor sanctioned, although they were considered illegal by the metropolitan 
authorities.24 Between 1910 and 1913 the governor tried to introduce a 
security sector reform that should have separated the military from the civilian 
command.25 This policy proposal got nowhere because interested district 
commissioners stalled the implementation until it eventually ‘flopped’.26 This is 
the second string that can be followed throughout Congo’s armed force’s 
history: firstly, general disobedience appears as a constant condition in the 
history of Congo’s armed forces; and, secondly, administrators and 
                                                             
21 Tanganyika Concessions Ltd 
22 Katanga units of the FP were also better equipped (Mauser rifles, Maxim machine 
guns, Krupp 7.5 guns) than the rest FP (Alpini fusils, bronze guns) for fear of British military 
companies in Zambia, see Lothaire, Roger (2008), Les débuts de l'artillerie coloniale belge, in 
Jacquij, Philippe, Jaarboek over uniformologie en krijgsgeschiedenis Koninklijke Vereniging 
Vrienden van het Legermuseum, Brussels, pp.69-100  
23 Shaw (1984), pp.20f 
24 Ibid. p.142 
25 In its article two of the reform, the related document states that only active Belgian 
officers shall recruited as officers of the FP, AA, Africa Archive of the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs/Ministere des colonies (1913), FP (2422) no 28 R18 II 17, Brussels 
26 Shaw (1984), pp.49, 53 
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responsible commanders merely paid lip service to reforms and improvements 
for the FP to transform it into a proper military.  
With the start of World War I the FP was administratively but not militarily 
organised at company level. Shaw affirms that it possessed no semblance of a 
serious military organisation. Artillery, engineering, logistics or health services, 
everything that went beyond being a mere constellation of uniformed warriors, 
were non-existent. Only the Katanga forces were grouped in battalion-size 
units and possessed an autonomous military command. 
Throughout its history the FP, rather than being a coherent and 
rigorously organised body with a cone-shaped chain of command, 'resembled 
a series of small disconnected military bands' directly reporting to the civilian 
cum military district commander.27 This is part of a heritage of personalised 
command structure shaping the exclusive loyalty of soldiers to their direct 
commanders. 
1.2 World War I 
Officially militarily neutral in accordance with the Treaty of Berlin of 1885, 
the Congo was ordered by the Belgian government to join its war efforts after 
an attack by German forces against the port of Lukuga at Lake Tanganyika on 
22 August 1914. Their first sortie in this war in September 1914 was to 
Cameroon. For two years, until the conquest of Jaunde (Yaoundé) on 1 
January 1916, 570 FP soldiers – by then equipped with a single section of 
artillery – assisted the French colonial forces in the Cameroon campaign. 
Because of the FP’s extreme degree of dispersal in the Congo it took until 
April 1916 to assemble a force strong enough to launch another campaign in 
                                                             
27 Ibid. p.18  
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East Africa.28 Then 719 European officers and NCOs, and 11,698 soldiers and 
gradés under the command of the Belgian general Tombeur attacked Rwanda 
and took Kigali in May 1916, to continue to the German administrative centre 
in Tabora, Western Tanzania.29 A third campaign against Mahenge (Tansanya 
Eastern high plateau) launched in mid- August 1917 on request of Great 
Britain was executed, under the command of the Belgian Colonel Huyghe, by 
450 officers, 6,600 soldiers and grades, and more than 20,000 carriers.30 A 
decisive victory remained however denied to the allies by the guerrilla tactics 
of the German von Lettow-Vorbeck.31 
Officers and NCOs represented about half of the 3,263 Belgians who 
lived in the Congo at the outbreak of the war. The FP of 15,000 soldiers grew 
during the war to about 25,000 men.32 Every battalion of approximately 600 
men was supported by 450 ‘porteurs’33, who had to be recruited and re-
recruited, officially as soldats de 2ème classe, during the campaign, often 
forcefully. Without roads, this was the only form of transport possible. In total 
an estimated 260,000 Congolese had to serve as carriers for some time 
between 1915 and 1918.
34
 However, as second class soldiers they would 
analogically remain second class citizens – in other words, mere subjects: with 
                                                             
28 Minutes of the Belgian War Cabinet, Le Havre, 1 December 1917, no 3775, FP 
(2422) no 28 R18 II 17 
29 Interestingly, much of the fighting during this advance was against Askaris serving 
the Germans and their Rwandan allies. The Rwandans remained loyal to their German joint 
commander, and fought all the way to Tabora, although their alliance commitment ended at 
the boundary to Tanzania, interview with Major Gerard Nyirimanzi, military historian at the 
Rwandan MOD  
30 Jacquij, Philippe and Pierre Lierneux (2008), Les gradés et soldats de la Force 
publique pendant la guerre de 1914-1918, in Jacquij, Philippe and Lierneux, Pierre, Annales 
d'uniformologie et d'histoire militaire Société Royale des Amies du Musée de l'Armée, 
Brussels, p.162 
31 See Belgian Army General Staff (1929), Les campagnes coloniales belges, 1914-
1918, Vol.3, Institut Cartographique Militaire, Brussels 
32 Reyntjens, Filip (1985), Pouvoir et droit au Rwanda, Droit public et évolution 
politique, 1916-1973, Musée Royal de l’Afrique Centrale., Tervuren, pp.102ff 
33 De Waele, Jan (2008), Voor Vorst en Vaderland: Zwarte Soldaten en Dragers Tidens 
de Eerste Weredoorlog in Congo, in Jacquij, Philippe, Jaaboek over uniformologie en 
Krijksgeschiedenis Koningklijke Vereniging Vrienden van het Legermuseum, Brussels, p.114 
34 AA, Africa Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (ny), Archive de Guerre, 1914-
1918, 663/28/2/19, Force Publique, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Brussels 
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an average of 28 per cent the annual mortality rate of carriers was even higher 
than that of soldiers, which reached ten per cent at its peak.35 Soldiers did not 
live in good circumstances either. According to inspection reports the state of 
the FP’s equipment and of the garrisons was pitiable, and the discipline 
accordingly low. Not only did the soldiers have to live in unhygienic conditions 
(described as saleté repoussante), they also received only a fraction of the 
amount of drinking water that was granted to white officers (one litre compared 
to three litres per day respectively).36 The war did not change the FP as its 
main tasks remained unchanged. 
1.3 The Inter War Period Colony 
With the experience of the war the colonial government tried to preserve 
some of the professionalism gained during force deployments abroad. A total 
of six battalions of Troupes en service territorial (TST) and Troupes campées 
(TC) were formed. TSTs were miniscule units widely dispersed over the whole 
territory; TCs were garrisoned companies in each of the provinces. The latter 
were considered of some military value. It became official policy to rotate 
dispersed TSTs on a regular basis back to the TC troops, which were 
considered in better military order. Still, the largest TST unit to rotate was the 
peloton. Unfortunately, instead of improving the TST soldiers’ discipline, the 
system eroded the discipline of the TCs. The influence from Kinshasa 
remained shallow, and command and control of TST units between rotations 
remained weak, leaving practically every second man at the permanent 
personal disposal of the regional civilian administrator.37 This led to repeated 
military operations decided by ‘men on the spot’, which were regularly 
                                                             
35 Belgian Army General Staff (1929), p.438 
36 De Waele (2008), p.128 
37 Interview former Belgian Congo regional administrator, Brussels March 2010, and 
follow up e-mail exchange in 2011 
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criticised by successive Governor Generals as excessive. The incomplete 
military layout of the FP contributed to the bad results of operations. Inability to 
serve as a genuine military force was not compensated for by good policing, 
although the FP was meant to provide both services. The situation 
deteriorated over the years as soldiers got accustomed to petits profits from all 
sorts of corruption and illegal taxing, to the point that a mid-1930 report 
diagnosed that within a short time there would not be a single serious soldier 
left among the troops.38 Lack of even minimal logistics drove the troopers to 
pillage villages. In sum one has to agree with Shaw’s observation that the FP 
'was not an army in the conventional sense of the word', and that its everyday 
tasks of tax collection and coercion subverted the development of a coherent, 
professional military.39  
In spite of sporadic administrative restructuring measures to 
professionalise it, the force remained the same because its tasks did not 
change. Occasional violent uprisings by the population in the early 1920s, in 
1926, and in 1931 were brutally subdued whilst, as a result of the global 
economic crisis, the living conditions of the military deteriorated.
40
 Although 
the numbers of officers and soldiers were reduced before 1939 by 17 and 36 
per cent respectively, the allocated reserves of, for instance ammunition, were 
not available for a military sortie when the Second World War started. After the 
Belgian defeat in Europe, Governor General Ryckmans in Leopoldville 
declared that the Congo would side with the allies, and in May 1940 the 
mobilisation brought the FP’s strength to 18,000 troops plus 12,000 carriers.41 
                                                             
38 Shaw (1984), pp.89, 91, 95f 
39 Ibid. p.333; we will again encounter this FP in the role of an occupational force in 
former German territory, where it acted completely independent from civilian control although 
nominally being under its supervision – see case study Rwanda 
40 See AA, Africa Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1930), Rapport Annuel de 
la Force Publique 1929, Leopoldville; Bangoura (1993); AA (1930)  
41 Jacquij, Philippe and Pierre Liernieux (2008), Les soldats et gradés de la Force 
publique pendant la guerre 1940-1945: Abyssinie, Nigérie et Moyen-Orient, in Jacquij, Philippe 
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1.4  World War II 
During World War II the exiled government of Belgium in London decided 
to deploy the FP as its army against France in West Africa and Italy in 
Ethiopia, although a campaign of 13,000 FP against Vichy loyal Dahomey was 
aborted when the local French administration turned to De Gaulle’s France 
libre.42 In Abyssinia the FP, the so called ‘Belgian contingent in Sudan’, 
achieved a remarkable victory at Saio on 3 July 1941, capturing eight Italian 
generals and 5,000 troops. The FP also saw combat in a joint assault with the 
King’s African Rifles on Asosa/Ethiopia.43 Later on, about 10,000 FP guarded 
prisoner camps and fuel depots in the Sudan and Egypt, in order to relieve 
British military resources until 1944. Participation in the European theatre, 
however, was barred by strong British reservations.44  
The Belgian government in exile considered it inappropriate that none of 
their military contributions to the war efforts came from Belgian-administered 
territory. Hence, to participate in the planned D-Day operations all of the 
training for Belgian fighter and bomber pilots (entrainement de pilotage 
avancé) was moved from Canada to a new base in Kamina/Katanga. 
In January 1945 all Congolese troops were back home, and the 17,000 
men strong FP returned to its peace time structure, divided into the usual TCs 
and TSTs now rebranded Détachements en service territorial (DSTs). 
Attempts to form a colonial army attached to the Belgian ministry of defence, 
and a gendarmerie under the ministry of colonies, failed due to a lack of 
funding45 and the FP remained the only regular armed force on the Congolese 
 
                                                                                                                                                
and Liernieux, Pierre, Annales d'uniformologie et d'histoire militaire Société Royale des Amis 
du Musée de l'Armée, Brussels, p.176 
42 The soldiers had already disembarked in Nigeria, but returned home 
43 AA (1944), p.17 
44 Jacquij and Liernieux (2008), pp.176f 
45 An independent police did not exist before 1950. An initial 2,000-strong police staff 




Table 2: Congolese Spitfire aircraft were donated by Belgian citizens. Each 
province bought one plane that carried the respective names, like Leopoldville, 
Katanga, Maniema, photo Koninlijk Museum van het Leger en de 
Krijgsgeschiedenis, Brussels  
 
territory until 1953, from which time the Belgian metropolitan army was present 
on the ground.46 Overall, the state of discipline in the FP for the period 
between 1950 and 1957 was reported as good, but the level of organisation 
and training was evaluated as poor. For example, only one deserter, but forty-
two missing (disparus) soldiers were reported. The authorities simply did not 
know where they had been sent.47 For 1958 no sorties other than military 
parades were reported.48 These so-called ‘démonstrations de force’ or 
                                                             
46 Interview Be 8 with Belgian veteran who had completed his military conscription in 
Congo, Liège, 2012: see also Van Reybrouck, David (2012), Kongo Eine Geschichte, 
Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/Main, p.15; and Newbury (2003), p.36; garrisoned and non-active on 
Congolese territory, these forces were redeployed to Belgian Ruanda-Urundi after Congo’s 
independence in 1960 
47 AA, Africa Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1957), Rapport Annuel de la 
Force Publique 1957 FP 2463, Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Belge, Leopoldville, pp.43, 
58 
48 One former Belgian administrator confirmed to this author that during his period of 
service between 1953 and 1958 he never used the FP in his district, conversation with the 
former administrator for two territories in Kasai 
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‘promenades militaires’ at company level left a ’deep impression on the local 
populations’.49 
By 1959 the military had made some progress towards professionalism. 
During the late 1950s the Belgians had profoundly modernised the FP 
technically. They had set up a considerable collection of rolling stock, 
commando units, and armoured (blindés) units – three such battalions at 
Kitona, Kamina and Banane in total.50 Africanisation of the force had started in 
1954, although a feasibility study for the FP general staff had advised against 
recruitment of African officers ‘ni en temps de guerre, ni en temps de paix’. 
According to this assessment, the Congolese ‘mentalité infantile` would 
frustrate any attempt to produce good officers.51 Yet, military education at staff 
level was launched in Luluabourg in 1954, but at independence in 1960 there 
were no graduates higher than sous-lieutenant.52 By 1960 the number of 
troops rose to 24,000 soldiers, living in military accommodation of different 
kinds, accompanied by about 30,000 women and children. 
1.5 Confusion from the Beginning 
 
Independence on 30 June 1960 did not result in the hoped for 
materialisation of a stable state. Only six days into self-government the armed 
forces of the young Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), as the country 
chose to name itself at independence, mutinied and nipped the post-colonial 
                                                             
49 Rapport Annuel 1958, p.76ff 
50 This was the base in which the United States later anchored its military support, 
when it invested heavily in 1963 to fully equip six Congolese battalions. FP at the time also 
owned thousands of lorries and jeeps, and 11 airplanes with eight to ten seats. However, it 
was considered by its CIC Major General Janssen as of little military value against an 
organised attack, AA (1958), Inspection Report FP (2473) 239 
51 This and the previous quote are from the study by Capitaine Howard, (1950), pp.11, 
17; a similar view was still aired by a retired Belgian officer, who had trained Congolese 
military during throughout the 1980s. His assessment was that his students were persons who 
had never had the opportunity to learn the basic skill of learning and were as a result unable to 
acquire complex knowledge; interview Be 13 with the author, Liège, July 2012 
52 Vanderstraeten, Louis-François (1985), De la Force publique à l'Armée nationale 
congolaise: histoire d'une mutinerie, juillet 1960, Académie Royale de Belgique, Brussels; a 
Second Lieutenant commands a section of twelve soldiers  
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state-building process in the bud. At that moment the only military force 
available to the government was a company of borrowed Ghanaian soldiers. 
The rebelling battalions as of 6 July were given the right to elect their own 
officers. The result showed clearly that the Congolese soldiers were not hostile 
to their former commanders: 255 out of 500 Belgian officers and NCOs were 
elected by the African soldiers of their units and remained for some time with 
the new armed forces. Particularly in the Kivu and Orientale provinces units 
stuck to their elected FP officers until 1964.53  
Only another week after the start of the general mutiny of the Congolese 
armed forces, on 11 July, Katangan politicians, organised around Moīse 
Tshombé as Conféderation des Associations Tribales de Katanga, and 
supported by soldiers of what should have been the regular Congo army, 
began an armed campaign for secession from the central government. 54 This 
war was to last until January 1963. Secessionists of the Kasai province, led by 
‘His Imperial Majesty Kalonji’ and supported by Belgian soldiers55, launched 
their own campaign in August.56  
Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba successfully ended the mutiny of the 
rump military left to Leopoldville by accepting the soldiers’ major demands 
within one week, including promoting them en masse.57 Former FP platoon 
sergeant (adjutant) Victor Lundala became commanding general (although 
then dismissed on 12 September); former FP sergeant Mobutu was promoted 
as colonel and head of the general staff (and about whom we will hear more!). 
                                                             
53 Interviews Be 6, Be 7 with two Belgian veterans, Woermont, Pettiaux, Brussels 
October 2011; see also Verhaegen (1967), p.11 
54 Tshombé is actually a nick name of Moīse Kapenda meaning ‘manioc’ because his 
father made a fortune with manioc plantations, see Burk (1992), p.66 
55 At least from June to September 1960 
56 Ebenga, Jacques and Thierry N’Landu (2005), The Congolese National Army: In 
Search of an Identity, in Rupiya, Martin, Evolutions & Revolutions: A Contemporary History of 
Militaries in Southern Africa Southern Africa Institute for Security Studies, Pretoria, Pretoria, 
p.65 
57 All members of the armed forces were promoted by one rank, leaving the army of 
26,389 without a single private, see Vermeersch and Cattier (1906), p.13 
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The Armée nationale congolaise (ANC) was created by presidential decree on 
8 July 1960 and sent to fight both the Kasai and the Katanga rebellions. In the 
course of this campaign former FP soldiers committed wide scale massacres 
against the population.  
Simultaneously, two competing delegations arrived in New York to lobby 
for support for the government in Leopoldville, one sent by President Kasa-
Vubu, the other by Prime Minister Lumumba. The Security Council chose 
Kasa-Vubu’s delegation to talk to. During the subsequent constitutional 
standoff between President and Prime Minister, in which they dismissed each 
other from their respective positions, the ANC under the command of Joseph 
Mobutu perpetrated its first coup d’état, overthrowing the government on 14 
September 1960. Two weeks later Mobutu suspended the first Congolese 
constitution.58 
For some time the territory of the Congo housed four different 
governments, none of which was legitimate, and none covering 50 per cent of 
the territory. As shown by the map below, there was the République du 
Congo-Léopoldville of the putschist military junta in the capital Leopoldville 
(later Kinshasa); the République libre du Congo under Antoine Gisengy’s 
Mouvement National Congolais/Lumumba faction residing in Stanleyville (later 
Kisangani) that held out until September 1961; Moīse Tshombé’s Katangan 
secessionist government in Elisabethville (later Lubumbashi); and Albert 
Kalonji’s South Kasai secessionists in Bakwanga (Mbuji-Mayi) until October 
1962.59 Little reported is the fact that even the provisional Katanga state had 
                                                             
58 Ebenga and N’Landu (2005), p.65 
59 Ndaywel e Nziem, Ididore (1998), Du Congo des Rébellions au Zaïre des Pillages, 
Cahiers d'Etudes Africaines, 38, 150-152, 417-439, p.420 
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its own internal secession conflict with the Baluba people of Katanga, who, in 
turn, demanded independence under the leadership of Jason Sendwe.60 
 
Table 3: Map of Congo in the 1960s 
 
The ANC was unable to face about 600 Belgian troops supporting the 
Katangan secessionists whilst mutinying against the elected government and 
the local population. They needed the massive international support of the first 
United Nations peace support operation, UNOC, from July 1960 to June 1964, 
which established at least a certain territorial unity of the country. 61  
                                                             
60 Lanotte, Olivier (2012), Online Encyclopedia of Mass Violence, 
www.massviolence.org/Chronology-of-the-Democratic-Republic-of-Congo-Zaire-1960-1997  
61 United Nations (1960), Resolution S/RES/143, of 14 July 1960 six weeks into 
independence called for support to the Congo that that would enable its armed forces to, as it 
is put in the resolution, ‘meet fully their tasks’. Operation ONUC also helped containing the 
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In spite of the apparently open conflict between Belgium and the DRC, 
20 Belgian military advisors formally stayed until 1963, but other Belgian 
officers still in Congolese uniforms were gradually phased out. At the 
conclusion of the war, the officers of those units that had fought as Lumumbist 
rebels were integrated into the ANC, keeping their rebel ranks. This policy of 
reintregration of complete rebelling units, the so-called mixage, into the regular 
armed forces, a pattern actually inherited from the old FP, would come to 
haunt the Congolese armed forces well into the 21st century.62  
To launch another fresh start for a Congolese army, two Belgian officials 
from the ministry of defence arrived in 1963 at the request of the government 
to make a thorough inventory and audit of the state of its armed forces’ affairs 
and assets. Because the conflict between Belgium and the DRC over the 
Katangan question had not ended at the time, and the DRC had officially cut 
its relations with Brussels, these conseillers had to move across the River 
Congo to Brazzaville and return the three miles by boat to Kinshasa on a daily 
basis. Nevertheless the Belgian officers were provided with cars and aircraft, 
and they succeeded in finding scattered ANC units all over the country.  
For the period from 1960 to 1972 the military is described by 
contemporary observers as a mere continuation of the structures of the 
colonial FP, although some tentative restructuring was launched after 1967. 
During this era there was never a coherent military body in the Congo. Infantry 
‘battalions’, the largest units, were dispersed all over the country just like 
former FP troupes campées were. At no moment did larger, versatile, 
                                                                                                                                                
ANC mutiny in Thysville, where Moroccan forces disarmed the whole garrison of Camp Hardy, 
Scholl-Latour, Peter (1989), Mord am grossen Fluß, DTV, München, p.149  
62 This was done after the mutinies of 1895, 1897, 1900, 1944 and 1960. 
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autonomous units at brigade, let alone division level, as one should expect 
from an armed force of this size, exist.63  
1.6 The Cold War  
Until 1965 mutinies on various scales were daily occurrences, and only 
from 1965 onward were new soldiers, who had not been members of the 
Belgian FP, recruited. Between 1967 and 1973 the training of units was 
intensified, with the total military coopérants rising to 245 on average per year. 
However, this training, provided at tactical level only, was executed in a way 
that would not allow the establishment of a single, coherent, military body. 
Most of the attention that the ANC gained at the time was for its dubious 
performance in South Kasai. After two years of Kasai self-rule under an 
increasingly tribalised and violent regime, the ANC attacked. In the course of 
their campaign, ANC soldiers killed as many insurgents and other civilians as 
they could capture.64 Dag Hammerskjöld described both the massacres of 
unarmed civilians committed by the ANC near Mbuji-Mayi and the murder of 
an estimated 6,000 Baluba people by the Katangan gendarmes as genocide.65  
By 1966 the war ended, and about 10,000 Katangan fighters retreated to 
Angola, taking their arms with them, whilst 5,000 joined the ANC as nine, 
basically independent, commando battalions. Although the integration of the 
Kasai fighters by brassage was suggested, a method that would have meant 
the dissolution of their units and integration of individual soldiers in other units, 
the majority of the Kasai fighters refused this, and most of them joined their 
                                                             
63 The formation of brigade level units was not achieved before 1979, well after, and in 
response to, lessons learned during the two Shaba wars  
64 One example was the capture of Manono when 50 POWs were mutilated before 
being shot, in another case 880 civilians were killed by the ANC in Kongolo in February 1962, 
see Kestergat, Jean (1986), Du Congo de Lumumba au Zaïre de Mobutu, Paul Legrain, 
Brussels, pg.123-125 
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comrades in Angola, in the course preparing huge arms caches to prepare 
their later return with the support from locals.  
A short time after the Katanga secession had finally been repulsed, 
another part of the country broke away. When President Kasa-Vubu’s policy 
turned out to discriminate against politicians from the Eastern regions, war 
resumed. Major uprisings in the East and South, triggered by former 
Congolese minister Mulele, and by Laurent-Désiré Kabila respectively, 
shuttered the DRC. This armed rebellion was started in April 1964 by the 
Lumumbist Conseil National de Libération (CNL) and lasted well into 1966. At 
the end of June 1964 the UN troops had left, and already in August 1964 the 
rebels, once more including deserted ANC soldiers, captured Kisangani and 
declared it the capital of the new People’s Republic of the Congo.  
Again, the Lumumbist rebellion could only be defeated by foreign 
support: firstly it was contained by Rhodesian and South African mercenaries, 
and eventually US aircraft dropped Belgian paratroopers – this time fighting on 
the side of Kinshasa.66 Christophe Gbenye’s CNL declared a ‘second 
independence’ in order to liberate the Congo from its alleged new foreign 
masters, the USA and Belgium, represented by a ‘puppet regime’ in the 
capital. 67 This uprising caused an estimated 20,000 victims. Alleged local 
intelligensia-collaborators were intentionally targeted.68  
The exceptional brutality of these uprisings and of the response was due 
to the pseudo-religious mobilisation of Mulelist fighters, the Simba, on the one 
hand, and to the ruthlessness of the European mercenaries executing 
government policy on the other. Poorly equipped and steadfastly believing in 
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their invulnerability, the Simbas were easily defeated by small sections of 
mercenaries because of the latter’s fire-discipline.69 About 2,000 European 
and suspected ‘westernised’ Congolese, who were taken hostage in Kisangani 
and other places, were eventually liberated by a regular Belgian force, the 1st 
paracommando regiment.70 
In the meantime, in July 1964, the former Katangan rebel leader, Moïse 
Tshombé, returned from his exile to be appointed Prime Minister. He won the 
national elections of May 1965 only to be toppled by General Joseph Mobutu’s 
second coup d’états on 24 November 1965.71 At the time Congolese armed 
forces, similarly to civilian administrative services, were nowhere close to 
representing coherent national institutions. Further armed rebellions broke out 
in 1966, lasting well into 1967. Firstly there was a mutiny by ex-Katangan 
gendarme veterans who were earlier reintegrated into the FAC in Kisangani as 
their leaders returned to the capital, and who did not want to accept the coup 
against Tshombé. Secondly, only a year later, the same ex- Katangan 
soldiers, this time supported by many of the foreign mercenaries that once 
fought against the Katanga uprising, marched eastward from Kisangani to 
occupy Bukavu, in the South of Kivu. What had started as a protest over 
unpaid wages culminated into yet another secession attempt as the mutineers 
and mercenaries declared their own republic in order to have negotiation 
leverage against the capital, renamed Kinshasa. It took the biggest part of the 
                                                             
69 Similar to later Maï-Maï (water.water) fighters, the Simba believed to be invulnerable 
due to holy waters sprinkled over their bodies.  
70 Operations Dragon Rouge (Kisangani), Dragon Noir (Isiro), Dragon Blanc (Bunia), 
Dragon Vert (Watsa); 392 European civilians were killed during the uprising, Villafaña, Frank R 
(2012), Cold War in the Congo, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, p.94  
71 Tshombé would eventually be charged for high treason in 1995. He went to exile to 
Spain, from where he was abducted and brought to an Algerian prison, where he died in 1967. 
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ANC to besiege them. When the rebels eventually ran out of ammunition, in 
November 1967, they retreated to Rwanda.72  
Western, especially Belgian, German, and US involvement provoked a 
reaction from the Communist block; the assassination of Prime Minister 
Lumumba, executed by Belgians on behalf of the CIA, and the steady support 
by these states and Italy, Taiwan, and South Korea to General Mobutu’s 
regime, triggered arms deliveries and personnel support to Congolese rebels 
from the Soviet Union, China, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Mali 
and Tanzania.73 Congo had become a battlefield of the Cold War.  
1.7  The Mobutu Era, a By-product of the Cold War 
Although the regular Congolese army, rebranded the Forces Armées 
Zaïroises (FAZ) in October 1971, had never performed well, its deliberate 
neglect by the political leadership during the following ten years would weaken 
it even further. Nevertheless, in a certain nostalgic retrospection, the period 
from 1972 to 1979 is considered by many observers as the ‘Golden Age’ of the 
Congolese armed forces. Contemporary witnesses widely agree that, if ever, 
this was the age of a Congolese army meeting the definition of a professional, 
differentiated yet unified coherent military body, able to perform large scale 
military operations including inter-state warfare.74 Although much of the more 
critical literature published in the post-Mobutu era claims that the military value 
of the Congolese forces has been poor at any given time, according to a 
contemporary German military observer ‘at least tactical combat level they 
                                                             
72 See the account of one of the mercenaries, Kimonyo, Jean Paul (2010), 
Understanding Rwanda's Journey publisher 
73 The most spectacular equivalent to Western mercenaries was the failed Cuban 
support to Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Tanzania based rebels, see Gálvez, William (1999), Che in 
Africa: Che Guevara's Congo diary, Ocean Press, New York  
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were capable fighters’.75 At the operational level, however, it was foreigners 
who organised military campaigns. 
After 1971 the politicisation of the armed forces began with the process 
of authenticity and Zaïrinisation – including rebranding the DRC ‘Zaïre’ – and 
the construction of a one-party state.76 The Mouvement populaire de la 
révolution (MPR) became the superior political institution of the state with all 
other institutions, including the FAZ as of 1977, subordinate to the party and 
its leader, the président fondateur.77 The dictator’s posts included Supreme 
Commander, Commander-in-Chief, President of the Superior Council of 
Defence and Minister of Defence.78 Every officer had to be a member of the 
MPR, and promotions depended more on active involvement in the party than 
on military qualities. In other words, the military had become Mobutu’s FAZ.79 
There is general agreement among ex-FAZ officers interviewed for this study 
that a devaluation of the armed forces was systematically pursued after a 
short-lived (between 1979 and 1982) period of personal interest of the 
president in owning a prestigious army that should underline his status as 
primus inter pares among African heads of states. However, Mobutu’s desire 
for a strong force was ambiguous. For instance, although officers were trained 
abroad, for example, ten Congolese officers had been trained in Hamburg, to 
maintain all of the communication devices that West-Germany had donated, 
they were deployed to unrelated posts when they returned.80 
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Congo’s military weakness, obvious from the late 1970s until the mid- 
1990s, was not considered a structural problem, but thought to be due to a 
mere lack of quantitative means to keep up a seemingly well-developed 
general military capacity.81 The propaganda effect of a country wide film 
screenings of the parading ‘Division Kamaniola’ was limited, and neglect of 
this unit ever after contributed to its military weakness. In 1981 for short period 
things seemed to improve. Foreign military observers were much impressed 
by the combined-arms field training exercise of the FAZ in 1981, thereby 
ignoring the fact that is was entirely commanded by Belgian officers. This 
‘goodwill’ assessment of the FAZ was probably due to wishful thinking among 
Western partners, desperate for success within a Cold War setting that saw 
their influence waning in Asia and Central America, and among the 
Congolese, proud to have on display the biggest and best among African 
armies.82 However, this famous field training remains the only successful 
event in the history of the Congo armed forces.  
The reality was, un surprisingly, different. With the decision to make 
membership in Mobutu’s party obligatory for all military, the personal rule 
system of the president-fondateur became the key operating principle of the 
armed forces. As one exiled former general of the FAZ explained to this 
author, military ranks became utterly irrelevant within the force by the early 
1970s.83 What counted was one’s place in the hierarchy of the party, including 
membership in party committees. According to the source, on occasions a 
brigadier would, contrary to military customs, salute a major – not only in the 
rooms of the party central committee, but also when they met in the barracks. 
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82 Interview Co 11 with former German military observer, Kinshasa July 2011 
83 Interview Co 4 General Mukobo, Brussels, October 2011 
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Another witness84 gave the example of a battalion commander’s title as Le 
Président sous-sectionnaire du MPR et Commandant du 12 ème battalion, 
clearly indicating the superiority of the party position over that in the military 
chain of command. With the establishment of a corps of political commissars 
(Mobilisation Propagande et Animation politique), the party had soon become 
the prevailing road of access to resources and influence.  
This politicisation of the army had several other serious implications. 
Firstly, it devalued the military proficiency of the FAZ. De-professionalising the 
armed forces (Congolese witnesses usually refer to the term ‘banalisation de 
l’armée’) was sped up by the execution of capable officers during political 
purges. In 1978, for example, ten generals who had graduated from the Royal 
Belgian military academy were executed; some of them directly after landing 
from Brussels at the Kinshasa airport. One former Congolese captain, who 
was dismissed during one of these purges, told this author that all soldiers 
ranking from corporal to major who came from Kasai were removed in 1978, 
and a non-specified number of them shot dead.85 Instead men linked to 
Mobutu, for family or loyalty reasons, were promoted to supreme ranks, such 
as Generals Likulia, Singa, and Babia.86 Whereas 75 per cent of generals 
originated from Equateur in the mid- 1970s, the average reached 90 per cent 
by the end of Mobutu’s rule in 1996.87 Soldiers from Kasai, Katanga, or the 
East had little prospect for advancement. 
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86 Turner, Thomas (1979), Problems of the Zairian Military, Wheeling College, courtesy 
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Secondly, most of the ‘political officers’, a function created for all acting 
staffs and command posts, were exclusively recruited from the region of origin 
of Mobutu, the North Western Equateur province. Third, in practical terms the 
weakening of the armed forces was continued through organisational 
decisions, leading to an atomisation of the FAZ. Not only were additional 
military and paramilitary units founded, like the German-trained Garde Civile, 
under Mobutu’s brother in law Baramoto,88 and the Israeli-trained presidential 
escort and Republican Guard, which were not controlled by the regular military 
command structure, but the armament and training of each by another foreign 
nation’s military deepened their heterogeneity. Equipment on the battalion 
level, and sometimes even within battalions, did achieve a certain 
standardisation, but overall as a result, the FAZ used twelve different rifles, 20 
guns and ten different mortars of both Western and Eastern calibres, making 
interoperability between any two battalions extremely difficult.  
Fourth, poverty commanded the lives of ordinary soldiers and their 
families, which stayed with them at military camps. The ironic rule débrouillez-
vous formed the baseline for civilians as well as military employees: all public 
servants were forced ‘to prioritize personal gain’ and discipline or loyalty to 
their duties became a secondary matter at best.89 Carlo Cornelis gives the 
example of the Zaïre Air Force: its personnel either used the equipment to run 
their own clandestine airline, undercutting the rates of Air Zaïre, with the 
ground personnel acquiring the passengers, whilst other members of the 
service sold spare parts for the planes, and fuel.90 Left to their own devices, 
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89 Lugan, Bernard (1997), Histoire du Rwanda: De la Préhistoire à nos jours, Bartillat, 
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discipline was severely undermined and soldiers’ individual behaviour 
contributed to the further undermining of the military. 
The non-payment of salaries contributed to destroying the little discipline 
and thus self-confidence and pride of the soldiers that existed. Salaries of 
active soldiers, and to widows of service men, never went beyond the pockets 
of battalion commanders. If ever, the payments were a personal favour of a 
patron to his clientele. The clientele system, crystalizing around a core based 
on regional discrimination, increasingly became the backbone of the officer 
corps. 
Then, the role of the FAZ was for years restricted to coercive action 
against the population, whenever protests occurred, such as during the major 
student strikes of June 1969 and June 1971. In the latter case unruly students 
were punished by means of forced recruitment into the army. As the regime 
security arm, the FAZ showed a ‘stellar performance’, as Michael Schatzberg 
put it, whenever deployed against unarmed opposition, especially after the 




Non-military tasks (policing) in combination with illegal extortion further 
eroded the self-esteem and the already mediocre public reputation of the 
armed forces. The demise of the public services soon infected soldiers who 
were in a similar position. The impact of blatant corruption was enhanced by a 
strategy of tribalisation of the officer corps. According to Georges Nzongola, 
Mobutu’s destructive policy eventually backfired when the client officers, many 
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of whom were related to Mobutu directly or by marriage, plundered the FAZ 
shamelessly, stole the soldier’s salaries, and sold the equipment.92  
The poor motivation of the FAZ became evident with the two Shaba wars 
in 1977 and in 1978. In 1977 former Congolese officer Nathaniel Mbumba had 
founded the Front pour la Libération Nationale du Congo (FLNC) and recruited 
Katangan veterans, who were exiled to Angola after the war of secession.  
During the first Shaba war, no brigade or division was available to 
respond to an invasion. Companies from all quarters were put together to form 
new brigades, and the transport organised with requisitioned trucks from 
mining companies. The result was a logistic nightmare, which left soldiers 
without ammunition, and gunners with tables and manuals in Chinese 
writing.93 This level of disorganisation of the FAZ was probably one incentive 
for the comparatively small force of 6,000 Katanga Gendarmerie and FNLC 
(equivalent to five battalions) to assault the Congo. FAZ units in the attacked 
province were staffed to maximal 35 per cent of their normal strength. Only the 
famous North Korean trained Division Kamaniola did effectively represent a 
fighting force. There were no logistic installations available, no communication 
devices, and no operational staff ready to perform.  
The Shaba wars left the general staff paralysed, and increasingly 
micromanagement of the armed forces crept in. Mobutu ‘personally promoted 
and dismissed officers, ordered equipment and directed military operations’.94 
As a result of Mobutu’s strategy, such was the state of the armed forces that 
they would immediately collapse at first sight of an armed enemy: 
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undisciplined, corrupt, frustrated, ill-equipped, and unequally trained – thereby 
providing little of the coercive means necessary to protect the regime. 
A Franco-Egyptian-Moroccan military intervention came to the rescue of 
the Congolese army.95 Fifteen hundred Moroccan soldiers, commanded by 40 
French officers and NCOs, were deployed to Kolwezi on 11 April. The entire 
logistics of the operation was in the hands of French and Belgian coopérants, 
with the French organising the support of the Moroccans, and the Belgians 
that of the Congolese96 and Egyptian pilots manned French fighter bombers in 
support of the campaign.  
Having utterly failed to defend the state, the upper echelons of the FAZ 
were dismissed, and Mobutu appointed General Singa as the new chief of 
staff (auditeur général in FAZ terminology). The performance of the FAZ was 
appalling. Again, after the purges of 1975, when 78 officers had been killed or 
dismissed,97 28 commanding officers were sent into retirement, others were 
dismissed without purse. The FAZ’s main ‘contribution’ was in violently 
subduing public, even patriotic, protests of Zaïrian citizens, which erupted as a 
result of what was felt to be the humiliating performance of their own armed 
forces.98 
Even before the next attack on Katanga and the Shaba II war, which 
started on 13 May 1978, President Mobutu had further weakened the armed 
forces by purging, and even killing, 250 of the best trained officers for allegedly 
attempting a coup d’état. The FAZ was then unable to stop ten invading 
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battalions. Katangan Gendarmes (self-styled ‘Tigers’) met little organised 
resistance, with only one company of the 142nd battalion of the famous 
Division Kamaniola trying to defend Kolwezi; the rest was an utter rout. A 
thousand invaders took Kolwezi on just day two of the campaign. Widespread 
looting and killing triggered a French sortie by the 2nd REP (régiment étranger 
parachutiste) to Kolwezi, to both evacuate expatriates and stabilise the front 
line. It is believed by several contemporary witnesses99 that Mobutu himself 
had ordered the looting of foreign possessions during the retreat in order to 
provoke a military reaction from a European country, most of which displayed 
little enthusiasm to get involved into another operation in Katanga. When 
Mobutu’s (foreign) advisors requested that he open a second front east of 
Kolwezi operated by his forces, he agreed but never deployed any units.100  
In Shaba II again it was Belgian and French paratroopers, transported by 
the US Air Force, which secured victory for the Congo.101 The French forces 
deployed in Kolwezi reported widespread lawlessness. They found it difficult to 
distinguish who the plunderers on the ground were, some of whom turned out 
to be FAZ officers, some were civilian opportunists, and some Katangan 
‘Tigers’.102 After this so-called ‘Six Days War’ French forces pulled out, and 
Belgian regiment para-commado secured Kamina and Lubumbashi for the 
Kinshasa government, until a Force d’intervention interafricaine (FIA) was 
deployed to fulfil what should have been the task of the FAZ. The African force 
included a Moroccan task force of 1455 men, a company each from Gabon, 
Senegal, and Ivory Coast, plus 310 Togolese soldiers. Congo’s southern 
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boundaries with Angola and Zambia were guarded for another year by 
Moroccan, Senegalese and Gabonese soldiers.  
To replace the FIA by national forces, another Congolese ad hoc brigade 
had to be set up, the 21st infantry brigade. In 1979 North Korean military 
technical assistants, who had trained the Division Kamaniola (which never 
surpassed the strength of a brigade), were expelled from the Congo, and 
Belgian military cooperation increased again from 60 to 110 officers, who then 
created the 21st brigade, based at Kitona.  
In 1980, in a rare move to strengthen the army – Mobutu may have 
realised that he had gone too far in weakening it – a ‘presidential staff’ parallel 
to the general staff at the presidency was set up, and the military reorganised 
into eight military regions, each of them with operational responsibility. 
However, there was no coordination across the regions, each of which was 
commanded by the respective regional general staff.103 In addition, the young 
National Police and the gendarmerie (leftovers of the former FP TSTs) were 
merged into the Gendarmerie Nationale (GN), a force officially controlled by 
the general staff of the land forces (Etat-major de l’armée de terre) but 
factually only available at the personal order of the president. Theoretically the 
FAZ was 52,000 plus 8,000 GN, but it remained without large units with 
combined task capacities, like artillery support, engineers, logistics, or 
communications. Instead of developing the whole spectrum of a functional 
military body, there was an inflation of Special Forces, paratroopers, and 
commando units. After 1973 Zaïre had eight parachute battalions, five 
commando battalions (in most modern armies those are counted as 
companies), and even a battalion voltigeur (air acrobatics) at the 7th military 
region at Boma. Thus, Special Forces, including the Presidential Guard 
                                                             
103 Military regions included the 1st region Shaba, 2nd Bas-Zaïre, 3rd Haut-Zaïre, 4th 
Kivu, 5th Babundu, 6th Kasai, 7th Equateur, and 8th Kinshasa 
133 
 
battalions (GP) and the battalion Escorte Présidentielle accounted for an 
unusual high proportion of command units compared to 22 battalions of 
conventional infantry.104 With this restructuring after the Shaba wars, the 
Congolese military became an army à plusieurs vitesses with some units well-
equipped and others falling into neglect. The few fortunate ones were meant to 
be elite units, detached from one another and placed under the control of 
foreign officers. The FAZ’s available heavy weaponry was never operational, 
be this Mirage fighter bombers or outdated Chinese main battle tanks.105 The 
purchase of expensive weapon systems was as much driven by a quest for 
decorum and prestige as the ‘white elephant’ steelworks and huge dams in the 
civilian realm. The bulk of the FAZ personnel, described as a ‘phantom army’ 
by Ebenga/N’dalu, were left on their own. Officers and the rank and file alike 
lived off the people, from petty crime and corruption.106 
After the Shaba wars the land forces consisted of 23,300 men, a size 
they would keep through the 1980s. This included a staff of nominally 4,400 
(état-major at Kinshasa and eight regional staffs); some 1,900 personnel at the 
five military schools, including teachers and students;
107
 a 1,500 strong Navy, 
and 2,500 personnel Air Force – equipped with a single operational Lockheed 
C-130. Men under arms included the 31st airborne brigade (4,000) garrisoned 
in Kinshasa, Kamina and Goma; the 1st armoured brigade (1,500) in Mbanza-
Ngungu, which could never provide more than one squadron of five tanks; the 
21st infantry brigade of three battalions in Lubumbashi, Likasi and Kolwezi, 
which soon went down from 3,500 to 450 soldiers; the 41st brigade commando 
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in Kisangani (2,000 men); the 1,500 strong 13th infantry brigade in Kalemie, 
consisting of aging soldiers who actually should have retired, but could not 
leave because of the lack of pension plans; and finally the ‘Division Kamaniola’ 
with its staff in Kolwezi, and its three brigades totalling a mere 3,000 men, 
scattered all over Katanga.  
Training, equipment and sometimes direct leadership for the various 
branches of the Congolese armed forces came from a broad range of ever 
shifting sources, with a few constants. The 31st airborne brigade, the so-called 
Bérets Rouges, was trained by 60 French officers (until 1990),108 led by a 
French colonel; and every Congolese officer and NCO down to the platoon 
level, had a French parrain (godfather) who was actually in charge, including 
for the payment of salaries.109 The 21st infantry brigade, the Bérets Verts, was 
trained and organised by the Belgian military until 1990. The 41st brigade 
commando, initially supposed to be equipped and instructed by 70 Chinese 
advisors, was eventually handed over to Belgian cooperation.110 The Navy at 
Matadi was trained by the North Korean military, which eventually destroyed 
all of the boat engines before they were expelled in 1991. The consequence of 
this multifarious engagement was twofold: first, there was very limited national 
control over the armed forces and, second, there was no military cohesion 
among the units, little communication and little interoperability.  
According to Belgian estimates, between 1979 and 1984 the strength of 
the FAZ had actually fluctuated between 29,000 personnel and 23,000. No 
FAZ units ever reached more than half of their nominal strength; none of them 
had sufficient rolling stock. For example, one retired general told this author 
that for the entire military region he commanded in 1982, a territory of the size 
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of Belgium, there was one single functional truck available to the military, and 
the gendarmerie had to patrol the territory with a single Jeep! 
The Corps Logistique (CORLOG) of the FAZ was concentrated in 
Kinshasa. About 3,000 nominal personnel included a command section, a 
logistics training centre, one transport battalion, one battalion for ammunition 
storage, and another one to oversee the empty depots. In 1979 15 Belgian 
technical assistants were sent to overhaul the logistical sector, and they 
organised a re-distribution of arms, so that there would be only one kind of rifle 
with each battalion. One could then begin to stock fitting ammunition closer to 
the respective battalions, keeping in mind that with every displacement the 
entire depot would have to follow suit. Still, with every unit carrying another 
assortment of arms, incompatible with other units, a centralised organisation of 
supply was unserviceable. 
Separately from the FAZ a presidential escort and a 4,600 strong special 
unit, the brigade (later division) spéciale présidentielle (DSP), existed. It was 
commanded by Mobutu's nephew Etienne Nzimbi. Originally well-equipped 
(they were the only unit with recoilless 106mm guns), the DSP saw its 
conditions deteriorate as it was gradually expanded to a strength of two 
command brigades of 7,500 men each, without its gear keeping pace with the 
rising numbers. This guard, consecutively trained by officers from Israel, 
Egypt, and North Korea, was not part of the chain of command of the land 
forces but reported directly to the President. In 1994 Mobutu even deployed 
this force abroad to fight in the Rwandan civil war in support of the incumbent 
Habyarimana.111 The elite of the Special Forces was formed by yet another 
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independent ‘Dragon’ battalion for especially sensitive operations.112 Another 
unit created by Mobutu, and trained by the United States, was his 1,500 to 
2.000 strong Service d'Action et de Renseignement Militaires (SARM), for 
years led by General Bolozi, the president’s brother-in-law.  
The Gendarmerie, counting some 25,000 personnel, was spread out over 
eleven different circumscriptions, each further subdivided along the colonial 
FP pattern into one bataillon territorial and one bataillon mobile respectively. 
Its situation deteriorated quickly when it was financially abandoned to the 
benefit of the new Garde Civile in 1984.113  
In 1981 it was decided at the suggestion of Western advisors that the 
armée de terre would need an official budget. Two French and two Belgian 
officers were commissioned to do this work, which was supposed to be 
finished by 1983. However, an official budget for the armed forces was never 
implemented.114 Without such a budget, the military had to live from day to day 
on whatever funding was ‘miraculously’ released from the presidential 
palace.115 As a means of damage limitation a mechanism was temporarily 
introduced to insure that all soldiers and their families would have at least one 
meal per day: this Direction des oeuvres sociales militaires was created, 
following the design of a similar FP structure, which was called ‘Promivil’.116 
The eventual abandonment of this structure after the initial funding run out was 
a major source of discontent and corruption at the lower echolons of the FAZ. 
In 1983 a Belgian-led audit of the Congolese army concluded that the effective 
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force consisted of a fraction of the nominal FAZ.117 It revealed that at least ten 
per cent of the personnel was ‘ghost-soldiers’, and that one could count at 
best on the 31st, the 21st, and to some degree the 41st brigades for military 
tasks. 
After 1984 it was decided to concentrate military cooperation on officer 
training. The foreign logistic specialists were replaced by staff officers, and 80 
per cent of funding went to the newly founded Ecole de Formation des 
Officiers (EFO). However, the EFO would always remain under the command 
of a Belgian colonel, even when it was transformed into a military academy in 
1987. The initial aim to raise the value of degrees from this academy to a 
university BA (license) grade was never achieved.118 Further plans for an 
Ecole supérieure d’état-major and an Ecole d’administrateurs militaires were 
not implemented for lack of funding.119 In terms of national ownership of 
military know-how this is unmistakeably at odds with the aim to create an 
intellectually and professionally autonomous army. 
1.8  The Façade Collapses 
Due to the culture of la debrouille the ‘loyalty’ of Congolese soldiers 
remained to the one individual who fed them, and already in 1988 the military 
were reported by Michael Schatzberg as working for example as private guns 
for those willing to pay.120 The negative effect of the long term neglect on the 
FAZ became obvious through the two big pillages of capital and country, one 
in 1991, and another one over January and February 1993. The former started 
as a limited bogus mutiny but quickly evolved beyond control; the latter was 
provoked by the issuing of a five million Zaire banknote to pay the soldiers’ 
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guerdon. The whole scale of bankruptcy became evident once foreign aid 
stalled and fell ‘from US$898 million in 1990 to less than US$200 million in 
1993.121 The looting of Kinshasa in late September 1991 could only be 
contained by French and Belgian support at Mobutu’s urgent request to the 
two countries, but they still had ‘scared off what remained of expatriate staff’, 
and the rest of any existing economy, which was already working under 
precarious conditions, evaporated.122 French operation Baumier and Belgian 
Operation Blue Beam included in total 2000 troops mostly from the French 21st 
RIMA, a regiment of French marines, and the 2nd regiment of the Foreign 
Legion Infantry. Belgium contributed about 1000 troops, a majority coming 
from the Régiment Para-Commando.123 The regime had once again survived 
despite of and largely against its own soldiers. The 1993 lootings were worse 
and extended throughout the country. According to contemporary French and 
Belgian observers the riot was a planned event that went out of control, when 
Mobutu tried to eradicate oppositional politicians under cover of a limited 
turmoil. The French ambassador, Phillip Bernard, had facilitated the escape of 
one of them, Etienne Tshisekedi, and was shot the same day by ‘a stray 
bullet’. French military cooperation was immediately halted, and advisors 
withdrawn. The FAZ was left with some Chinese and Israeli military advisors.  
In sum, it appears that the ‘Golden Age’ of Zaire and the Congolese 
armed forces was neither better nor worse than any other sequence of its 
existence. This author asked six supreme command officers of the FARDC, 
who all had begun their career in the ANC or the FAZ, and who had all 
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received classical European staff training in the 1970s and 1980s, how they 
would assess the quality of professionalism and coherency of Mobutu’s ‘army’ 
and its successor. They were asked independently to give grades according to 
the French school system, which gives zero for complete failure, and a mark of 
‘twenty’ for an optimal result. 124 The sobering result was that they on average 
allocated a mere ten points for the FAZ, with no better mark for the ‘Golden 
Age’ of the Congolese military. According to their assessment, at no other 
point in their history did the Congolese armed forces reach this level.125  
Any success in military operations, training, advancement in equipment, 
standardisation, organisation, or doctrine was due to an intentionally scattered 
and non-coherent foreign support. In that context, the pretention of a national 
security policy based on non-alignment only served as a tool to atomise the 
FAZ. Training of the armed forces was performed at best at the tactical level, 
which left the country with a large number of capable uniformed warriors, but 
no working chain of command or equipment to employ or deploy them.126 
Indeed, at the operational level, and even more at the strategic level, skills 
acquired via external support – often even abroad – were eroded by neglect or 
indirect intent dolus eventualis, by side-lining trained officers, or their physical 
elimination. The Mobutu personal regime successfully stemmed the 
development of a national army in the form of a coherent military body, bound 
by undivided loyalty to a state or constitution. In the early 1990s ‘rather than 
serving as an instrument for the state, the army had become a loose cannon’, 
difficult to control, and at times even an active participant in local 
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insurrections.127 From 1991 to 1993, débrouillardise, corruption, and 
institutional failure quickly metastasized from one sector to another, reducing 
the Zairian quasi-state to utter impotence. In Mobutu’s own assessment the 
FAZ was a ‘conglomérat des commerçants et affairistes en tenues 
militaires’.128 Having shaped this officer corps he was well aware of the actual 
function of his dozens of generals.  
Although ostensibly aimed at the construction of a true army, its 
restructuring as it was employed achieved actually the opposite result. It bore 
fruit in two ways, firstly it barred the instigation of a proper military, and 
secondly, it prevented the inception of a strengthened, institutionalised state. 
The political consequence was the solidification of the position of president 
Mobutu’s personal rule regime.129 
1.9 The First and Second Congo Wars  
The start of what would later be called the First Congo War may 
represent the most tragic event to those Congolese longing for the creation of 
a viable state. According to Georges Nzongola, the Alliance des Forces 
Démocratique pour la Libération du Congo-Zaïre (AFDL)130 invasion under 
Laurent Kabila aborted an initiated transition to democracy and 
institutionalisation, which could no longer be kept at bay: a political bargaining 
for power had been put on its way with the establishment of a National 
Constitutional Conference (CNS) in 1990.131 Mobutu had been shocked into 
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granting this conference by images of the Romanian dictator Nikolaou 
Ceausescu’s execution, but he dismissed the CNS again only 18 month later, 
when he had regained enough confidence in his power, and had managed to 
re-incorporate disobedient politicians within his clientèle.  
The reason why Mobuto could hold claims for more freedom at bay, and 
thus once more bar the creation of a state, is twofold. Firstly it lies in the 
political culture of opposition leaders to whom ‘democracy’ signified a mere 
instrument to access personal power – in other words, to become the ‘caliph at 
the caliph’s place’. Secondly it was based on the soldiers’ readiness – during 
the period between two major mutinies – to subdue oppositional 
demonstrations that were demanding the reopening of the CNS.132  
In truth, the CNS was no more than an instrument of an ethnically driven 
intra-elite power contest, itself exploiting existing tensions within the 
population. The national conference itself actually added to some older 
grievances. Among others, it had barred many Congolese Hutu and Tutsi 
delegates from attending, contributing much to the problems that still haunt 
Eastern Congo.
133
 As the end of Mobutu, consumed by cancer, was coming 
near, the country fell into a free for all power grab. 
The First Congo War, from 11 October 1996 to 17 May 1997, brought 
down the regime of Joseph Mobutu. On this occasion the FAZ was again 
exposed as of little military use. Hard hit when the AFDL, a group once more 
officially led by the old hand Laurent Désiré Kabila but actually being carried to 
victory by Rwanda and Uganda, had no difficulty vanquishing the merely 
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figurative FAZ. Little fighting occurred because the fleeing FAZ was faster than 
the advancing enemy, confirming its demise after that of the dictator.134 Those 
of its elements that did not desert fast were incarcerated in a concentration 
camp at the former military base Kitona, South West of Kinshasa. One officer 
detained there for about six months told this author that ‘there were 46,000 of 
us in the beginning. The conditions were terrible. Every day we collected the 
dead. At liberation there were about 36,000 men left’.135 These dead were due 
to starvation and in part to disease; even if for the 1996 proportion of 
Congolese active military that perished from AIDS are given as 36 per cent.136  
After the AFDL victory, newly liberated POWs and other former FAZ 
military were recruited into the new army of the Republic, the Forces armées 
congolaises (FAC), which represented a conglomerate of rebel makeshift units 
including the AFDL and Laurent Kabila’s child soldiers, the so-called 
kadogos.137 We recognise here a pattern that carries through Congolese 
military history: as in the case of the colonial FP, the ANC in the 1960s Congo 
crises, rebellions and secessions, and the 1970s deserters and enemies of the 
Shaba wars, any former enemy combatant, rebel, or disobedient soldier was 
to be integrated in the respective official regular forces. Disciplinary 
consequences for disobedience were not addressed, and the individual 
soldiers developed a sense of impunity. 
The new organisation that claimed from 1997 onward to be the army of 
the Republic, the FAC, mainly served as an instrument in the new President’s 
quest for power. As it was in Mobutu’s era, political and military power in 
Kinshasa ‘lay less in the official institutions of state than in the persona of the 
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president and his informal networks’.138 Once securely in power Laurent 
Kabila’s forgot to honour the political demands from the Ugandan and 
Rwandan allies who had carried him to victory. Hence, in August 1998, the 
Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), a proxy force similar to 
the ex-AFDL, was launched to unseat the leader in Kinshasa. As a reaction, 
troops loyal to the President rounded up Tutsi civilians and soldiers in cities 
around the country and summarily executed them; Stearns reported, ‘This 
included around a hundred men at the Kamina military camp in Katanga 
province, [and] eighty in the Kananga camp in Kasai-Occidental.’139 
During the ensuing second Congo War, the so-called ‘African Great War’ 
from 1998 to 2003, the former rebels of the first Congo War, now rebranded 
the national army, did not have any military education except for their little 
experience as factual auxiliaries of Uganda and Rwanda. Poorly trained and 
fed, the unpaid kadogo elements of the FAC bore the lion’s share of casualties 
by fighting, first, against Rwandan elite units in Katanga and later against the 
RCD.140 In that war the official victor of the first Congo War, the new FAC of 
Laurent Kabila, was never considered by anyone as a serious army to be 
reckoned with. It was the military from Angola, Zimbabwe and Chad that saved 
Kinshasa from renewed conquest, protection that the Congolese government 
had to pay for in terms of licences given to its foreign protectors to exploit the 
natural resources of the country at will. In retrospective, René Lemarchand 
described the FAC as ‘a metaphor for the appalling inefficiency of the 
Congolese army [and] synonym for further unrest’.141 Insurgencies, militias, 
home defence groups, and organised crime had mushroomed during the 
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period in which the central government had so little control over the entirety of 
its territory.  
Quickly losing credit both with Western donors, who had little use left for 
undemocratic leaders after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and with his clients, who 
felt entitled to the positions formerly occupied by the entourage of Mobutu 
Sese Seko, Laurent Kabila soon found his support fading on all fronts. His 
assassination by his bodyguard on 16 January 2001 cleared the way for a new 
round in the open battle for power in Congo.  
 
Table 4: Map of Congo in the early 2000s 
 
On 31 July 1999 the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement to end the war in 
Congo had been signed by six heads of state, but not implemented except for 
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the launch of the MONUC peacekeeping operation in November 1999.142 
Importantly it moved the game from the battlefield to the negotiation table. 
After the assassination of President Laurent Kabila, peace was given another 
chance, in the context of a peace contract that invested his son, Joseph, as 
president with strong Western support and included all warring parties on the 
Congolese territory. 
By the end of 2002 the all-Inclusive Agreement between Kinshasa, now 
led by Joseph Kabila, was agreed with the RDC, the Mouvement de Libération 
du Congo (MLC), the Rassemblement Congolais pour la 
Démocratie/Mouvement de Libération (RCD/ML), the Rassemblement 
Congolais pour la Démocratie/ National (RCD/N), diverse Maï-Maï 
organisations, the political opposition, and civil society (les Forces vives). 
State and security institutions building were to be forcefully pursued by the 
Congolese transitional authorities – with a key milestone set by the national 
elections in 2006 – and by the international community expected to provide 
major financial and technical support to this effort. Among others, the parties 
committed to engage in a process of formation of a newly restructured and 
integrated national army.143  
However, similar to the non-application of the constitution, which was not 
employed during two presidential terms, effective military-bureaucratic reform 
towards an institutionalisation and professionalization of the FARDC was not 
implemented in earnest. Following the examples of military micro-management 
of his predecessors Joseph Mobutu (during the Shaba wars), and Laurent 
Kabila (during the Second Congo War), Joseph Kabila interfered between 
2008 and 2009 heavily in commanding campaigns in the Eastern provinces. 
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Not only did he command brigades directly via satellite phone, in the course 
paralysing the general staff, but he even ‘directed individual battalion 
commanders in some cases, making a mockery of the chain of command’.144 
During January 2009, the chief of defence staff and key operations staff were 
only made aware of Ugandan and Rwandan movements into the country the 
day they crossed the borders.145 Under Congolese politico-cultural conditions 
parties are mere instruments of patronage adapted to the rhetoric of 
modernisation towards democracy acceptable to foreign onlookers. Even less 
than in other African regions, power in Central Africa ‘cannot easily be divided 
or shared’ – a usually implicit understanding and assumption that is nicely 
captured in the Zairian/Congolese cultural axiom, ‘Le pouvoir se mange 
entier’.146 Nowhere is this principle more relevant than in the government’s 
security related policy, as demonstrated by the example of Kabila’s Garde 
Républicaine (GR). Like Mobutu with his Special Presidential Division, Kabila 
the younger relies on an Angolan trained GR of 12,000 privileged fighters 
‘without bothering with the national army’s chain of command’.147 
1.10 The Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of 
Congo 
The foundation of the FARDC was part of the peace process that led to 
the transitional constitution. In November 2004 a preliminary law (loi 04/023) 
on the organisation of the armed forces was adopted, and with article 191 of 
the 2006 constitution the FARDC was finally legally established. Only on 11 
August 2011, however, was the loi organique portant organisation et 
foncionnement des forces armées, which defines in detail the place and role of 
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the army, ratified by Parliament and signed by the director of the cabinet of the 
president. According to the law the FARDC is a professional, republican, 
national, non-political (apolitique) army of development (armée de 
développement).148 
In line with the all-inclusive peace agreement signed in Pretoria in 
December 2002, the FARDC was a joint project of the former belligerents. The 
highest positions in the new army were at the time allocated among them as 
follows: the FAC provided the chief of staff, and the recently notorious General 
John Numbi temporarily became the commander of the small air force.149 The 
MLC would command the navy, and RCD-Goma would lead the general staff 
of the Armée de terre, the land forces. As part of the peace agreement power-
sharing formula, former rebel groups were allotted positions in key institutions 
that they could fill with competent people. This term did not mean people 
endowed with high soldier’s ethics, however. Stearns and Borello highlight the 
cases of Generals Gabriel Amisi, alias ‘Tango Fort’, and Mustafa Mukiza. The 
former, an ex-RCD commander responsible for the May 2002 Kisangani 
massacre of civilians, became head of Congo’s land forces. The latter, a 
commander of Jean Paul Bemba’s MLC militia and thus responsible for the 
2002 massacres and mass rapes in the Central African Republic,150 became 
commander of the important Kitona military base, later to take command of the 
first military region. 
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In 2003 a Presidential Decree established the National Commission for 
Demobilisation and Reinsertion (CONADER) which opened yet another drive 
to incorporate as many people into the army as possible, including warlords, 
criminals, and mutineers. Impunity for committed atrocities, desertions, and 
war crimes was the main common denominator of the units that would form 
the new army. All ex-combatants, whether on the territory of the DRC or 
abroad at the cessation of hostilities, were to become officially part of the 
FARDC. At the end of the fighting the belligerents had declared a total of 
340,000 combatants.151 Half of these, 170,000, were reported as former FAC. 
All RCD factions and MLC together counted for 27 per cent; Maï-Maï and 
other armed groups 21 per cent, and ‘fighters abroad’ two per cent.152  
By 2004 the future army was planned to consist of four divisions of forces 
territoriales or forces de couverture of 12,000 men each, garrisoned in the 
hinterland where they were supposed to represent the strategic reserve; 18 
regiments totalling 56,000 troops as force principale de défense, the active 
defence; and 6,000 forces de réaction rapide. The process was to be 
completed in 2015. By 2008 the Minister of Defence, Chikez Diemu 
announced new targets: the creation a Rapid Reaction Force of 12 battalions 
was to be completed by 2010; territorial reserves as the principal force should 
be available in 2015, a process that would be completed by 2020.153 
Throughout the transitional period and the first term of President Kabila, 
progress in army integration was slow, and one cannot speak of the 
installation of a legitimate monopoly on violence by the state. Former 
belligerents turned politicians kept their private militias well into 2006: Vice- 
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President Ruberwa of the RCD-Goma and vice-president Bemba of the MLC 
even had strong forces in downtown Kinshasa.154 President J. Kabila’s guard 
remained a military body parallel to the regular armed forces; in addition, 
independent armed groups up to brigade strength, like the FDLR, continued 
populating the Eastern provinces, benefiting heavily from illicit trade in natural 
resources.155 Congolese ‘civil defence’ Maï-Maï militias in the area received 
protection from the regular armed forces while at the same time they work 
directly with armed groups, whose original raison d’être was actually long 
forgotten.  
In such an environment beyond Kinshasa’s control Congolese army 
officers as high as the Deputy Army Commander blended into the economic 
and social structure of the regions in which they are present. In an 
opportunistic move they exploited their military power for personal benefit, and 
at the expense of wider society. Self-enrichment activities not only comprised, 
and continue to do so, classic racketeering at historical FP or FAZ levels, but 
some of them even ‘personally control[ed] whole mines’.156 A 2008 MONUC 
report noticed that the Bisiye casserite mine in North Kivu was under the full 
control of the ‘top brass of pro-Kinshasa military’, RCD-Goma and Maï-Maï. 
The three parties shared the profits instead of fighting each other.157 Hans 
Hoebeke and Henry Boshoff have given another example of this level of 
corruption in the armed forces with the FARDC 85th brigade, concluding that it 
was obviously not in the interest of certain FARDC commanders to end the 
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conflict as long as their units were able profit from mining areas.158 The 
phenomenon is actually hugely widespread, with a UN report speaking of 
‘criminal networks of the armed forces’ trading gold, tantalum ore, and other 
commodities, exported via Burundi, Uganda, and Rwanda. In addition, 
everyday illegal taxing of the population through FARDC soldiers at 
roadblocks is ubiquitous.159  
Taking up arms has in many cases been the ultimate means to get a 
foothold in the corridors of power and wealth. The career of one general is 
exemplary: Laurent Nkunda was proposed by the RCD-Goma, of which he 
had commanded the 7th brigade, to help lead the unified army in 2003, and the 
national military leadership accepted his nomination. Although he did not take 
up the post, the message had been sent that the authors of war crimes, such 
as he accused of, would not actually be punished but rewarded with important 
and profitable positions.160 Both Nkunda and his successor Bosco ‘Terminator’ 
Ntaganda were during their command involved in illicit gold smuggling;161 
other non-regular military including Maï-Maï Yakutumba and Raia Mutomboki 
were and are benefiting from the unruly situation;
162
 mines in Walikale, 
particularly rich in tin, Tantalum, and gold, are almost exclusively under the 
control of armed groups, including the FDLR, the Maï-Maï Cheka, and FARDC 
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units.163 Between them commanders of such armed groups have become 
business partners, earning millions of dollars. However, this huge joint 
commercial enterprise, which some Congolese have unofficially dubbed 
‘Walikale Incorporated,’ is for the most part overseen by regular Congolese 
officers. The United Nations reported that in 2010 it had received credible 
evidence that an entire sector of the ‘FARDC criminal networks’ […] 
 
was created for the explicit purpose of benefiting from the mineral trade. Its 
deployment follows the outlines of one of the Province’s main cassiterite [tin ore] 
and gold zones.164  
 
Not only former rebels integrated into the FARDC, but also former FAZ 
personnel took advantage of the lawlessness in the country; reports of officers 
and soldiers involved in contraband and unashamed theft have become 
standard news to the public. However, good mafia policy is tempered so as 
not to overdo the extraction of the guilty, in order to avoid losing of this source 
of revenue. Hence, the criminal is as often the only power of legal mitigation 
and at the same time the protector of the community: local security is on offer 
from the military in an entirely informal way, negotiated between village elders 
and the main big man, who more often than not is a commanding officer. The 
researcher Judith Verweijen summarises her findings about FARDC officers as 
being part of the local nobility, representative of the state and the ‘Big Man’. 
Accordingly FARDC commanders are required to distribute both symbolic and 
material resources to the communities in their area of deployment. These are 
‘not only their legally mandated and professionally determined objects of 
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protection, but also their clientele constituencies’.165 In the heavily militarised 
zones of the East, FARDC conjoined with the local population, participate in all 
public events as the local authorities, be this football matches or important 
marriages. However, whether these soldiers represent the state ruled from 
Kinshasa in any positive way remains disputable. Community level 
arrangements are equally revolving around individual profit generation as 
around general security.  
The process of military integration after the war proceeded slowly under 
the transitional government. The reform of the armed forces was an ‘open 
heart’ operation. One illustration of an army operating whilst in the midst of a 
restructuring process was the reaction to an infiltration of Rwandan troops into 
South Kivu in December 2004. Rwandan soldiers aimed at attacking Hutu 
rebels of the FDLR on Congolese territory. About 10,000 FARDC troops 
deployed, including former FAC, MLC, RCD-ML and even Maï-Maï; they 
suffered from a lack of equipment, food and means of transport. Poorly 
equipped former MLC units were sent to fight, whilst better equipped units of 
ex-FAC remained in reserve.
166
 Many soldiers deserted and some units even 
fought each other for access to ammunition and food.167 During this short 
campaign, FARDC elements of former RCD rebels, then nominated as the 
123rd Battalion of the 12th Brigade, reportedly committed war crimes against 
civilians. Exchange of hostilities between rebel units continued throughout the 
process of integration of armed forces well into 2006.168  
Some of the new regiments resulting from the reforms were mergers of 
former FAZ with AFDL rebel forces; some were a mix of all kinds of other 
mutineers or guerrilla groups, as well as more formal militia. The 2004 plan 
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included a proper vetting process of future soldiers – a highly selective 
recruitment including recycling of ex-regular soldiers of the FAZ and a 
formation de base, – to achieve integrated battalions (or, later, regiments). 
Remaining combatants were to be demobilised or integrated into the police. 
Little of this was implemented, as was agreed, before the 2006 election.169 
Congolese officers blame donors’ narrow interest in just one aspect of the 
whole reform process, the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
procedure.170 By contrast, the vetting process to identify potential loyal 
professional soldiers with sufficient integrity and dismiss others, although 
mainly organised by the EUSEC171 operation, was underfunded from the start. 
Former insurgent leaders, some of whom never commanded units stronger 
than 50 fighters, kept their self-appointed ranks as Colonel, Major General or 
even General de corps d’armée when they joined the regular army as a result 
of the Sun City/Pretoria peace negotiations. As a result, new battalions and 
regiments remained non-integrated; in other words, they simply saluted 
another flag post while keeping their loyalty to their former rebel commander 
cum FARDC officer.
172
 With little achieved to better the situation on the 
ground, in August 2005 MONUC and EUSEC, who were to monitor and guide 
the progress, called for the instant establishment of nine brigades for the most 
vulnerable territories in the East (Bunia, Goma, and Uvira), when tensions in 
the region increased again. One would expect standardised military training as 
necessary to establish a new army. However, again Congolese soldiers are 
trained in a non-concerted way: Chinese trainers in Kamina do not 
                                                             
169 ICG (2006), Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report, 104, pp.17f 
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172 To have an idea of one detail of the estimated costs for the transport of all 
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communicate with US trainers in Kisangani or EUSEC trainers in other 
regions.173  
After waves of desertions across all ranks, at times in large groups, 
which accompanied the vetting process, officers again pursued their personal 
interests, facilitated by the possession of arms and the loyalty of their client 
soldiers and weak loyalty to the government in Kinshasa. During late 2005 and 
early 2006 General Nkunda, for example, himself a renegade officer who 
joined the FARDC from the RCD-G, benefited from many desertions of 
Rwandophone soldiers who were previously integrated in the FARDC and who 
thereafter joined his Congrès national pour la défense du people (CNDP), a 
proxy force from Rwanda established to fight Hutu militias in the DRC.174 Peter 
Karim, of the Front des nationalistes et intégrationnistes, and Martin Ngudjolo 
of the Movement des révolutionnaires Congolais each brought their 3,000 
fighters with them. Their integration as colonels was facilitated by the rebel 
commanders’ willingness to liberate seven Nepalese UN peacekeepers they 
had captured a week before. 
The capabilities of the FARDC developed inefficiently as demonstrated 
by its first major operations in East Congo against the local Rwandophone 
militia CNDP. After President J. Kabila realised in late 2007 that his armed 
forces were unable to defeat this 5-6,000 renegade troop militarily, he gave in 
to negotiations with Kigali.175 The arrangement found between Kigali and 
Kinshasa was as follows. Firstly, Kigali would use its leverage with the CNDP 
commanders to convince them to integrate into the FARDC; secondly, General 
Nkunda, the militia’s leader, was neutralised; and, finally, Rwandan regular 
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175 HRW (2009), Selling Justice Short, Human Rights Watch, London, p.52 
155 
 
military forces would deploy to East Congo in order to fight the FDLR.176 Under 
Nkunda’s former second in command at the time, Bosco Ntaganda, these 
soldiers again joined the FARDC, however forming an autonomous cohesive 
unit within the larger armed force and maintaining separate command 
structures. They also resisted efforts to be redeployed outside the Kivus and 
have actually doubled their troop numbers to 11,000 soldiers’ between 2008 
and 2011.177 The International Crisis Group summed up the process as 
follows: 
 
The Congolese authorities pretended to integrate the CNDP into the political 
system; while the latter pretended to be integrated into the FARDC [and] both 
have acted in bad faith.178 
 
The joint Congolese-Rwandan military operation was launched in 
January 2009. This operation, which could have been a state-strengthening 
measure to establish central government control over the entire territory, 
remained under the personal control of the President. The Constitutional rights 
of Parliament were ignored, and the FARDC was consulted only after the 
arrangement with the former enemy had been concluded. 
Having gained no success, the 2009 joint DRC-Rwanda campaign Umuja 
Wetu, or Kimia I (Our Unity), was repeated one year later under the name 
Kimia II in cooperation with MONUC. This operation, soon rebranded Amani 
Leo (Peace Now), again a quest to accept military control over the national 
territory, failed by not following up on an initial success and because of an 
unsustainable drain of desertions. During the last year of operation Amani Leo 
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the Congolese armed forces’ brigades were restructured into a regimental 
system of 26 regiments, a reform considered necessary to overcome parallel 
chains of command, but which did not actually achieve its aim. This created 
time and space for the armed groups to recover.179 When, finally, the 
mistreatment of the population by soldiers involved in Amani Leo became 
untenable, the operation was folded in April 2012.180  
The next crisis was probably a foretold story. In April 2012 several 
hundred soldiers, a majority of them former CNDP, carved out a fiefdom in 
eastern Congo's North Kivu province, started organising a local administration 
in cooperation with traditional rulers, and began collecting taxes.181 This 
mutiny, which is called M23 after the date of the peace agreement that had 
been the basis for its integration into the FARDC (March 23rd 2009),182 soon 
defined itself as a political movement with a military branch called the  
‘Congolese Revolutionary Army’ (ARC), very much comparable to the 
RPR/RPA of the civil war in neighbouring Rwanda. The FARDC again turned 
out to be incapable of defeating this mutiny militarily.183 Desperation in the 
Congo supreme command was reflected by attempts to recruit non-state 
militias to join their fight.184 In late November 7,000 FARDC fled from the 
advancing 1,500 ARC, plundering on the way the homes of the citizens of 
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Goma, the regional capital, which was then occupied by their enemy.185 
According to a United Nations official in the town of Minova, retreating FARDC 
looted residents for three nights, and UN peacekeepers had to protect civilians 
from government troops.186  
After Goma city was occupied by M23 a non-declared truce was used by 
the rebels to formulate their demands, and by the government to call for a new 
international ‘neutral military force’ to substitute for the incompetent FARDC. 
By December 2012, M23 had shot its way to the negotiating table, repeating a 
pattern the reader has become familiar with.  
By late 2012 other elements of the FARDC were in mutiny. On 16 
August, Colonal John Tshibangu, a former RCD member, and 20 of his 
soldiers defected from their garrison in central Congo, Kasai province, 
founding in the process another armed group called Mouvement pour la 
revendication de la vérité des urnes. Former chief of the Congolese general 
staff Faustin Munene had deserted from the FARDC in 2010 to Brazzaville. 
His anti-governmental guerrilla group, the Armée de résistance populaire 
(ARP), claims that Joseph Kabila’s appetite for personal rule is the main 
obstacle to peace in the country.187 Mutinies of FARDC units on a smaller 
scale are still happening, even if not all of them develop into a civil war 
situation like in the M23 case.188 Meanwhile small wars are on-going, 
uncontrolled by the authorities, like the one carried out by Rwandan FDLR 
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rebels who, together with a local militia (Nyadura), burn down and plunder 
villages at will. 189  
A 2011 Belgian evaluation of the FARDC reads like a summary of 
Congolese military organisations from the colonial Force Publique to the FAC: 
first, forces are left to fend for themselves, and the average soldier has little 
choice but to engage in complementary activities or find means to extract his 
subsistence to the detriment of the local people he is meant to protect;190 and, 
secondly, soldiers are not housed in decent conditions, and they are 
inadequately and irregularly paid.191 An attempt to separate the chain of 
command from the chain of payment had very limited success, firstly, for 
simple logistical reasons and, more important, because of the resistance by 
officers all along the chain of command to relinquish control over the purse.192 
In a more recent Belgian assessment of June 2012 by Belgian military 
advisors requested by the Congo, the construction of the FARDC was 
described as a titanic task (une tâche titanesque).193 Practical reasons were 
cited for the difficulties, for instance, the remoteness of training facilities. 
Kisangani, the place for the establishment of the 1st Integrated Brigade is 
1200 km as the crow flies from Kinshasa and is itself divided between three 
major armed factions, a point of extreme tension.194 
The FARDC was meant to be an army based on the spirit of 
inclusiveness, which was, according to Stearns and Borello, the Leitmotif of 
the transition from an all-embracing war between numerous armed actors 
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towards the synergy of those actors in a unified army.195 This inclusiveness, 
however, did not result in peace between the former enemies. Rather, it was 
the price to be paid to appease former warlords and their entourages. 
Integration in the FARDC is a revolving door militia use to get in and out of the 
regular forces. The formerly integrated Maï-Maï Lafontaine196 deserted again 
in 2012 when they found out that other militia were granted better 
conditions.197 They then attacked the FARDC to gain arms and killed dozens 
of soldiers.198 Another example of the revolving door is the career of ‘General’ 
Albert Kahasha, alias ‘Foka Mike’. In January 2013 a new rebel organisation 
was founded in Bukavu, South Kivu.199 This Union des Forces 
Révolutionnaires du Congo declared war on the government.200 In 2003, after 
the Pretoria Agreement, Albert Kahasha had joined the FARDC with his Maï 
Maï Mudundu 40. In 2005 Colonel Kahasha became commander of FARDC 
808 brigade, which at the time fought the ADF-Nalu rebellion, a Ugandan 
oppositional militia based in the DRC. After the contested 2011 general 
elections Kahasha defected from the FARDC in protest. He then joined M23, 
but returned to the FARDC again in November 2012. One week later he 
deserted again with soldiers and many supplies.201 In 2012 too, the Maï-Maï 
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Yakutumba, and the Parti d’action et de la reconstruction du Congo-force 
armée Alléluia (PARC-FAAL) joined the regular force, and in January 2013 the 
Force populaire pour la libération du Congo (FPLC) announced its willingness 
to join the FARDC for the purpose of fighting M23. Another offer voluntarily to 
join the armed forces by the Maï-Maï Bulongo, after the killing of their leader, 
was however rejected.202 It remains unclear how long such militias’ integration 
may last. In early 2013 in Katanga irregular military activity by the Maï-Maïs 
Gédéon and by Kata Katangais increased rapidly.203 
In 2012 Richard Dowden wrote that the post transitional era after 2006 
did not lead to a government and an army ‘capable to produce security [rather] 
kleptocracy remains the zeitgeist of its ruling class’.204 The inheritance from 
Mobutu’s reign – an unprofessional, undisciplined, fragmented, poorly 
organised, corrupt and predatory military – ‘was still the standard in 2011’, 
larger in size and even further de-professionalised by rebels without basic 
training, many of them in high ranks.205 Notorious for their criminal energy they 
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2  Conclusion: The State and Army that Never Were 
Les FARDC sont une armée fantomatique dans 
un pays sans Etat ni gouvernance (Godefroid Kä 
Mana, President, Pole Institute, Goma)206 
 
This assessment of the state of the DRC, passed by the Goma-based 
Pole Institute’s President a few days after the fall of Goma to the M23 rebels in 
November 2012, is widely shared, including among some representatives of 
the armed forces themselves. As one active Congolese general, who served in 
all of the regular Congolese armies in his long military career, described the 
fate of the armed forces to this author in 2011, ‘We stumbled from emergency 
to disaster without ever having a rest to build up our military and our state.’207 
The Congo/Zaire/DRC state was and remains the perfect quasi-state. If 
pundits cannot agree on an identifiable moment of state failure for the Congo, 
this is because the state never existed in the first place; it was never more 
than an abstract concept. From its official birth in 1960, the Congolese state 
has remained a hollow shell, internationally sovereign without internal 
empirical existence. Experienced from the ground, the state has been no more 
than a colonial overlord, followed by the void of the civil war, the long era of 
Mobutist unashamed personal rule, yet another battlefield criss-crossed and 
plundered by half a dozen different foreign national armed forces, and, in the 
more recent period, has become an ‘absentee landlord’ relying on personal 
and clientele alliances to control what it can from the national territory and 
wealth in a constant trial of strength with local and regional power networks. 
How did it come to this point? First, with the victory of UN forces over 
Kinshasa’s contestants in the early post-independence war, the window of 
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opportunity for a ‘natural’ state formation process in the Congo basin was shut. 
Neither Western powers nor African states at the time could have faced the 
prospect of the Congo and its neighbours wrestling over their borders for 
decades or even centuries in a long process of state formation through war in 
the traditional mode of European and Asian states. Thus, with the forceful 
maintenance of Congo’s unity through external support, the Congolese quasi-
state was born.  
The second stage was the stalling of the Congolese state-building 
process. With Mobutu’s second coup d’état on 25 November 1965, state-
building effectively came to an end. Mobutu gradually but proactively dissolved 
whatever remnants of the project that men such as Lumumba and Kasa-Vubu 
may have entertained for the Congolese state and then undertook to reshape 
the Congo into his private property in what looked very much like a more 
advanced version of King Leopold’s CFS. After 1965 Mobutu first led, via his 
personally loyal ANC, a Bonapartist-type regime, developing – or degrading – 
the DRC into an 18th century-style presidential monarchy. This regime still 
could be termed pseudo-democratic and institutional rule with the 1967 
foundation of the single party, and it could still have acted as a constructive, 
so-called ‘developmental patrimonial’ government. However, in a deliberate 
misreading of more egalitarian elements of African traditional forms of 
governance, Mobutu used all of the coercive and corrupt tendencies of the 
pre-colonial and colonial periods as leverage, thereby eliminating any checks 
and balances that may have existed in Central African rule patterns. By 1970 
the country had an adapted patrimonialised colonial state structure combining 
the influence of pre-colonial concepts of kingship with a prefectural 
administrative apparatus, which put it in constant rivalry with local power 
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players.208 Compared to Cold War patterns of governance, the regime was 
able to concentrate power combining features of Western-style presidentialism 
and the Eastern single-party model, as international patrons were little inclined 
to question its institutional underpinnings and democratic credentials.209 
Mobutu’s role as a client of Northern patrons is often interpreted as a one-
sided hierarchical centre-periphery relationship. However, it is obvious that he 
benefitted at least as much from the constellation formed by his alleged 
masters.210 
Little change occurred with Mobutu’s fall. Laurent Désiré Kabila’s short-
lived reign (1997-2001) was only long enough to abort the foetal process of 
democratic state-building in the country, but insufficient to assert any kind of 
firm rule – especially as he owed his military victory entirely to the support of 
his Ugandan and Rwandese backers – whereas the post-transition 
governments of Joseph Kabila after 2006 clearly tended towards the 
renaissance of Mobutu-type personal rule.211 Few state-strengthening 
measures, such as the creation of a broad structure of regional governments, 
as provided by the Constitution, have been implemented. Military 
administration and oversight is no exception.212  
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The constant striving of successive Congolese regimes to prevent state-
strengthening and condone or encourage state-weakening measures is in line 
with the Congolese patronage-based political culture in which  
 
connections and cash are the currencies of power and influence, […] with the 
ruler cast in the role of a superpatron dexterously handling carrots and sticks.213  
 
In such a system, the public and private spheres are but two sides of the 
same coin, the exchange of self-serving favours is the norm, and the logic of 
personalised ties thoroughly penetrates legal-rational institutions. Such a 
context allows no more than the emergence of a quasi-state and its security 
twin, the quasi-army.  
The successive embodiments of the Congolese quasi-army share 
several common features throughout their history:  
 
 First, rather than being a coherent and rigorously organised body with a 
cone-shaped chain of command, it has mostly consisted of 
disconnected military bands directly reporting to their immediate civilian 
or military sub-regional commander214; 
 Second, disobedience on all levels appears as a constant condition 
from the FP to the FARDC. The reoccurring reincorporation of 
mutineers and rebels into the regular forces – from the 1960 mutineers, 
to the Lumumbist, Katangan, and Kasaian rebels into the FAZ, to MLC 
and RCD soldiers into the FAC, and to CNDP troops into the FARDC – 
has resulted in the national armed forces being little more than a 
disorderly conglomerate of undisciplined military personnel; and 
                                                             
213 Lemarchand (2008), p.271 
214 Shaw (1984), p.18 
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 Third, the proficiency of the Congolese military has historically been 
low. Even if they have at times demonstrated acceptable and even 
occasionally good tactical capacities, at the operational level they have 
depended permanently on foreign backing.215 Mutinies and rebellions, 
as well as external military challenges, could only be defeated with the 
assistance of foreign military. The FAZ fighting on its own for the first 
time in 1996 was utterly defeated by AFDL, and its successor, the FAC, 
could only be saved from defeat by Angolan and Zimbabwean forces. 
The 2008 and 2009 to 2010 campaigns against militias in the Eastern 
provinces were failures; and, during the 2012-13 M23 crisis, the FARDC 
was routed at first contact with armed opponents.216  
 
These outcomes are largely the product of Mobutu’s treatment of the 
national armed forces. Understanding the threat to his personal regime that 
the military could pose, Mobutu set out systematically to destroy the emerging 
army through various, mutually reinforcing means. Thus, the degree of 
professionalism that could be imparted to the force via officers’ training 
pursued at European military academies was undermined by: 
  
 General deliberate neglect;  
 The nurturing of corruption; 
 The tribalisation of the officer corps; 
 The politicisation of the corps; 
                                                             
215 Oberst Valentin, interview CO 11, Kinshasa 2011 
216 The fleeing FARDC regrouped in Minova town, where they immediately started 
looting houses. MONUSCO has since threatened to stop any cooperation with these particular 
brigades if there were no legal consequences for the 126 rapes the FARDC committed within 
two days of arrival, see BBC News Africa (2013), UN in DR Congo 'Army Rape' Ultimatum, 8 
March   
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 The micro-management of units by the presidency and fragmentation of 
the chain of command (a practice actively replicated by Joseph Kabila); 
and 
 The fragmentation of the force structure after the Shaba wars, as 
Mobutu’s short-lived aspiration to have a coherent and efficient army 
relapsed into a preference for many small units of able infantry warriors, 
which are easier to control and sufficient for the purposes of indirect 
rule.  
 
In that context, a positive relationship between the armed forces and the 
population never developed. Having played no role in the movement for 
national independence, the military remained as estranged from the people in 
the new Congolese state as it had been under the Belgian colony. This fact 
finds its expression in a slogan popular among soldiers: civil azali monguana 
ya soldat – the civilian is the enemy of the soldiers. Never an instrument for 
interstate warfare, the military was transformed more and more exclusively 
under the Mobutu regime into a tool to assert and distribute power internally, 
repressing opponents as necessary. The factual legal immunity enjoyed by the 
soldiers over many decades evolved over time into impunity, to the point of 
representing a key characteristic of the Congolese military in the present time. 
‘La société civile doit s’occuper de ses affaires’ – ‘Civil society should mind its 
own business’,217 reacted the FARDC’s spokesman to demonstrations against 
widespread rape organised by civil society in Eastern Congo in 2011, 
confirming the view of many that the military has become the largest single 
threat to civilians in the country.
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217 Broadcast Radio Ocapi, 15 Sept. 2011 
218 Gebrewold-Tochalo, Belachew (2009), Anatomy of Violence: Understanding the 
Systems of Conflict and Violence in Africa, Ashgate, Farnham, p.94 
167 
 
Up to this point, the military therefore has failed entirely to ‘reconquer 
hearts and minds’ via the delivery of security services to the people, not to 
mention the even more ambitious support it is supposed to provide to the 
country at some stage in its quality as armée de développement.219 So far, not 
a single building, school, or bridge can be reported to have been built that 
would at least compensate for installations run-down or even destroyed by the 
armed forces, which would help to rebuild the confidence of the population. 
Many citizens still perceive the ‘State’, including its armed branch, the military, 
through the metaphor of Bula Matari, and the two terms are used 
interchangeably, symbolising a form of overwhelming and crushing power.  
This does not prevent certain forms of symbiosis between the armed 
forces and the population, however. For example, many Congolese have at 
least one family member in the military or gendarmerie, and discussions with 
ordinary Congolese citizens reveal that they consider the cover of arms and 
uniform as the only means of protection against crime. At the local level, 
individual officers may gain the confidence of citizens by providing security 
measures at sport events or on market days on a case by case basis.220 
However, such operations are part of a patron’s role exercised by military 
officers rather than regular state operations. In the eyes of the population, they 
are interchangeable with the provision of security by local militiamen or self-
defence groups. Similarly, extractions perpetrated by marauding soldiers, 
legally belonging to the army, but temporarily outside the reach of command, 
are no different from those committed by ever proliferating and constantly 
mutating non-state armed groups.221  
                                                             
219 Chapter I and Article 71 of the military Basic Law (August 2011) 
220 See Verweijen, Judith (2013), Military business and the business of the military in 
the Kivus, Review of African Political Economy, 40, 135, 67-82 
221 Schneckener, Ulrich (2009), Spoilers or Governance Actors? Engaging Armed Non-
State Groups in Areas of Limited Statehood, DFG Research Centre Berlin, see table on p.17 
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A form of alternative security structures is therefore emerging in some 
parts of the country, unstable and weak, but at the same time sufficient to 
prevent a complete collapse of law and order. They may, as in the North 
Eastern Ituri province even come to frame the local social organisation, as the 
militarisation of society by long years of war has prompted a shift away from 
traditional rulers to new military-led power structures.222 These alternative 
security structures are the hallmark of indirect rule. Like their European 
predecessors in pre-modern times, they may not produce total and 
dependable control, but may be sufficient to hold major risks at bay and to 
provide for arm’s length steering from the centre, but at the same time they 
remain weak enough not to challenge the central power. In sum they may 
more easily be acceptable to a personal ruler than a strong institutionalised 
army would be.  
In such a security system in which the armed forces are deprived of a 
reliable access to state funds, but unlike the officers who are members of the 
upper crust of the patronage system, the lower ranking military have little other 
advantage than their residual client status and the arms enabling them to feed 
on the wider population. 
  
Mercenaries and marauding gangs in ridiculously small numbers destroy entire 
regions, displaying greed for bounty combined with an increasingly self-
aggravating cruelty. 
  
This is not the contemporary Eastern DRC, but Golo Mann’s description 
of Europe’s 17th Century Thirty Years War. Mann continues: 
                                                             
222 Vlassenroot, Koen and Timothy Raeymaekers (2004), The Politics of Rebellion and 





The Thirty Years War was one in a political environment of state formation, or 
Unstaaten. Non-permissive to modern configurations the military system 
remained one of rough irrationality’.223  
  
One cannot fail to be struck by the similarity of the two situations, more 
than three centuries apart. The Congolese Lumpen-militariat embodied both in 
its regular and irregular armed forces, is a terrifying reminder of the marauding 
Landsknechte of the Thirty Years War of state formation. More than any other 
picture, they symbolise the Congolese Tillian state. Curtailed by colonisation 
and again by a wide international consensus in the early 1960s, Congolese 
state formation is unfolding before our eyes at the beginning of the 21st 
Century.  
 
                                                             
223 Mann, Golo (1971), Wallenstein, S.Fischer Verlag, Frankfurt/Main, p.346, Mann’s 
term ‘Unstaaten’ was unfortunately not picked up by other authors. It perfectly describes 
quasi-statehood as opposed to the term ‘Nichtstaat’ (non-state) 
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Chapter Four: Cameroon – A Two Speed Army 
 
Unlike the other two countries examined in the present thesis, Cameroon 
has seldom been in the headlines in recent decades. The country has been 
engaged in no other external war than the relatively minor border conflicts with 
its neighbour Nigeria in 1981 and again in 1994-96; no military coup or forceful 
toppling of the government has been attempted since 1984, endowing Paul 
Biya (elected in 1982) with one of the longest presidencies on the continent; 
and domestic unrest has remained limited to social rather than political 
outbursts in the early 1990s and 2005-2008, following the eradication of the 
insurgent nationalist campaign in 1970. Congruently, little is heard outside and 
even inside about its military, which may, among African armies, most deserve 
the label la grande muette, after the French model on which it was patterned. 
Generally speaking, the Cameroonian armed forces have little visibility, enjoy a 
fair degree of respect from the people,1 have not been suspected of harbouring 
political ambitions, and are considered relatively more professional than those 
of most neighbouring countries.  
Their apparent conformity to the ‘Huntingtonian model’, however, only 
applies up to a certain point. The configuration and development of the national 
armed forces are part and parcel of the history of immediately pre-
independence and post-independence Cameroon, marked by a priority on the 
needs of a regime put in place in the early 1960s and which has known little 
evolution since. Cameroon’s civilian and military institutions have developed in 
synchrony, all the more so because the country was deprived of a reference to 
a pre-colonial experience of statehood. Regime continuity has had a major 
                                                             
1 Very little is reported on the military in the very vibrant Cameroonian press and those 
few articles discussing it are rather neutral in tone 
171 
 
impact on the configuration of both civilian and military institutions, giving 
Cameroonian armed forces’ subordination to the political leadership a 
particular meaning. 
Consistent with the methodology presented in Chapter 2, this chapter will 
first provide an historical narrative of Cameroon’s state and military formation, 
demonstrating that both were firmly planted at the end of the French colonial 
period in the 1950s. It will then proceed to interpret the national armed forces’ 
development through the prism of Cameroon’s political culture and the 
regime’s use of this culture to assert its control over civilian and military 
institutions, whilst recognising the requirement to selectively adapt its armed 
and security forces to new types of national and international threats and risks. 
This will enable us to relate Cameroon’s fragmented military to the presidential 
regime’s adroit management of the political landscape, with a constant 
attendant risk of state-weakening well captured in 2010 by the International 
Crisis Group’s somewhat rhetorical title: Cameroon, a Fragile State?2 
1 The Three Stages of State and Army Building in Cameroon 
1.1 Forms of Governance and Military from Pre-colonial Times 
to Independence 
Having inherited its name from its first European visitors, the 
Portuguese3, Cameroon appears in its pre-colonial form as a territory of 
stateless societies endowed with some tribal organisation. As Victorin Hameni 
has demonstrated, it is difficult to date from when one can first speak of the 
military of Cameroon.4 With state formation in Central Africa restricted to the 
savannahs bordering the large forests of the Congo Basin, little political 
institutionalisation took place prior to colonialism on what is today’s Cameroon 
                                                             
2 ICG (2010a) 
3 From Rio dos Camarões (River of Shrimps in Portuguese) 
4 See Hameni Bieleu, Victorin (2012), Politique de défense et sécurité nationale du 
Cameroun, L'Harmattan, Paris 
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territory. Western Central Africa with the exception of the Loango kingdom was 
populated by small groups of slave hunters who delivered their Batéké 
neighbours to Portuguese merchants.5 Accordingly, the Cameroonian history 
of warfare was mainly restricted to the slave hunt, as was typical for West-
Central Africa.6 As of the 16th century spread of Islam to the Maghreb, the 
feudal organised Northern part of Cameroon had been connected to the Arab 
trans-Saharan slave trade, especially via converted Fulani warriors. The South 
had remained primarily a stateless region, although between the 16th and 18th 
centuries about 90 small tribal polities formed a defensive confederation.  
By the 19th century this construct had entirely disappeared due to internal 
infighting.7 Europeans were confined to small coastal places, which had their 
main defensive installations against the sea. African kings were reliable 
partners rather than a threat as both sides partook in the slave trade. It is only 
when the Atlantic slave trade was abolished in the 19th century that the Douala 
kings had to seek protection by Europeans because their main source of 
revenue and power had faded. The colonial configuration that emerged was a 
continuing win-win alliance among partners, Western and African.
8
 
1.2 From the German Protectorate to the French/British Mandate 
During the colonial period, which started as a ‘deal’ between local minor 
kings and a reluctant German government, feudal structures survived colonial 
state-building basically unhampered in the North of the country, where the pre-
                                                             
5 Coastal chefferies, such as the Gabonese ‘Kingdoms’ of Louis and of Quaben, were 
only recognised as states by those Europeans in need of someone to sign a treaty of 
subjugation; all of the aforementioned were absorbed by the French Gabonese colony  
6 Bachiri, Mohammed and Maniragaba Balibutsa (2005), Causes et Moyens de 
Prévention des Crimes Rituels et des Conflict en Afrique Centrale, UNESCO, Libreville, p.3 
7 Minihan, James (2002), Encyclodaedia of Stateless People Vol. IV, Greenwood Press, 
Westport, pp.1771ff 
8 In the North, Germans had found an agreement with traditional leaders, who would 
formally recognise a colonial status, and pay tribute, in return for German military support. In 
the South newly introduced farming and the construction of the port of Douala necessitated 
more modern administrative conditions. At independence 17,000 mostly farming French 
settlers were established in the Southern half of Cameroon 
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colonial overlords only became temporary clients to their new Western patrons. 
This did not change with the takeover by France and Britain after World War 
One. The circumstances in the South were different: there, newly invented 
‘traditional’ elites were originally established by German and later maintained 
by French colonists.9 In sum, the German and then the French colonial state 
and its sovereign successor maintained the pre-colonial power structure of the 
Northern feudal hereditary elites, and consolidated new indirect-rule patronage 
networks in the South. Economically, unlike the Northern unchanged feudal 
system, most of the Southern economic infrastructure installed by German 
companies was taken over by French agriculturists.10 Although the system as a 
whole was less oppressive and extractive than in proper colonies because 
every centime raised had to be spent within,11 indirect rule, or to use the 
French official term introduced in 1924, the indigénat, was never meant to 
develop and strengthen a proper state in Cameroon – even if this was officially 
the task to be fulfilled under the League of Nations’ mandate.12 With its lack of 
an indigenous pre-colonial military tradition, from 1916 on, after the African 
Askaris
13
 serving the Kaiser were defeated in both Cameroon and Rwanda, the 
military conditions in these two future mandate territories started resembling 
each other to the extent that the difference between Belgian and French 
military allowed for. It is important in this context to recognise the impact of the 
prohibition to recruit locals into the military under the mandate rule. African 
soldiers serving the French in Cameroon came from other West and Central 
African countries, just as Congolese soldiers manned the Belgian forces in 
                                                             
9 See Geschiere, Peter (1993), Chiefs and Colonial Rule in Cameroon: Inventing 
Chieftaincy, French and British Style, Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 63, 2, 
151-171 
10 See Keen, David (1998), Top-Down Economic Violence, Adelphi Papers, 38, 320, 
23-44, pp.39ff , BBC News Africa (2013), chap.7 
11 Manning (1998), pp.76f 
12
 
In a mandate territory the establishment of military forces was not permitted.
 
13 Arabic for soldier       , see Morlang, Thomas (2008), Askaris und Fitafita: Farbige 
Söldner in den deutschen Kolonien, Ch Links Verlag, Berlin 
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Ruanda-Urundi. A double alienation of African soldiers from the people and the 
country therefore emerged in both Cameroon and in Rwanda, with its roots in 
the colonial system.  
In 1920 the militarisation of the demilitarised Cameroonian territory begun 
with the formation of a gendarmerie force called the Garde régionale 
camerounaise, which was rebranded the Garde indigène in 1925 – even if it 
did not count more than 26 men until late into the Second World War. This 
force was then gradually expanded and in 1940 integrated as gendarmerie in 
the French military forces loyal to General de Gaulle’s France libre. In 1945 
they finally joined the metropolitan French Equatorial forces. On 1 June 1946 
this gendarmerie was dissolved and then re-established to form civilian police 
units, keeping however the gendarmerie military uniforms and insignia.14 
Officially non-military, this guard remained attached to the French gendarmerie 
via their French officers, forming its general staff (état-major).15 There was 
some confusion with the chain of command because it reported to both the 
French high commissioner for Cameroon and to the superior command of the 
French forces for Equatorial Africa (EAF). Structured into platoons the guards 
were at the direct disposal of the regional administrators of the mandate 
territory. In 1947 the force was less than 900 men strong, but reached 2,000 by 
1960.16  
1.3 From World War II to Independence 
After World War Two the colonial situation changed radically and ceased 
to be a relatively stable and controlled one, with both the metropolises and 
                                                             
14 Most well known is the ‘grenade de la gendarmrie’ insignia, see Ministère des Forces 
Armées Camerounaises (1980), Livre d'or des forces armées camerounaises, Cible, Paris, np 
15 3,000 Cameroonian soldiers fought on the German side in WW I against 7,000 
British, mostly Nigerian troops, and Ghanaian regiments, British Indian colonial forces, and 
some French and Congolese pelotons. Many of those who had fought with the Germans were 
allegedly systematically killed between 1916 and 1920, interview CO 12 Cameroonian officer, 
June 2011 
16 Law (1978) 
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their dependent territories repositioning themselves in an international political 
context marked by the dawn of the Cold War and the emergence of the Non-
Aligned Movement as the standard-bearer of the emancipation of the ‘coloured 
people’.17 Cameroon found itself in the midst of this late-colonial/Cold War 
environment, which automatically drew opponents into political camps. 
Whether intended or not, the independence movement was seen from the 
West as alignment with communism. Even if this was not initially the truth, 
Western anti-communist obsession after the Berlin blockade and Eastern 
expansionist optimism helped define the fault lines by imposing their self-
fulfilling prophesies on the rest of the world. Africans had to take sides in the 
run for independence.18  
For France, military influence in the region remained key to national 
interests, as World War II had demonstrated the importance of the African 
‘Hinterland’ in the security of the French territory. The emerging Cold War 
context diminished in no way that requirement, rather to the contrary. Africa 
was also to provide a reservoir of agricultural provisions as well as military 
manpower, in peace and in war equally. The basis of French influence was the 
Union Française, which had, with the constitution of the 4th Republic of 
27 October 1946, transformed the French colonies into overseas departments 
or overseas territories in the boundaries of the former colonies. Its symbol was 
the by now famous Rally Paris-Dakar, launched in 1949, which demonstrated 
                                                             
17 The imperial world disintegrated rapidly: in 1945 the Arab league was founded, and 
the Dutch East Indies declared independence; 1946 saw the beginning of the war in Indochina; 
and 1947 saw rebellions in Madagascar and Kenya, while India and Ghana achieved full 
independence the same year 
18 This does not mean that this situation was entirely uncomfortable. Politicians such as 
Patrice Lumumba, Kwame Nkruma, or Sékou Touré, and later Gamal Nasser and Marien 
Ngouabi were ancious to exploit this East-West confrontation to their advantage as much as 
possible, and with some success 
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practically the unity of a single territory under French domination.19 The Union 
fell apart when South East Asia, Morocco, and Tunisia became independent 
between 1953 and 1957, but the 5th Republic of 4 October 1958 instituted its 
successor, the Communauté française.  
As of the early 1950s, however, severe blows were asserted to France’s 
policy aims in Africa and to its self-perception as a great power by defeat in 
South East Asia (Dien Bien Phu), the disastrous Sinai operation, the tragic 
quagmire of the Algerian war, and political setbacks such as Guinea’s rejection 
by referendum of the Communauté Française and the victory of anti-French 
nationalists in Togolese elections.  
In that context, West-Central Africa was gaining increasing value for the 
French and Cameroon represented a particularly valuable prize. By 1955 
Cameroon was openly considered a French strategic outpost (un avant-poste 
de l‘Union française);20 and leading French journalist André Banchet, of le 
Monde, wrote the same year, ‘Nobody, whether in Cameroon or abroad, takes 
it as a secret that Cameroon will continue to remain French, no matter under 
what constellation.’21 French influence was not a mere military/security issue, 
however. Economic/strategic interests in Cameroon were, for example, 
secured through the Alucam (aluminium-Cameroon) company by its lobbyist 
Louis-Paul Ajoulat – who was not only a former French minister for overseas 
possessions, but also president of the Cameroonian territorial assembly 
(parliament) – in cooperation with the French High Commissioner for 
Cameroon, Roland Pré.22  
                                                             
19 Deltombe, Thomas, et al. (2011), Kamerun, Da Découverte, Paris, p.99, Nowadays 
perhaps comparable in its perception with the Schengen treaty’s impact on free travelling in 
Europe – something very popular with the populations of the countries included 
20 Duval, Eugène-Jean (2004), Le sillage militair de la France au Cameroun,1914-1964, 
L'Harmattan, Paris, p.189 
21 Quoted by Deltombe (2011), p.69 
22 Ibid. p.109 
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The mandate given to France and the United Kingdom according to 
article 76 of the San Francisco Charter – continuing from the League of 
Nations mandates – officially aimed at developing the population’s capacity for 
self-rule. Nothing was actually initiated to achieve this aim until 16 April 1957, 
when France assigned to Cameroon the status of ‘State under trusteeship’ 
(Etat sous tutelle). It had decided on 13 December 1945 to administer 
Cameroon as an integral part of France, but it had now abrogated the 
indigénat, a status granted to local populations, which had long contravened 
the spirit of the mandate. Two overseas-territories representatives from 
Cameroon had also joined the Constituent Assembly that would draft the 
French 4th Republic Constitution. Under the tutelle regime, Cameroon was to 
establish a government by 10 May 1957 in order to prepare for independence. 
By the end of 1959 elections to a Cameroonian Local Assembly were held in 
preparation for internal autonomy. The Assembly was to elect the 
Cameroonian Prime Minister.23 Over the post-war period, France had set up 
two successive development plans for its overseas territories, one from 1947 to 
1953 and one from 1954 to 1957, of which 18 per cent (80 billion Francs, 
equivalent to US$67 million) went to Cameroon alone.  
The new Cameroonian political elites who were to take over from France 
were to some extent the cultural and ideological products of Western 
colonialism. Their drive for self-rule did not necessarily alienate them from la 
Grande Nation, whose original philosophical foundations rather promoted 
political self-determination. However, the political rhetoric of independence 
movements came in different forms, some of which would allow former 
collaborators to stay in powerful positions, but others aiming at a changing of 
the guard. Among important political actors, the nationalist party, Union des 
                                                             
23 The first non-elected prime minister, Ahidjo’s predecessor, was nominated by the 
French High Commissioner. He was dismissed as unsuitable to French interests soon after  
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populations du Cameroun (UPC), was never granted the right to participate in 
elections and was gradually driven ‘underground’. Its leader, Ruben Nyobè, 
had stepped into the crossfire of competing international, economic and 
ideological interests. He did represent the genuine aspiration of a part of 
Cameroon’s small upcoming elite to emancipate itself from colonial tutelage, 
but his affiliation with communist countries was rather an outcome of French 
exaggerated suppression of the nationalist movement than the expression of a 
deep conviction.24  
Democracy, a strong, sovereign state, legal equality, and social justice 
were uncontested aims to which the emerging Cameroonian political class paid 
lip service. A national army to secure the newly acquired liberty and serve as 
an instrument of nation-building was always considered a necessary and 
helpful tool. At the same time, as will be demonstrated below, the two 
indigenous patronage systems in the South and the North, as dissimilar as 
they were, survived as the power bases of the new political class of emerging 
independent Cameroon. This would eventually result in a situation where the 
‘dominated of yesterday constitute the mass of the dominated of today’.25  
On the military front, already in October 1950 France had sub-divided 
African territories under its control into different zones de défense, which not 
only constituted military regions, but represented strategically autonomous 
entities. French West Africa, Togo and Central Africa, grouped as the Zone de 
défense de l’AOF et du Cameroun were treated as proper French territory.26 In 
Cameroon itself, new units of the French Equatorial African forces had been 
deployed in 1949 and the indigenous Guards were integrated. With rising 
                                                             
24 The reaction of the United States on Fidel Castro’s success in Cuba was a similar 
situation 
25 Bayart, Jean François (1979), L'Etat au Cameroun, Presses de la Fondation 
Nationale des Sciences Politiques, Paris, p.19 
26 Deltombe (2011), p.101 
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tensions, however, France soon realised that its security capacities were 
becoming insufficient and, in the early 1950s, forces from Libreville, Brazzaville 
and Fort Lamy had to be alerted. In December 1956 the French military 
installed local militias, milices d’autodéfense, made up of loyal villagers.27 This 
French-initiated and trained local defence force had actually no fighting value, 
but it helped categorise men of combat age, and negated the UPC’s claim to 
represent the nation. The move was also meant to avoid the mistakes in 
Indochina by enlisting the local population in the resistance against the 
nationalists or, as they were seen, the ‘communist fifth column’. From the start, 
however, it was clear that these militias would have to be dissolved as soon as 
the struggle against the nationalists was won, in order to prevent any 
potentially competing Cameroonian military organisation.28 Later on, in 1955, 
the Cameroon Guards were restructured in order to stiffen counter-insurgency 
policy. Four additional platoons were created, bringing the force to 2,000 by 
1960, from a nucleus of 900 in 1947, and more French officers were 
appointed.29  
As independence drew near the main political strategic problem for 
France was securely to lead the French-designed Cameroonian transitional 
authorities to independence without having to organise elections before the 
decisive date, 1 January 1960. The declaration of a state of emergency in 1959 
allowed France and its local allies to achieve that goal, at the same time driving 
the nationalists further underground.30 When the first elections on the heels of 
independence were actually held in 1960, the incumbent prime minister, 
                                                             
27 Local self-defence militias, following Algerian example, were set up, in order to 
respond to the revolutionary strategy of peoples’ war, as was assumed to be the aim of the 
UPC. 
28  Deltombe (2011), p.216 
29 Hameni Bielu, Victorin (2012), Politique de Défense et Sécurité Nationale du 
Cameroun, l'Harmattan, Paris, p.387 
30 The state of emergency declared in 1959 was only lifted in the early 1970s, and laws 
against subversion were not repealed until 1990, see Eboussi Boulaga, Fabien (1997), La 
démocratie de transit au Cameroun, L'Harmattan, Paris, p.66 
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Ahmadou Ahidjo, won as expected and became the first President. The 
prevailing political culture, favouring popular inclination to support the ‘big man’ 
in power, helped reach the results desired by France and its local protégés.31  
2  Cameroonian Armies: The Race for Legitimacy 
Officially Cameroon’s sous tutelle government had taken over 
responsibility for internal security from France on 1 January 1959, exactly one 
year before independence. It had been clear since the mid-1950s that the 
Garde camerounaise would form the future national army. However, no single 
command post was occupied by a Cameroonian officer before independence 
nor even long after: a majority of French officers remained in place until 1975. 
In fact, Cameroon began independence with two partially integrated, but in 
reality very different, armies, a French one, and a Cameroonian one.32 
2.1 The Armed Forces 
In Cameroon there were no colonial military forces that could be 
‘nationalised’ at independence. As mentioned above, under the mandate status 
no Cameroonian was allowed to be recruited by France. However, according to 
Article 84 of the UN Charter, France could employ the territory’s contribution to 
maintain international peace and security. France thus justified the integration 
of Cameroonian volunteers into its armed forces by the need to maintain peace 
and security in Indochina. Francis Atoungou is an example of a Cameroonian 
who served with the French armed forces there. He was recruited into the 
French army in 1953 and sent for training in Chad. In 1954, he joined the 
regiment from Cameroon, which later moved to France, then on to fight in the 
colonial war in Indochina.33 This integration was facilitated by acculturation, as 
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32 Touwa, Ernest (2007), Armée et développement, Tectum Verlag, Marburg, p.91 
33 ANCY (1952), Recrutement volontaires au Cameroun pour l'Indochine, Archiv 
Nationale Camerounaise Yaounde 1952/ no 917, I. APA-12150, Raport condidentiel du chef de 
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education in Cameroon had been in French since 1918 and basic education 
was well-distributed. Deltombe quotes from the private archives of a 
Cameroonian gendarme, François (!) Yogo Ntonga as saying in 1949: ‘Our 
country is France. We will love it even if it costs us wealth and life.’34  
The commander of the French forces, General Briand, was deployed as 
Supreme commander of all services of the French forces in Cameroon, and 
head of mission to the Government of Cameroon after Independence Day.35 
His tasks included the defence of the territory against foreign threats, 
organising a défense intérieure based on local militias, provided by the 
chefferies, which would immediately transform the nationalist adversary into a 
domestic enemy.36 Simultaneously, French metropolitan troops were 
reinforced to protect key installations such as airports and harbours.37 Twelve 
hundred French forces would remain on the territory, with the Cameroonian 
forces representing one battalion. The forces not only created the 
Cameroonian army but practically also protected the new government against 
the insurgency. The military was complemented by the gendarmerie forces 
whose role it was quickly to train more local gendarmerie forces. On 1 April 
1960, a quarter year into independence, the African auxiliaries to the 
metropolitan French gendarmerie in Cameroun became the Cameroonian 
national gendarmerie, representing eight companies.38  The paramilitary 
Mission d’organisation de la gendarmerie camerounaise (MOGC), with 2,500 
men, was commanded by 336 French officers and NCOs and was led by 
French officers until 1967. On 11 July 1960, 77 Cameroonians graduated from 
                                                                                                                                                                                
cabinet militaire, 1 Decembre, np; on Cameroonian veterans see Radio Netherlands 
Worldwide (2010), Equal veteran pensions well received in Cameroon 
34 Deltombe (2011), p.69 
35 Commandant interarmées des forces Françaises au Cameroun, chef de la mission 
près le Gouvernement de la république du Cameroun 
36 AHM Chateau Vincennes (1960), Ministerial instruction from minister of armed forces 
Guillaumat to gerenral Briand, 14 January, 3001/EMGA/12A in 6H266, Paris, np 
37 Deltombe (2011), p.184 
38 Touwa (2007), p.95 
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the then recently founded gendarmerie school, and became platoon 
commanders.39   
 Whilst also in the April 1960 reorganisation, 46 platoons would form the 
garde républicaine,40  the creation of the actual Cameroonian army started 
later, but quickly surpassed the setting up of the gendarmerie.  The Armée de 
terre was founded in name three weeks before independence. The first article 
of the relevant law No 59/57 of 11 November 1959 reads: 
 
A Cameroonian army is created responsible to the head of the 
Prime minister of the Cameroonian government 
 
Recruitment for the future army started in late 1959 with 300 
Cameroonians forming the 1
st
 battalion of four companies, ready for the parade 
on Independence Day on 1 January 1960.41 In April 370 recruits including a 
group of seventy French regular soldiers formed the 2nd battalion. A 13th 
company was annexed, set up with 132 Cameroonians, who had formerly 
served in the Royal West African Frontier Force.
42
  
As happened in many regions formerly under French colonial rule or 
tutelage, it was soldiers originally loyal to colonial France43 that formed the 
nucleus of African armed forces, and who eventually commanded these forces. 
About half of the troops initially recruited were former French soldiers.44 The 
Cameroon navy, for instance, was formed from French forces originally based 
                                                             
39 The school was founded on 24 December 1959. By 1973 a majority of officers were 
Cameroonians, with only seven French officers and 23 NCOs left. 
40 Hameni Bieleu (2012), p.338 
41 The soldiers were split in two groups, one parading in Yaoundé, the other one on 
Douala. 
42 With the foundation of the Nigerian army, the Cameroonian citizens found 
themselves in the wrong African country. 
43 In some cases they were soldiers formerly loyal to the United Kingdom, as in the 
case of Cameroonians who served with the Nigerian armed forces that followed upon the West 
African Frontier Force (RWAFF) at independence in 1960. 
44 Interview Ca 4 with General Semengue, Yaoundé, April 2011 
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at Pointe Noire in French Equatorial Congo, who had been responsible 
previously for the lines of communication in the Gulf of Guinea. In 1959 they 
were reinforced by a unit of pirogues with outboard engines to patrol the 
Cameroonian rivers. This was the core of the 1960 officially founded Marine 
nationale camerounaise. It was only in July 1973, however, that a 
Cameroonian lieutenant de vaisseau (ship of the line lieutenant) became 
commander of this service. 
Shortly before independence a search for prospective Cameroonian 
officers was launched. In Cameroon, however, recruitment into the new army 
and gendarmerie forces proved somewhat of a challenge. Although recruiters 
visited French universities to enlist Cameroonian students as officer cadets, 
the military profession was not held in high esteem at the time. In addition, the 
guards were involved in a war against Cameroonian nationalists, and the 
legitimacy of this entirely foreign-led force was low. One retired colonel recalls 
that he was studying engineering in France, hoping to become a university 
teacher, when he was convinced that he could teach as well young officers 
once he had finished his own military obligation. His decision to join the armed 
forces was very confrontational vis-à-vis his parents.45 Only a handful of 
Cameroonians were enlisted for education at the French école militaire 
immediately after its inauguration in 1959. Other prospective Cameroonian 
soldiers for both the army and the new gendarmerie nationale were identified in 
different French units in Senegal or Gabon, and among other volunteers in the 
French metropolitan army.  
In October 1961, 300 British-trained soldiers from the former British 
Cameroon mandate territory joined the Cameroon armed forces as one 
additional battalion. The English-speaking contingent was immediately 
                                                             
45 His grandfather had served with the German Askaris; military service was unpopular 
in the educated population. 
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retrained to French military command customs, undertaking a crash course in 
French. At the time the first Cameroonian commander of the land armed forces 
had been appointed. It was Pierre Semengue, one of the young Cameroonians 
who had been enlisted as volunteers in the French army. Then sous-lieutenant 
Semengue had participated in the competition to join the prestigious military 
academy of St. Cyr.46 He was promoted to captain after his premature return 
from this military education in France.47 The incoming commander of the 
Nigerian contingent, James Tataw, was a captain as well. For this reason 
Semengue was instantly promoted to Commander as there should be no 
ambiguity about the francophone lead.  
Politically, with independence the French High Commissioner was 
replaced by an ambassador, who defined his task as to consolidate the Ahidjo 
regime and to prevent Cameroon from becoming a second Guinea.48 In a letter 
to Prime Minister Debré the first civilian ambassador, Bénard, insisted that to 
achieve this aim the Cameroonian chief of staff should always be a French 
officer. In fact, until 1973 the majority of officers in the Cameroonian armed 
forces were French. Lieutenant-colonel Semengue was appointed as the first 
Cameroonian Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces in 1965 replacing the 
French Colonel Boussiquet. However, five years into independence, 
Semengue’s staff would still be assisted by French colonels. The Cameroonian 
army remained under unofficial, yet complete, French control, via a sequence 
of French officers providing ‘technical assistance’ to the Cameroonian supreme 
commander and via the actual command of the general staff through the 
                                                             
46 According to his own collection he ranked 259 out of 365 applicants; French sources 
recall him at place 246 out of 250, interviews Ca 4 with General Semengue and a French 
liaison officer (anonymised), Yaoundé, 2011 
47 He had been urged by his French superiors to return without ending his training as 
artillery officer. ‘If you want to learn to swim, jump into the water,’ he cites his former 
commanding Colonel, Interview with Semengue 
48 Letter from Ambassador Bénard to prime minister Debré, quoted by Deltombe 
(2011), p. 460 
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éminence grise, Colonel Blanc, at first officially and, later, unofficially until 
1968.49  
2.2 The Other Side, L’armée de Brousse 
Ruben Um Niobè, the secretary general of the UPC, went clandestine 
when the French repression became unbearable in early 1955. Um Niobè 
created a competing national Cameroonian government, which immediately 
started issuing birth certificates, cadastre certificates, and marriage 
documents.50 Purportedly the government-in-hiding ruled over 800 local 
committees on liberated territory.51 The nationalist army, the security branch of 
the alternative state under construction, was the Comité National 
d'Organisation (CNO), created on 2 December 1956, with a World War II 
veteran, Isaac Um Niobè Pandjok, who had fought for France, as its first 
commander in chief.52 This committee would be supported by a general staff, 
led by Niobè Pandjok and ‘two or three other members’.53 French intelligence 
was always well informed about the status and whereabouts of the nationalist 
forces. A detailed order of battle of the CNO, which gives an impression of its 
ambitions, and the means available, can be found in the military archive of 
Chateau de Vincennes. According to a report, there was one military district at 
the beginning, the forces divided into no. 2 Brigade (with 1st and 5th regiment), 
which would cover the zone d’action South/Zanaga, no. 3 Brigade (with 3rd and 
4th regiment), which would cover operational zone Nord, and one additional 
independent regiment (2nd). The 1st regiment was estimated at seven battalions 
of about 20 men each and the 5th regiment at two such battalions (180 fighters 
in total). The 2nd regiment was reported as being composed of 230 to 250 men, 
                                                             
49 Interview with General Semengue, see also Deltombe (2011), pp.210-212 
50 Eyinga, Abel (1991), L'UPC: une révolution manquée?, Edition Chaka, Paris, pp.89f 
51 Deltombe (2011), p.225 
52 Ibid. 
53 AHM Chateau Vincennes (1958), Note renseignement 16 janvier 1958, ZOPAC No 
107/ZPC/S Annexe BRH, No 3, Paris, np 
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who would probably form the nucleus of the no 1 Brigade. It comprised six 
battalions plus one reserve, each about 35 strong.54 Each battalion would be 
led by an adjudant-chef, equivalent to a regimental sergeant-major, curiously 
an officer rank also in the CNO. Individual operations would be led by a 
capitaine de front, commanding between three and ten combatants. Each 
combatant carried his nom de guerre. However, because the regimental 
register gave both real name and battle name, details about the identity of 
every member of the 2nd regiment were known to the French intelligence 
service. An assessment by the French Lieutenant Soult, responsible for 
psychological warfare in Cameroun, reads, 
 
The CNO has no chance whatsoever to develop revolutionary warfare. 
Although they were able to commit about 100 assassinations between 
September and December, the forces are dispersed all over the region, 
dwelling close to villages, thereby avoiding their respective home villages 
not to have to fight their own kin’.55  
 
Another note attached to the order of battle includes an exposé sent by 
the ‘commander zone of pacification’ (known by its French acronym ZOPAC), 
Lt. Col. Lamberton, to the Prime Minister of Cameroon, Ahidjo, on 2 December 
1958, stating that the insurrection was basically defeated by the killing of Um 
Niobè by a French commando on 13 September. The report continues that, 
although the main military task was accomplished, minor problems existed with 
fighters living in hiding, who, however, had no more access to resources. By 
1963 the insurgency had been quasi-terminally crushed. 
                                                             
54 4th regiment was to be prospective at the time, putting the overall strength of the 
CNO at 750 to 800 fighters  
55 AHM Chateau Vincennes (1958), ZOPAC report no 9/Act/Psy 2 December 1958, 




Table 5: Map of Cameroon, the zone of pacification 
 
As explained by a French military advisor to Cameroon, this force never 
posed any serious threat to the French project of Cameroonian independence 
arranged in accordance with French interests.56 In military terms the CNO was 
inconsequential from the start to its demise. Poorly trained and armed with 
bows and arrows with poisoned tips, machetes, and a few hunting rifles, its 
most important ‘weapon’ was a ceremony that would allegedly harden the 
fighters’ bodies against enemies’ bullets.57 The CNO’s true significance was of 
a political quality as representing the only organisation claiming to be the 
regular army of a nationalist government in waiting, which had taken up arms 
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in order to achieve independence on its own terms. In reality the few pockets of 
resistance that existed until 1970 provided Ahidjo with a justification to 
concentrate power in his hands. 
In the people’s perception soldiers both black and white fighting against 
the UPC represented a threat to their livelihood. In fact Chadian tirailleurs and 
Cameroonian infantry, under French command committed many atrocities 
against the Cameroonian population who could hardly differentiate foreign 
fighters from those declared Cameroonian regular forces. According to 
Professor Sindjoun Pokam, the  
 
Cameroonian armed force constituted the negation of a force contributing to 
liberation [….] its historical mission has been to search and destroy 
nationalism and patriotism embodied by Ruben Um Niobè, and others.58  
 
The legitimacy of the FAC thus was hampered from the beginning. As the 
outcome, however, it was the Cameroonian regular army that had prevailed.  
2.3 State and Military-creation: Ahidjo’s Neo-colonial Course 
The Forces armées camerounaises (FAC) had already been waging civil 
war against the UPC for some years when the state became independent. 
Gradually developed under the surveillance of its French creators, they 
became the most important means of regime stability.59  
State-building and military-building had to be performed by fulfilling two 
tasks that were difficult to align: by winning the quest for legitimacy internally 
and externally; and simultaneously by denying the same achievement to other 
                                                             
58 Sindjoun Pokam (2002), Guerre de libération, destin historique des empires 
coloniaux et armée nationale en Afrique noire, Impact Tribune, 20,  quoted in Touwa (2007), 
p.111, author’s translation 
59 This was even facilitated by the support the UPC had desperately requested from 
communist states. Chinese sub-machine guns and explosives were the best the rebels ever 
had in terms of equipment 
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Cameroonians. By 1958, Um Niobè’s physical elimination created the technical 
preconditions for the political forces aligned with the French (around future 
President Ahidjo) to eradicate conflicting claims to legitimacy, even if outbursts 
of UPC violence kept occurring until the mid-1970s. 
Internally, however, state-building made only slow progress. Once in 
power President Ahidjo centralised the political structure of the state to achieve 
what Jean-François Bayart described as his ‘hegemonic project’ via complete 
control of all levers of power.60 The federative constitution of 1961, necessary 
to merge English-speaking Cameroon with larger Francophone Cameroon, 
was quickly abandoned and replaced by a centralist one. President Ahidjo 
industriously used this central power to create supportive networks in the new 
provinces in order to put his political base on a larger footing. 
Some impulses for state-building came from the military, especially from 
General Pierre Semengue. Congruent with his education and French 
acculturation he advocated making the army the focal point of nation-
building.61 At various times he suggested that Ahidjo introduce general 
conscription in order to forge a united people, proposing three years of 
compulsory service. That service would be separated into a smaller military 
branch and a larger civil branch, including afforestation and agricultural works. 
However, President Ahidjo was not inclined to pursue the development of a 
more directly-ruled state through stricter control of the whole country, as this 
would have alienated the powerful feudal lords in Northern Cameroon.62 
Ordonnance 59/57 of 11 November 1959, generating the Cameroonian armed 
forces, does include the term ‘general conscription’, but this is primarily due to 
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the fact that it was cut and pasted from the French model, without further 
scrutiny of the applicability of the content.63  
For legitimacy reasons, however, at least until the nationalist insurgency 
was entirely subdued, the President was keen on propagating the concept of 
the people’s defence, because ‘the army alone could not shoulder such a 
task’.64 The army was supposed to be only a military vanguard supported by 
the nation in arms. However, apart from a few phony civil militias, this was 
never implemented. 
Paragraph V of law no. 69 of 12 June 1967 defined the means available 
for the defence of the country as divided between two forces, first, the regular 
forces (les Forces régulières), composed of fonctionnaires en armes – a term 
which in its literal sense means ‘civil servants in arms’65 – and, secondly, 
‘auxiliary forces’, whose recruitment conditions, missions, organisation, 
administration, guardianship, and employment were to be determined by 
Presidential decree.66 Such a decree, however, was never issued, and its 
implementation never materialised. When Ahidjo repeated the slogan of the 
people’s army during the 10th promotion of Cameroonian officers, stating that 
‘our defence must be national, with everyone participating because a united 
people are invincible’, this policy had in reality been given up.67 Over time the 
people’s defence disappeared from the discourse. Instead, as of the early 
1970s, after the rebellion’s defeat, the concept of the ‘army of development’ 
                                                             
63 See Ntuda Ebodé, Jean Vincent (2011), Politique de défense du Cameroun: 
évolution du concept d'emploi des forces et perspectives, Revue de Défense Nationale, 1-4 
64 Speech of President Ahidjo on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of 
independence, see Ahidjo, Ahmadou (1973), Recueil des discours presidentiels de 1968 à 
1973, Secrétariat de l'Assemblée nationale de la République unie du Cameroun, Yaoundé 
65 Actually pointing towards the role of soldiers as servants of the state 
66 Journal Officiel de la République du Cameroun (1967), Yaoundé, Loi n°67/LF/9 du 12 
juin 1967, Définition des moyens de défense - de la loi portant organisation générale de la 
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was widely popularised as the new basis of military legitimacy.68 By that time, 
there was no competing claim regarding what constituted the legitimate armed 
forces. 
An important reason for the image of the Cameroonian forces as a 
coherent military body during the first phase of their existence was the 
consistency of the same small group of officers commanding the armed forces 
at the very top over several decades. However, the army suffered from a 
number of weaknesses. Firstly, like in the civilian part of the bureaucracy, over 
time President Ahmadou Ahidjo had positioned the clientele from his Northern 
home region in the military apparatus: the closer to the President the more 
likely one was to find Northerners in place. The composition of his Republican 
Guard was an excellent indicator of this policy. Only the supreme military 
commanders, who were once chosen by France, kept their position no matter 
their geographical origins. As it appears, the clientele structure continued to 
function in both vertical directions from Ahidjo, downwards to the Cameroonian 
clientele and upwards to Jacques Foccart, De Gaulle’s man on the spot.69 
Secondly, at the head of an authoritarian regime preoccupied with maintaining 
internal order, Ahidjo kept close control over the security forces. In order to 
maintain a tight rein over the army, between 1973 and his departure from 
power in 1982, he made sure that it had only one general. The ministry of 
defence and other key positions were filled with people from his own region. 
Military training centres were established in the north and the west, far 
removed from the official power centre. Throughout the period the country was 
closely tied to France, whose strong presence included the technical military 
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192 
 
assistance agreement.70 Thirdly, the President was well aware of the fact that 
the armed forces would not be strong enough to fight a new counterinsurgency 
war on their own and that the previous low-intensity but long lasting war had 
caused an estimated 300,000 victims. As a result of a combination of these 
conditions, the identification of the people with their army was non-existent at 
least for the period from 1960 to 1984. Efforts to fill this void by propaganda 
failed. The FAC of the first 25 years remained a neo-colonial quasi-army at the 
service of Françafrique and Ahmadou Ahidjo’s cliques.  
2.4 1982-84: Change of the Guard  
In 1982 the first, and so far only, change of head of state of Cameroon 
took place. Paul Biya’s advent to power was the start of a process of 
differentiation and sophistication of power management, which culminated in 
placing the president in an uncontested position as supreme patron of the land. 
The definitive turn did not come immediately, but after the attempted coup 
d’état of 6 April 1984. Until then, Biya had only been consolidating his power 
with difficulty, as he hardly had the confidence of the French, who had very 
much underestimated the intellectual capacity and resilience of this career 
bureaucrat. Similarly, many Cameroonian political leaders had regarded him as 
a mere placeholder until they had settled their own internal negotiations for 
power.71 The coup unveiled the real Biya, as he used the event as a stepping 
stone to consolidate a reign of more than 30 years (so far).  
The official narrative of the coup d’état of 6 April 1984 goes that members 
of the Presidential guard from the formerly privileged home region of President 
Ahidjo would have attempted to turn back the wheel from Biya’s takeover to a 
return of Ahidjo. Those officers were reportedly worried about a prospective 
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loss of the privileges they had become accustomed to over two decades, as 
their comparative advantage – representing Ahidjo’s clientele from his home 
region – had lost its attraction to the new president. Based on their 
Weltanschauung oriented at patrimonial power structures, they interpreted 
Paul Biya’s project of diversification of recruitment in the armed forces as an 
attempt to re-tribalise of the army and the state to the benefit of the new 
president’s own people, the Béti. 
Whether the President had a hand in the attempted coup himself or not, 
there is little doubt that it came as an opportunity for him to strengthen his own 
position in the direct follow-up to the events. General Semengue has indicated 
that he had received early warning of the putsch and reported them to Paul 
Biya. However, the President remained noticeably unimpressed, seemingly 
preferring things to go ahead.72  
Following the coup, there were no mass executions, nor comparable 
bloodshed. Some purges against ‘Ahidjoïstes’ did take place and, for a brief 
moment, it looked like the response was going to be a changing of the guards 
along the line of a typical Central African ‘winner takes all’ political culture. 
However, Biya’s patrimonialism actually aimed at higher, more comprehensive 
goals. At the level of the elites, many of the former coup leaders and 
sympathisers were integrated into the armed forces and into the president’s 
clientele circle. Correspondingly, at the lower level, Biya set out to expand his 
power outreach by a massive job creation programme in the civil service: 
between 1982 and 1988 the number of civil servants increased from 80,000 to 
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180,000 and recruits were drawn from all ethnic groups and regions.73 
Although Cameroon’s balance of payments was experiencing severe 
disequilibria at the time as a consequence of a serious economic crisis, the 
president was able to maintain and widen his position as a redistributor of 
wealth thanks to generous international credits – secured with the help of the 
French.74 
2.5  Estrangement from the French  
At the time of Biya’s power takeover (1982), although Cameroonian 
officers had assumed the vast majority of command posts from their foreign 
‘advisors’, the direct influence of France on the army continued to be strong. 
The 1984 coup attempt marked the moment when French direct involvement 
lost its exceptional hold, even if some important influence could be 
maintained.75 Ambiguity ruled Paul Biya’s perception of French support. On the 
one hand he would not abandon the necessary backing of the former colonial 
power; on the other his developing paranoia of coups eventually included 
France in potential threats. Mutual mistrust and opacity increased in spite of 
continued French-Cameroonian defence treaties. As an outcome of this 
gradual alienation, France started to accuse Biya of all that went wrong with 
the development of the Cameroonian army. French dispositions played their 
role in the quarrel, as did Paul Biya’s political preferences.  
As a result, a strategy of diversification of foreign military support, already 
tentatively launched by Ahidjo, was then pursued more steadily. French 
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supremacy gradually fell. American, German, Israeli, and Chinese advisers 
and arms traders became increasingly important. Significantly, after the 1984 
coup, the French-trained Republican Guard was dissolved, and Israel was 
contracted to create a Presidential Guard (GP). This political move was 
actually visible because the FAC don French style uniforms, whilst the GP has 
an Israeli outfit. 
2.6  The Cameroonian Army’s ‘Golden Age’ 
Like its Congolese counterpart, the Cameroonian army had its ‘Golden 
Age’, at least if looked at through the mitigating lenses of nostalgic 
retrospection. For Cameroon this was the period from the early 1980s until the 
advent of the democratisation movement after the end of the Cold War. During 
this period, when the armed forces remained very much in isolation from the 
population and away from political infringement, Cameroon was one of the few 
countries in the sub-region in which the armed forces protected the regime 
against an attempted coup d’état rather than committing one themselves.  
The French favourable assessment of the Cameroonian army labelling it 
a professionally trained military body, at least for the period of overwhelmingly 
French influence until about 1986, probably reflects some degree of French 
military self-adulation. Accordingly, the FAC is judged in retrospection, for the 
period of French uncontested domination, as a republican force, invariably 
loyal to the constitution. This positive view on the FAC ‘Golden Age’ is 
supported by General Semengue’s assessment, who stresses the fact that the 
1980’s army was more operational than it is at present.76  
Much of the qualitative demise attributed to the FAC after about 1986 is 
with little doubt due to the mass pull-out of French officers from command 
posts in 1984 and 1986. However, French officers still held administrative 
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power and positions of technical assistance, comparable to the Belgian 
parrains during the same era in the Congo, and they still maintain some at the 
time of writing those lines in 2013. 
Further changes, however, may have contributed to blurring the image of 
the FAC. First, within, its recruitment base broadened and diversified over time. 
In a step to move away from the tribal affiliation of soldiers, students were 
recruited on merit as of 1986 – a move based on the notion that intelligent 
people will think twice about the consequences of insubordination before they 
execute orders by would-be putschist superiors.77 According to another source, 
however, the first decade of the 21st century saw some loss in sophistication 
regarding recruitment: for example, the only distinctive feature to join the 
guards in 2012 is perfect marksmanship.  
Second, the role of the FAC has been to some extent depreciated by the 
gradual creation of other types of better-endowed, better trained and fully loyal 
security forces. A first step in this direction was the creation, after the coup, of 
the new GP, trained by the Israelis. The Guards had limited privileges, but still 
significant ones compared to the standard of living of ordinary soldiers: a better 
diet (on mange bien), and improved housing came with a monthly gratification 
of 30,000 Fcfa.78 From the start the GP would be subject to constant rotation 
from and into the army. Just like with any other privileged positions this rotation 
does not occur according to a predictable pattern.  
2.7  The Cameroonian ‘Breeze of Change’ 
The democratisation process of the early 1990s in Cameroon was, as 
elsewhere, a consequence of the ‘breeze of change’ coming from Eastern 
Europe. However it also had domestic roots. The late 1980s had seen the 
                                                             
77 Interview Ca 11 with Colonel II, Cameroon army, Libreville, 2011 
78 About 36 £, figures for 2012, interview Ca 12 with Colonel III Cameroon army, 
Douala, April 2011 
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economic crisis deepen, making it difficult for the regime to maintain its 
patronage system at a constant level, despite consequent external support. 
The people of the North, accustomed to feudal settings, were seeing the 
benefits of redistribution dwindle, whilst many in the South, including soldiers, 
had come to the conclusion that their tribal pedigree (shared ethnic origin with 
the President’s clan) was not sufficient to ensure a certain position and social 
security. As the same time as the people expressed discontent, however, they 
started adapting to the more difficult conditions. Following the example of their 
patron-in-chief, they begun diversifying their social and economic networks as 
a tool to spread risks and benefits. This, as will be explained below, also 
applied to the military. 
The push for democratisation did not generate challenging pressures to 
Biya’s rule, even if Mitterrand’s famous speech at La Baule had raised 
expectations among observers.79 Rather, the drive for pluralism and 
diversification could effortlessly be canalised by the leadership into an 
atomisation of all powers jeopardizing its domination. The atomisation of 
political opposition was facilitated by the Cameroonian political culture, 
regardless of the introduction of a pluralistic multi-party system. The 
Cameroonian hierarchical system serves as a frame of reference for 
oppositional politicians as much as for those in charge. It corresponds to a 
limited-access order in a closed society configuration. At the same time as it 
cajoles, this system is also threatening as the political opposition is 
systematically presented as the enemy of the people by a state apparatus that 
pretends to incarnate the nation. As a result, an atomised opposition possibly 
representing a majority of the people gathers in the shadow of the all-powerful. 
                                                             
79 June 1990, accordingly ‘old friend’ African regimes, if repressive or inefficient, could 
no longer count on French support, see Bayart, Jean F (1990), France-Afrique, la fin du pacte 
colonial, Politique Africaine, 39, September, 47-53 
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The new parties, as Nicolas van de Walle has demonstrated, were sectarian, in 
ethnic terms, and hardly provide ideological or programmatic debates. Rather 
they displayed the ‘illiberal nature of most of the new African democracies’, in 
which the monarchist-presidentialist character of the hierarchy shapes all 
individual behaviour and political organisations.80 It is this character of the 
political intercourse that enabled Paul Biya to maintain his pivotal position in a 
seemingly pluralistic political environment. Incorporation of opposition leaders 
in Biya’s patronage network was thus an efficient tool to undermine 
oppositional movements. 
The 1992 parliamentary and Presidential elections marked the end of 
one-party rule (since 1966), but fraudulent conduct and a boycott by a main 
opposition party kept Biya in power. Even if the new parliament had 90 
oppositional members, including the old UPC with 18 seats, Biya managed to 
draw a good number of parliamentarians to his camp.81 How fragile the 
institutions were, however, was demonstrated during an episode in 2004, when 
rumours of Paul Biya’s death spread. Instead of organising to ensure the 
continuity of state affairs, parliamentarians and other administrators rushed 
back at once to their individual relatively secure power bases to await the 
outcome of the expected infighting for succession.82 
In a context of continuing civil unrest (violent street protests occurred 
through the early 1990s) and rising external threats (from Nigeria) Paul Biya 
could not afford to atomise the security forces in the same way as he had 
handled the political forces. Neither did he want to strengthen this key pillar of 
                                                             
80 See Van de Walle, Nicolas (2003), Presidentialism and Clientelism in Africa's 
Emerging Party Systems, The Journal of Modern African Studies, 41, 2, 297-321 
81 See Takougang, Joseph (1997), Cameroon: Biya and Incremental Reform, in Clark, 
John Frank and Gardinier, David E, Political Reform in Francophone Africa Westview Press, 
Boulder, 162-181 
82 Interview Ca 10 with Jean-Bosco Ntala, editor Germinal Magazin, Yaounde, 2010; 
see also Chia, Innocent (2008), President Paul Biya of Cameroon is not dead – What 
Difference Does it make?, The Cia Report, 1 November 
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the state structure at the expense of the patronage system.83 The President 
could have followed the example of Mobutu’s Zaire – by preserving a small but 
sufficient number of Special Forces isolated directly under his own control, 
which would have been able to perform limited domestic and external military 
operations. However, unlike Mobutu, Biya did not want to overdo the 
weakening of the security sector. In much more densely populated Cameroon 
a dispersal of the armed forces would not have had the same result as in the 
Congo. Possible violent repercussions from unpaid salaries or other 
grievances would also more easily have threatened the government. Biya 
feared a completely de-professionalised armed mob, from which alternative, 
potentially dangerous, power structures could emerge. His solution was as 
follows: in difficult economic situations the army would keep receiving its 
payment, but room for alternative incomes would be tolerated. At the same 
time a few highly specialized combat units would be enabled to do the hard 
fighting. They would, however, remain insulated from the military chain of 
command.  
During the oppositional ‘ghost town’ operations of the mid-1990s 
widespread violence and looting was brutally suppressed by security forces. 
Some sources claim that the military was deployed and committed atrocities, 
but such accusations have so far not been supported by concrete data or 
witnesses.84 However, even if no distinguishable army units were deployed, 
so-called Operational Command units subdued most of the upheaval that the 
police was unable to cope with. These dubious Operational Command units 
                                                             
83 As demonstrated by Atul Kohli, state-weakening measures, if driven too far, they can 
result in the self-inflicted political impotence of a leader, see Kohli, Atul (1997), Centralization 
and Powerlessness in India, in Migdal, Joel S, et al., State Power and Social Forces,  
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 89-107, p.92 
84 See for example Banseka, Cage (2005), The ‘Anti-Gang’ Civil Militias in Cameroon 
and the Threat to National and Human Security, in Francis, David J, Civil Militia: Africa's 
intractable security menace? Ashgate, Aldershot and Burlington, VT, pp.165ff; Mbapndah 




were again used in 2000 in riot control, and they were reported as having been 
set up to fight organised crime in the Littoral province.85 Such units could be 
created ad hoc as ‘temporary subordinated commandments’ to be established 
‘par décret à la demande’.86 
By contrast, even during the turmoil of the political crisis between 1990 
and 1996 the armed forces were mostly restricted to their representative role. If 
fighting had to be done, this was executed by small battalion-level special 
forces. On 21 December 1993 2-3,000 Nigerian troops took the initiative for the 
first time to infringe on the boundary passing through the Bakassi peninsula 
under the pretext of defending their territory.87 An estimated 40 Cameroonian 
naval soldiers and a handful gendarmerie had to withdraw to Idabato. In 1996 
the Nigerian advanced farther under the protection of heavy arms up to about 
25 kilometres into Cameroon.88 The Nigerian soldiers deployed did not exceed 
3,000 troops at any given time. Even at this limited level of external military 
threat, the army could not cope and two portions of Cameroonian territory 
(Bakassi and Darak, in the Lake Chad area) were occupied by Nigerian troops 
until an UN-mediated settlement resulted in their final withdrawal in 2008). 
2.8  De-forming the Armed Forces 
During the evolving confrontation with Nigeria it became apparent that 
limited military threats needed a matching response in order to avoid an 
                                                             
85 Human Rights Watch (1992), World Report 1992: Cameroon, np; claims from an 
interview with the prestigious journal Jeune Afrique Economique in September 2002, by 
Cardinal Tumi, that half a million Cameroonians had been executed by Operational Command 
in the course of such events have no empirical backing, see Guichi, Marie Noelle (2001), 
Execution of Cameroonian Youths Provokes Demonstrations publisher 
86 According to decree 73/313 of 21 June 1973 
87 Messinga, Ernest Claude (2007), Les Forces Armées camerounaises faces aux 
enjeux militaires dans le Golfe de Guinée : le cas du conflit Armée de Bakassi, Mémoire de 
D.E.A., Law and Political Science Department, Université de Yaoundé II SOA, p.66 
88 According to one source the Nigerian side seems to have taken the opportunity to 
rotate as many soldiers as possible into the frontline. They changed the units every other 
week, whilst the Cameroonian units stayed in place for three months each. Afterwards, they 
spent two weeks for training by French officers in Limbe (South Cameroon), plus two weeks 
recovery. Each unit deployed made three tours per year, over a stretch of two years, Interview 
Ca 13 with Bakassi navy veteran Adjutant I, Yaoundé, July 2012  
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escalation and not to provoke all-out war, which was considered more of a  
threat to the regime than, for example, the quickly contained political pluralism. 
Since the conventional armed forces were at no time considered capable to 
confront a foreign army, the Bataillon Léger d'Intervention (BLI) was created in 
January 1999. This move would allow the authorities to respond successfully to 
a threat at battalion level. Officially the BLI was described as the armed forces’ 
module to face newly emerging asymmetric military threats, like large scale 
organised road robbery (grand banditisme) in the North of Cameroon. Through 
Presidential decree 2001/183 of 25 July 200189 the BLI became the Bataillon 
d'Intervention Rapide (BIR), with one full battalion in each of the three military 
regions.90 For the Southern region, the so-called BIR Delta would be tasked 
with fighting piracy in the Gulf of Guinea, but its operational target was 
primarily the control of the Bakassi peninsula, to deter further Nigerian 
ambitions. BIR units are now to be found throughout the entire Cameroonian 
territory, represented by nine additional BIR, including BIR Delta, the Bataillon 
Spécial Amphibie (BSA), one airborne BIR, a Centre d'Instruction des BIR, the 
Centre Antiterroriste, and a logistic base of the BIR.
91
 Domestically the military 
is deployed against violent domestic uprisings only in the form of occasional ad 
hoc ‘operational commandoes’ of the regular army, unimpressive compared to 
the parallel BIR deployment. In the semi-official Cameroonian press, the BIR is 
hailed as having permitted the judiciary to chase ‘evil doers, and to re-establish 
                                                             
89 Published the following day in Cameroon Tribune 
90 Three military regions were established during the latest army reform attempt by the 
French General Raymond Germanos in 2001. The gendarmerie has established its own BIR 
called GPIGN, Groupement Polyvalent d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale, interview 
Ca 13 Adjudant I, Yaoundé, July 2012 
91 Nkoa Atenga, Camille (2005), Army in the Mood of Change, Honneur et Fidélité 
Magazine des Forces Armées, special edition, pp.20f (Nkoa is at the time of writing chief of 
staff the land armed forces) 
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peace on the entire national territory’.92 Few, if any, oppressive operations are 
executed by the army. 
3 Patronage as Social Contract  
No more than its Congolese counterpart can the Cameroonian military be 
understood if it is not placed in the context of the political culture in which it 
evolves. As others in Central Africa, the Cameroonian political culture is based 
on a patronage system, but it is marked by local features linked to the country’s 
distinctive type of political leadership, the particular complexity of its patronage 
networks, and a deep infusion with mystical traditions.  
3.1 The Ahidjo Heritage 
In societies where literacy is limited, griots, the traditional singer-poets, 
preserve political and social history. Griots are living libraries. They deliver the 
interpretation of political events and are thus vital to their audience’s perception 
of historical events. At the time of transition to independence, upon becoming 
the prime minister of semi-autonomous Cameroon, Ahmadou Ahidjo was 
characterised by the griots as nouveau patron de toutes et de tous, the new 
patron of everything and everybody.93 Ahidjo had obtained the power from 
France, said the griots, ‘He came from Paris, passed through Douala; and went 
to Yaoundé.’94 One of them, Bello Dow Keerol, sang, ‘Ahmadou Ahidjo […] our 
white governor – he now has the power of France.’95 As summarised by Prof. 
Saibou Issa, the new political class was perceived as mimicking the former 
white rulers, with Ahidjo, the tout-puissant, the all-powerful, in the words of the 
griot, heading them, stepping in his predecessors’ shoes. To avoid any 
                                                             
92 Cameroon Tribune, 20 February 2009 
93 See Saibou Issa (2009), La transition du pouvoir colonial et la naissance de 
l'administration territoriale au Nord-Cameroun, Kaliao, revue interdisciplinaire de l'E.N.S. de 
Maroua, 1, 1, Maroua 
94 Ibid. p.60 
95 Quoted in Ibid. p.60 
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misunderstanding, the incoming rulers ensured that the new allocation of might 
was accompanied by powerful symbols reflected in the size of palaces and 
villas, and even more so in the strict allocation of cars. Thus the Prime minister 
would own an American Pontiac with twin V-shaped fins; his ministers were 
assigned Frégate amirale, the Paris-typical taxi of the epoch; directors would 
still have the less sophisticated Frégate; and everyone below drove a Citroën 
2CV ‘Deux cheveaux’.96 The transition had changed the commandant for the 
Coumanda. 
Having centralised the state by the re-unification of the two Cameroons 
under the protection of the French, Ahidjo set out to broaden his power base 
on the basis of extended patronage networks. According to Etonga, ‘These 
networks were based on a patronage system that allowed him to control and 
distribute the resources of the state.’97 And Takougang and Krieger observe: 
 
Those who received important positions within the party or in the 
administration were not only able to exploit those positions for their 
personal gains, but were also able to build clienteles for themselves and for 
the President through employment opportunities and by providing other 
social and economic benefits for their clients. The President was thus able 
to create an extensive patron-client network that transcended various 




Paul Biya inherited this system upon taking power in 1982 and set out to 
perfect it in his own style. He was helped in this by the increase in revenue 
                                                             
96 Abwa, Daniel (1998), Commissaires et Hauts-Commissaires de la France au 
Cameroun 1916-1960, Presses universitaires de Yaoundé, Yaoundé, p.401 
97 Etonga, Mbu (1980), An Imperial Presidency: A Study of Presidential Power in 
Cameroon, in Kofele-Kale, Ndiva, An African Experiment in Nation Building: The Bilingual 
Cameroon Republic Since Reunification Westview Press, Boulder, p.142 
98 Takougang, Joseph and Milton Krieger (1998), African State and Society in the 
1990s Cameroon's Political Crossroads, Westview Press, Boulder, pp.52f 
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from the (relatively) newly integrated Anglophone zone's petroleum which was 
kept out of the national budget and used in a discretionary manner to fuel a 
wide swath of public enterprises, development projects, and ‘a ‘high politics’ of 
patronage sufficient to attract and hold the loyalty of its beneficiaries and their 
clients’.99 
3.2  Ruling via Uncertainty: The Führerprinzip 
Combining irony with frustration, Cameroonians joke about their 
president’s ‘official state visits to Cameroon’, when he is in the country. Taking 
into account the fact that most of the military coups on the African continent 
after the initial post-colonial decade have been performed during the absence 
of the incumbent leader,100 the time spent abroad by the head of state can be 
taken as an indicator of the stability of his regime.101  
President Biya epitomises the state to a degree that allows comparison to 
Louis XIV. However, his power is not an absolutist one depending on coercion 
alone. Rather, his subjects, a majority of them born after he took power, 
demonstrate an anticipatory, pro-active form of obedience. In a way, the 
system is analogous to Adolf Hitler’s Führerprinzip, in which the leader lets his 
inferior clientele fight out their interests, and then has the last word without 
involvement in internal rivalries. This principle applies in particular within the 
ruling party, the Rassemblement démocratique du peuple camerounais 
(RDPC), whose members try to negotiate their careers and policies according 
to what they anticipate as meeting the leader’s intentions. The balance 
between positioning for power and not raising the incumbent’s suspicion is 
difficult to sustain and backlashes can come suddenly, without explication. On 
                                                             
99 Wehler (1969) p.4 
100 See Clark (2007) 
101 President Biya spends most of his time at the Hotel InterContinental, Geneva 
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the other hand, they are rarely irrevocable.102 The Cameroonian one-party rule 
as of 1966 is therefore quite different and much more sophisticated than the 
blunt instrument of power represented by Mobutu’s single party MPR, instituted 
at the same period.  
In the broader social context, patronage from the top functions on the 
same principle as a paternoster elevator. Every such elevator of opportunity 
will undoubtedly turn down after arrival at the top. Paul Biya’s sophisticated 
system of binding people through a balance of uncertainty and hope is 
grounded in the experience that one cannot only be dismissed but also be 
promoted the very next day without any premonition. At the same time one 
cannot successfully play in all channels theoretically available. There is 
therefore little certainty about the best method to advance because the ultimate 
leadership systematically surprises with unexpected twists, and the speed up is 
identical with the speed downwards.103 In this system, simple kinship is far 
from being a warranty for career: as one colonel said to this author, ‘The 
President is my uncle, but that does not help me become general’ – it may, 
however, have helped him to become a colonel.  
In such a political context, public discourse retains a degree of freedom 
that can be measured by a relatively outspoken press. The only taboo is 
placed on criticism of the President himself and his wife. As long as people or 
newspapers blame ‘the government’, or air their discomfort though metaphors, 
discourse is possible. Addressing widespread corruption, for instance, may be 
done by criticising the national football organisation, whereby the national 
coach or the responsible minister, both traditionally mired in corruption 
                                                             
102 ICG (2010b); the impression of a number of observers that the ruling party is 
‘increasingly divided’ may be attributed to the fact that some see President Biya’s rule as 
coming to a close soon, leaving the party as the main battleground for succession
 
 
103 Ministers sometime learn about their appointments from the newspapers. Given the 
rare presence of Biya in the country, the high turnover of ministers has prevented some from 
even meeting him during their tenure, see Pigeaud (2011), p.64 
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scandals, stand for the President and his cronies, the management’s 
disappointing performance for the administration, and the suffering team for the 
people. 
3.3 The Cameroonian Patronage System: An Ever Reshaping 
Web  
The Cameroonian social contract materialises mostly in an informal 
shape, namely in the guise of multiple informal networks thriving under the 
cover of official organisations. The party, the security forces, the churches, the 
universities, and public works enterprises are the many hosts for those 
networks, feeding on a diversified pool of economic resources including taxes, 
charges of all kinds, national and international trade, and production revenues, 
etc., in a context in which there are few transparent channels to access 
positions or contracts, and every individual is permanently on the lookout for 
alternative roads to wealth or at least a better life.  
 The state apparatus, both at the local and the central levels, is the most 
powerful of the network hosts, making access to its ranks particularly sought 
after in the search for positions d’argent or sinecures.104 For this reason, every 
network ultimately points up to the same central power, the presidency. In a 
pattern typical of limited access orders, the semi-closed Cameroonian society 
creates economic rents through privileged access to political influence, and 
then uses these rents to sustain the political order via a patronage scaffolding 
holding it together. Accesses to rents remains ultimately at the grace of Paul 
Biya, but before it comes to decision applicants have to perform in a 
competitive and highly differentiated system of intermediate level screening.  
In such a system no individual wants to rely on a single clientele system. 
Being a soldier, for instance, does not mean that one does not take part in 
                                                             
104 Sinecure is used here in its pre-modern sense of clientelism: a non-permanent 
position or office that requires little or no work but provides a salary. 
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elevage or farming. Being a University teacher does not mean that one does 
not develop economic ties with soldiers who command certain military budgets. 
Similarly, to obtain a military promotion, a number of payments are due, which 
will be difficult to generate without an external source of revenue; and in turn, 
to assure a place for one’s son or a client at a prestigious military school, 
contacts via the church or the political party may be decisive. The former 
German Democratic Republic is perhaps the best example of a similar system 
where the bureaucracy, the armed forces, public enterprises, and a little private 
economy come together as a network of providers of wealth and goods at 
different levels.  
Clientele systems are an evolving web and there are also ‘fashions’ in 
what helps one work up the patronage ladder. For example, for some time a 
university degree ensured relatively quick access to a guaranteed basic salary. 
This is no longer the case: although any graduate is still entitled to a post, this 
no longer necessarily comes with a secured income. For an academic career, 
especially one with access to a poste d’argent (position with potential access to 
personal gain) at the university, however, the stand within the political party 
can be decisive.105 Membership in certain secret associations, such as 
Rosicrucians and Freemasons, may be helpful or prohibitive depending on the 
situation. The informality of clientele networks goes beyond membership in 
pseudo-organisations: at the time of the field research in Cameroon in 2010 
and 2011 interviewees from independent (non-related) backgrounds credibly 
reported that men applying for work at the public energy company, or a large 
mobile phone company, had to be homosexual.106  
                                                             
105 Interview (anonymised) with an alumni of Yaoundé University with a degree in 
international relations who had not received his salary for the first six months of his 
employment at a ministry non-related to his expertise 
106 The concealed question was whether they were ‘bilingual’ in the right manner, 
aiming at sexual preferences. This phenomenon was widely discussed in the press as a matter 
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Overall, clientele systems today are much more intricate than during the 
early years of independence. The old North-South divide is still relevant but 
decreasing in importance. With the advent of a multi-party system and social 
diversification, a multiplicity of sub-clientele systems and horizontal networks 
has developed, fed from the top and the bottom at the same time, leading to 
the constant rearrangement of paths of advancement. Alternative channels 
compete with one another at the same time as the actors within may use them 
simultaneously as parallel paths of advancement as part of a personal risk 
management strategy. This is also a way to protect themselves against the 
downward spirals of the ‘staircases of advancement’ described above.  
The Cameroonian clientele system has developed on the scaffolding of a 
political culture that is as stringently hierarchical as in the rest of Central Africa, 
but much more conflict-averse than is typical for the sub-region.107 Under an 
apparent calm and Fabian surface, internal divisions due to the discrepancies 
between the feudal North and the more modernised South, tensions among 
social layers, and the inequities between the people and predatory elites, all 
impact on the social fabric.
108
 In this context, the patronage system appears to 
work as conflict management and conflict mitigation tools in the hands of the 
elites. As a result, the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, as an important rung 
of this system, does not have the same function as in conventional directly-
ruled states in the Western or Chinese traditions. Rather, in a quasi-state such 
as Cameroon, where the bargain between the subjects and the lord had never 
happened,109 the quasi-state façade represented by the administration does 
not function as a conveyor belt between the nation and the legislator or the 
                                                                                                                                                                                
of grievance, naming the fifty most important homosexual persons, Nkongo, Alain Bertrand 
(2012), Homosexualité: Le double langage du Gouvernement, Cameroon Info-net 
107 Together with neighbouring Gabon, Cameroon has never suffered a military take-
over or other violent political transformation linked to the intra-elite power struggle, although 
both experienced coup attempts (Gabon in 1964, Cameroon in 1982)  
108 Bachiri and Balibutsa (2005), pp.3ff 
109 As theorised by David Leonard date, see chapter two, section 3.2 
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executive, but as a series of political dashpots cushioning the impact of social 
conflicts within the indirect rule order. In the Cameroonian context of deep but 
subdued structural violence, the patronage of a big man still appears as the 
best insurance. 
3.4 Beyond State Power: Witchcraft 
Sorcellerie (witchcraft) is another characteristic of Cameroonian political 
culture – as it is in most Central African societies. Witchcraft is important as it 
pervades daily individual beliefs and behaviour, leading to actions which, from 
a Western perspective, may seem ‘irrational’. For example, an officer or an 
official taking an important position will eradicate any leftovers from the office 
of its predecessor, up to the curtains and wall paint, in order to stamp out any 
evil force that may have been left lingering around.110 Witchcraft is also 
important because it implies the existence of supra-natural forces, the power of 
which goes beyond the control of the state. If the power of the state to reign 
may be conceded during daylight, other forces are believed to dominate the 
realm of the night, and the state is not considered to have the ability to tackle 
witchcraft head-on.111 Witchcraft acts as a constraint on action, as everyone 
everywhere – and particularly individuals in high-ranking positions – feels 
under the permanent threat of falling prey to an act of sorcery mandated by an 
enemy, but also as an instrument of control in the hands of the powerful who 
can, precisely, call upon the services of nganga (sorcerers) to threaten their 
adversaries. The president himself, as well as his ministers, are said to have 
their own advisers on occult techniques, and even the football team travels 
with twelve Marabouts!112  
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Interview Ca 3 with foreign military advisor, Cameroon, April 2011
 
111 Geschiere (1993), p.333 
112 Pigeaud (2011), p.110 
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Widespread belief in witchcraft makes it a useful tool to steer or prevent 
political action. For example, one wonders whether the wide rumours about 
witchcraft related to a decade long series of fires in the offices of high military 
and defence officials in the 2000s may not simply be a way to prevent 
investigation in corruption or other cases by destroying evidence in a non-
attributable manner.113  
According to relevant research114 and interviews115 witchcraft had a 
renaissance with the democratisation movement of the early 1990s and official 
campaigns to eradicate it – or at least mitigate its most extreme forms – have 
had rather the opposite effect as they have exposed the popular obsession 
with the phenomenon. On the political front, many people believe, for example, 
that President Biya must have employed witchcraft to remain in power, using 
stronger sorcerers than opposition groups tried to employ against him. This in 
turn strengthened the president’s position as the foremost patron, both of the 
state and the informal world beyond.  
4 The Military in the Cameroonian State Order 
The state of the Cameroonian armed forces 50 years after independence is a 
product of the country’s history and its political culture. The outcome is a 
particular form of ‘quasi-army’ characterised by a deep immersion in national 
patronage and corruption networks, a lack of coherence in operational roles 
and capacity, and an ambiguous relationship with the citizenry.  
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In 2000 the records of Colonel (later brigadier) Bénaé Mpecke went up in flames. In 
2001 and 2002 the cabinet du Mindef, the office of Laurent Esso at the MOD burned out. In 
2008 in the so called ‘Pentagon’ building offices of General of the Army Semengue, general de 
corps d’armée Nganso Sundji, the Divisional Generals Tataw and Youmba, and of Br igadier 
General Songole caught fire
 
114 There is extensive research on sorcery by African academics, which is mostly 
ignored by their Western colleagues, see for instance Bachiri and Balibutsa (2005) 
115 Interview Ca 14 with Prof. Balibutsa, Libreville 2010 
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4.1 Patronage and Corruption: A Contaminated Military  
The Cameroonian armed forces are part and parcel of the quasi-state 
bureaucratic patronage network, both constituting a clientele system in their 
own right and also intersecting with the patronage networks operating in the 
civilian realm of the administration. In those networks, political elites and 
military elites overlap and the military is as little a monolithic institution as the 
‘state’ is one. Quasi-state bureaucracy and military serve as the framework in 
which high-ranking officials pursue their individual interests, rather than 
institutional interests. Hence, the military is as much a tool of influence and 
resources management in the hands of the patrons dominating the state 
apparatus as an instrument of power projection of the state. In this system, 
military and civilian elites act in competition or cooperation across the 
networks, rather the military and the civilian bureaucracies competing against, 
or cooperating with one another. 
 In a context marked by the penetration of Cameroonian political culture 
by corruption,116 the fact that the military-bureaucratic apparatus is the 
recipient and manager of a considerable part of the funds available to the 
nation makes it particular prone to contamination. At times officers can 
mobilise enough leverage to resist influence from internal or external informal 
networks.117 According to the ranking of Transparency International for 2008 
the Cameroonian army was in the third highest position pertaining to corruption 
within the administration.118  
                                                             
116 See Titi Nwel, Pierre (1999), Corruption in Cameroon, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung 
Kamerun, Yaoundé; Titi Nwel, Pierre (2009), La lutte contre la corruption en Cameroun, 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Kamerun, Yaoundé; in the national archives of Cameroon staff 
demanded a negotiated bribe for every document accessed – without providing a receipt  
117 Interview Ca 8 with Owena Nguini, April  2011; in civilian as much as military 
bodies, when patrons see a vanishing of capacities among their own clients they would use all 
of the institutional means available to repel an external influx of claimant 
118 It was the only year when the army was on this opinion pool’s list to choose from 
and be ranked, Mbassi, Dominique and Marie Robert Eloundou (2008), La corruption monte en 
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4.1.1  The Roots of the Problem 
Patronage in the Cameroonian military has its roots in early 1980s 
political developments but its generalisation and intertwining with corruption 
dates from the economic crisis of the ensuing decade. Political and financial 
factors have therefore combined in redefining the shape of the military away 
from professional criteria. 
The 1984 attempted coup against President Biya altered the position of 
the security forces as, from that time onward, military control has been placed 
in the hands of a small circle of trusted men occupying key senior posts. This 
small circle comprises a few generals who came to, or remained in, their 
positions during the first transition from Mamadhou Ahidjo to Paul Biya and 
kept them until the early 2010s, has constituted the top rung of the military 
patronage system. The first of them to retire did so only in 2011, including 
General Semengue, Commander of the Cameroonian Armed Forces, as 
general of the army (5*) and General Tataw, the highest Anglophone military 
officer, as general of the division (3*).119 All in all, the Cameroonian army had 
only 24 generals in its entire history and, in 2012, most of them were well 
beyond the legal retirement age of 65.120 By the early 2010s certain of them 
owned forest concessions or plantations, headed private security companies or 
owned land rented out to multinationals.121 Political control over the military 
and the distribution of favours to maintain it have been the responsibility and 
                                                                                                                                                                                
grade, Germinal, 2, October/November, p.12; TI’s relative comparison of countries put 
Cameroon in a range between places 134 out of 182 (2011) and 146 out of 178 (2010) 
119 The other two were General de corps d’armée (4*) Oumaroudjam Yaya, 
Commander of the gendarmerie, and Rear admiral Guilaume Ngouah Ngally. The four of them 
were the first generals of the Cameroonian Armed Forces ever to retire 
120 General Semengué was 76 when he retired in 2011. The limited number of generals 
is very much in contrast to Gabon, where the title ‘General’ is a purely political position, with 
two generals coming from each region – presently counting for 19 generals for the 2600-strong 
land armed forces 




the privilege of those few. A policy of promotion favouring the President’s own 
ethnic group, the Béti, is said to have buttressed the system.122  
The rules of the military clientele system started changing radically with 
the economic crisis in the early 1990s. Under pressure from international 
financial institutions and creditors to reduce public expenditures in order to 
juggle the country’s ballooning debt, president Biya decided to remain loyal to 
his soldiers, partly because they had been loyal to him, and for fear of coups or 
armed rioting. Whereas average bureaucrats’ salaries were decreased by 60 to 
70 per cent in the early to mid1990s, the military remained unharmed and, as 
in 1994 the franc CFA was devalued by 50 per cent, the military were offered a 
way out by obtaining the authorisation to go into business – at least at the level 
of senior officers.123 The Cameroonian débrouille was not as severe as under 
Mobutu, but it opened the floodgates of ubiquitous corruption. 
4.1.2  Forms of Patronage and Corruption 
There are three main levels of corruption in the security sector: first, large 
scale corruption linked to arms transfers, fuel acquisition, and the most 
profitable postes d’argent; secondly, the institutionalised corruption of mediocre 
postes d’argent at battalion level, which generally earn their beneficiaries small 
amounts of money over a long period of time; and, thirdly, petty corruption at 
the level of ordinary soldiers, which has only been developing very recently.  
Senior officers of general rank are involved in large scale corruption, 
which implies handling enormous sums of money for arms acquisitions. The 
dangers of such deals came quickly enough to the attention of the political 
leadership, who realised the risk of dispossessing itself of control on major 
                                                             
122 Interview Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Yaoundé, April 2011 
123 Pigeaud (2011), p.61; Takougang (1997), p.5; Blandford, David, et al. (1994), Oil 
Boom and Bust: The Harsh Realities of Adjustment in Cameroon, in Sahn, David, Adjusting to 




pools of resources; and, as early as 1996, a reform of public tendering 
(réforme du système de passation des marchés publics) was introduced by 
placing a US$6,000 ceiling limit on any tender. These limitations, however, 
were quickly circumvented by strategies such as splitting orders into several 
smaller lots124 and introducing as many ‘points of sale’ as possible for the 
payment of bribes in each contract. 125 Whilst such high level corruption is well-
known, unearthing it is not easy and can be a risky business. According to an 
air-force colonel interviewed for a study by the Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation:  
 
Look at the contracts for the supply of arms, military hardware and 
equipment. You will be shocked if you were to try to look into this area. You 
will see, but after that you will be eliminated. Some of the most 
unscrupulous businessmen are found among our military bosses.126 
 
High level corruption is fostered by the lack of transparency in the 
governance of public funds. Since training institutions, for example, have no 
distinct legal personality, it is impossible to separate funding allotted to them 
from funding allotted to the ministry.127 Thus, 4/5 of a five billion FCFA grant 
(six million £) intended for the creation of a joint French/Cameroonian military 
academy project are reported to have gone directly and without receipt to the 
minister of defence. In another instance, from a one billion allotment for the 
equipment of forces deployed during the Bakassi crisis in 1996, a mere one 
                                                             
124 Aircraft, for instance, were ordered in parts, wings, engines; ships, which cannot be 
subdivided in different lots are not being ordered anymore; Interview Ca 16 French military 
adviser I, January 2012 
125 ‘Points of sale’ include for example: placing of purchase order; approval as 
contractor or supplier; the award of the contract; the signing of the contract; implementation of 
the contract; technical reception and delivery of supplies; or payment of bills or debit notes, see 
Titi Nwel (1999) 
126 Ibid. p.54 
127 See B&S Europe Report to the European Commission (2012), Assistance technique 
pour appuyer la CEEACdans la mise en place des conditions d'un soutien Europ éen aux 
centres de formation regionaux, non-published, Brussels, pp.80-89 
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million arrived on the ground, reflecting a similar confusion between the chain 
of command and the chain of payment as that encountered in the Congo. After 
this episode, French advisors reportedly offered to finance and install a 
software controlled personnel planning programme to control the flow of funds, 
but the machines were ‘deliberately crashed’ soon after installation, and never 
touched again.128 In more convoluted schemes, the military administrative 
chain can be used as a channel for money laundering. Journalist Jean Bosco 
Talla reports that in 2004 an office chief of one brigadier general ‘who 
meanwhile had passed away’ asked his five staff to present their role number 
(matricule) without any further explanation. In the ensuing weeks money 
additional to their normal salaries in the range of 50,000 to 800,000 Fcfa 
arrived in their accounts. Soon after their office chief would demand his (lion’s) 
share of the money. Not having the money ready meant punishment at the will 
of the sender and ‘godfather’.129  
 It is at the intermediate level that corruption takes its most varied forms. 
It may include fraudulent salaries or pensions, ghost soldiers, fuel trade, 
commissions on arms and other equipment acquisition, trade in promotions 
and nominations, or bribing of commissions. Fraudulent disability pensions are 
apparently a favourite and relatively easy tool for officers, and at times civilian 
defence officials as well, to beef up their monthly income.130 On the other hand, 
initial recruitments, success in internal competitions (concourse) for promotion, 
                                                             
128 Interview Ca 16 with a French military adviser I, January 2012
 
129 Interview Ca 10 with Talla, Yaoundé, April 2011 
130 In 2009, Prof. Pius Ondoua Ondoua revealed to the Cameroonian press that one 
battalion commander (administrative title at the ministry of Defence) regularly received three 
pensions, two of which were false claims amounting to four million FCFA and a maréchal de 
logis chef (NCO ranking below adjudant) had received some 10 million FCFA. This seems to 
have been part of a scheme tailored to the needs of NCOs, with benefits cases ranging 
between seven million and above 14 million FCFA. Among the recipients were 48 per cent 
sergeant and sergeant chef, 22 per cent adjudant and adjudant chef, and 18 per cent civilian 
staff at the MoD. Only one corporal chef, and one soldat première classe were in the list. 
Interestingly, Prof. Ondoua, head of the philosophy department at Yaoundé 1 University, is a 
member of the ruling RDPC and his official CV includes Secretary of employment, labour, and 
providence (prévoyance) in the 1997 cabinet. This gives an idea of the complexity of inter-elite 
relations in Cameroun  
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and access to training opportunities seem to lend themselves to a particularly 
active trade.131 Training abroad (stages), especially in France, is theoretically 
the outcome of a strict and objective selection process, but it is suspected of 
following its own rules, including a concern for the ‘fair’ distribution of favours, 
in a similar logic to that of the ‘paternoster system’ in civilian career-making. 
Posts abroad, such as defence attaché, in an international organisation, or in a 
peacekeeping mission are most of the time a way to be rewarded by one’s 
patron, as confirmed by several interviewees.132  
Not all postes d’argent are of similar quality in terms of income, though, 
and access to them is not necessarily a matter of rank. As one graduate of the 
Ecole de guerre explained to this author, there are only 30 places to fill each 
year at the prestigious school. With a bribe rate within the range of hundred 
thousand FCFA per aspirant, the harvest is rather mediocre for the director, 
especially as the post is usually limited to three years. The same post, 
however, can be a stepping stone for access to a better-endowed position.133 
Acquisition of petrol and fuel for the land armed forces, on the other hand, is a 
very lucrative post, occupied in 2011-2012 by a captain, eliciting some 
considerable jealousy from colonels who had not made it to a general position. 
Most NCOs, on their part, will derive their income from engagement in 
business activities aside from their military duties, rather than straightforward 
armed forces-related corruption. Several interviewees (corporal, adjutant-chef, 
captain) confirmed to this author that they were active as cattle raisers or 
farmers or in the import-export business, an activity tacitly facilitated by regular 
                                                             
131 Testimony of a retired capitaine de vaisseau (equivalent commodore/colonel) in 
ZAP Press, Yaoundé, 5 October 2008; this was also confirmed by one active officer during an 
interview Ca 11 with this author, Douala, April 2011 
132 Ca 15 with Professor Fogué, April 2011, Yaoundé 
133 According to Cours Supérieur Interarmées de Défense (CSID) staff, 90 per cent of 
the bribe money goes to the director. That the post is a stepping stone position is 
demonstrated by the fact that three of the recently promoted generals are earlier directors of 
the school  
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weekends off duty including Friday and Monday. The riches many of them 
have piled up, as testified by the interior of their houses, would be difficult to 
explain solely from their military income. Private agricultural enterprises were 
as freely listed by interviewees as ‘side benefits’ of purchases made in service 
of the army. 
The third level of corruption, low level corruption, has developed only 
recently. With pressure increasing on low income households, simple soldiers 
have begun engaging in paltry corruption, such as using military cars and the 
deterrence created by their uniforms to start a new transport business; 
unchallenged by the ubiquitous roadblocks of police and gendarmerie, these 
soldiers offer taxi and transport services that pass by these taxing points. 
Military vans are also a safe and appreciated means of transportation in 
regions where road robbery is a significant problem.134 
4.1.3 The Consequences 
Two kinds of distortions have resulted from the perversion of the 
Cameroonian armed forces by patronage systems and business interests. 
One has been a decrease in the proficiency of the military, to the regret of 
a cohort of officers who joined during the ‘Golden Age’ of the 1970s and 1980s 
and retained a high level of professional ethics.135 As officers and soldiers have 
been spending more and more time catering for their private interests, they 
have been less and less available to improve their duty performance. As 
access to military academies and training abroad and sometimes diplomas 
themselves have been traded for favours, there has been less and less 
certainty of the proficiency of the alumni. Besides, in the absence of a 
                                                             
134 Various interviews with civilians and soldiers, Douala, Yaoundé (2010 and 2011), 
see also Ngome, Casimir (2007), Cameroon’s Military and Police in Clando Transport 
Business in the South West Province, The Frontier Telegraph, 24 September, np 
135 Interview Ca 11 with officer, Douala, April 2011 
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systematic record keeping of individual soldier’s or officer’s training courses or 
achievements in training or action, there is no objective foundation on which to 
base promotions or assign duties.136 There is no institutional remembrance in 
the armed forces.137 Such a context increases the likelihood that affectation or 
advancement decisions will be based on criteria other than merit, feeding 
further the vicious circle of clientele and corruption. Even worse consequences 
may at time ensue when several actors within the military try to reach out for 
the same lucrative deals. For example, a widely reported episode of armed 
assailants attacking a military post in Bakassi, killing 21 soldiers, in November 
2007 was initially attributed to Nigerian pirates. However, it later came out that 
arms deals involving senior military were at the source of this assault: 
International Crisis Group research demonstrated that ‘the objective of the 
attack was to eliminate witnesses to trafficking’.138 
The second distortion is more of a sociological one, as the pillars of 
Cameroonian military power structures have remained the clientele networks of 
the old generals. The establishment of this military bourgeoisie with incomes 
out of all proportion with those of regular soldiers, and in all cases much higher 
than their immediate subordinates, has undermined the army’s stability. It has 
created deep resentment in higher officers’ ranks as many colonels have been 
barred from access to the circle of those privileged few, have seen their 
promotions blocked and have had to retire at the legal age of 65, unlike the 
generals themselves, with their ultimate goal forever dashed. The resentment 
is an economic one, as alternative opportunities, such as foreign postings or a 
                                                             
136 Interview Ca 17 French military adviser II, Yaoundé, June 2012 
137 The MINDEF could provide the name of a Colonel in charge of military 
historiography. However, neither at the ministry, nor among the military leadership could 
anyone give the location of his office or his telephone coordinates  
138 ICG (2010b), p.10 
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tour in a peacekeeping operation, are few and far between.139 It is also a 
professional one, as the younger generation of officers generally have a higher 
level of education than their elders and commanding officers. On the other 
hand, the ‘permanent generals’ cannot but feel that their positions, one day, 
will be jeopardised. Finally, keeping the older generals active has also 
complicated the army’s command as some of them entertain tense mutual 
relations; however, as they are all but ‘untouchable’, they cannot be 
disciplined. These tensions compound others, with which they sometimes 
overlap, such as suspicions raised by what is perceived as arbitrary promotion 
of Béti officers or lingering resentment from the attempted coup of 1984, as 
some of those who helped thwart the coup believe they were not sufficiently 
rewarded, while others think they were unjustly sanctioned. 
4.2 Operational Roles and Capacity: A Patchwork 
Officially, the Cameroonian military has two roles: one in defence of the 
territory and one in support of the country’s economic development, as is 
traditional in many African armies. In practice, neither role is systematically and 
coherently carried out. On the contrary, mandate fulfilment appears the 
exception rather than the rule. 
4.2.1  Combat Functions 
As explained above, the management of the army via patronage 
networks and its contamination by business interests has damaged its 
efficiency both by disrupting the chain of command and undermining the 
proficiency of individual soldiers. Further neglect, motivated in part by the 
regime’s concern not to allow the emergence of an armed counter-power, has 
                                                             
139 In many countries, peacekeeping operations provide a channel to reward high 
ranking officers or even simple soldiers. With very little Cameroonian involvement in such 
operations, this opportunity does not exist 
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led to a significant weakening of the Cameroonian regular military. Troops 
have increasingly insufficient incomes and equipment; they are poorly trained 
and are often kept idle. With few military barracks, soldiers live alongside 
civilians in military districts. Logistics, always a marginalised branch, remains 
limited to the barely necessary minimum, whether in terms of food, or 
ammunition or transport.140 As a result, the operability of the regular army has 
decreased to a mediocre level. 
Instead of calling upon the regular forces, President Biya’s regime has 
been relying more and more on a wide range of specialised units. As indicated 
above, in 1984 the Presidential guard (GP) was created to ensure the head of 
state’s personal security, followed a decade and a half later by the Bataillon 
Léger d'Intervention (BLI), which became the rapid deployment battalion 
(Bataillon d'Intervention Rapide, BIR) in 2001.141 In the meantime, Marine 
commandos and the Groupement Polyvalent d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie 
Nationale (GPIGN) had also been set up in 1993 and 1999 respectively.142 
Although the BIR is officially entrusted with a public security mandate – initially, 
the fight against highway robbery in the north and east of the country – like the 
GP, it benefits from special treatment and depends directly on the President’s 
office rather than the Ministry of Defence. That the BIR is a personal affair of 
the President is demonstrated by the fact that it was initially led and trained by 
a foreign officer retained on a private contract after he successfully shaped the 
GP to the President’s liking.143 
                                                             
140 Although the logistic autonomy and fighting capacity ratio are normally calculated for 
four days at tactical level, 10 days at regional level and three months at national levels, these 
requirements are seldom met. Many gendarmerie brigades have no means of transport. 
Interview with General Semengue 
141 See sections 2.5 and 2.8 
142 Decrees no. 93/212 of 4 August 1993, 93/0940 of 4 September 1993, and 99/015 of 
1 February 1999; Journal Officiel de la République du Cameroun 
143 The Israeli Colonel and former defence attaché to the Israeli Embassy in Yaoundé, 
Avi Sirvan, who had trained the GP, later took over the command of the project BIR. He retired 
from the Israeli service and continued as a consultant. Sirvan died in a helicopter crash in 
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Recruitment for the BIR is different from the other corps: it is centralised 
while regular forces have a recruitment centre in each region. This makes it 
easier to generate a central national loyalty within the force. BIR soldiers have 
to constantly prove their capacity to be members of the unit in terms of 
toughness. They are very well trained at arms, and members of the public tend 
to refer to them as less intelligent but more robust in behaviour than regular 
soldiers.144 Since the February 2008 riots, when they were deployed as 
reinforcements to secure Douala, Yaoundé and the Presidential palace 
threatened by demonstrators, their role has changed considerably. Since 
March 2009, their numbers have been increased, and they have replaced 
regular forces in Bakassi. This growing presence of the BIR in national security 
tasks has become problematic. Their deployment in Bakassi has been 
perceived as an act of defiance by the regular army. BIR and other forces units 
have clashed several times. For example, in April 2010, a dispute between BIR 
troops and policemen of the rapid intervention team (Equipe spéciale 
d’intervention rapide) degenerated into a gunfight in Bamenda in which four 
BIR soldiers were wounded. A particular cause of resentment by regular 
soldiers is that BIR troops are favoured both professionally – they are better 
equipped, better trained, and have more opportunities for real engagement – 
and personally – they enjoy advantages and bonuses that regular soldiers do 
not. According to some observers, Cameroon now has a two speed army, an 
armée à deux vitesses, with the BIR doing the fighting, and the regular military 
responsible for the parades.145 However, considering the fact that the general 
staff of the armed forces has no effective control over the BIR, it seems to be 
                                                                                                                                                                                
November 2010. This accident was accompanied by rumours of his allegedly trying to replace 
the GP through his BIR units; interview with Cameroonian academic (anonymised), April 2011 
144 Interview Ca 9 with researcher at the Policy Institute in Yaoundé, April 2011 
145 Interview Ca 17 with French military adviser II, Yaoundé, June 2012 
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fair to talk of two military bodies, neither of them fulfilling the role of a proper 
army.146 
The sharp separation of the structures, however, does not mean total lack 
of both permeability and similarities at the personal level. Motivated officers, for 
example, can always be assigned to these specialised units rather than 
remaining frustrated with the main army. The privileged status of a force does 
not mean security for its members. For example, GP troops are subject to 
constant rotation from and into the army. Just like for any other privileged 
position, this rotation does not occur according to a predictable pattern. Any 
member can always hope to remain for an extended time with the guard, or to 
return to it if well-behaved. As a matter of principle, the privilege has to be 
deserved without guaranty of a lasting reward.147  
In sum, five decades after independence, Cameroon appears to be 
endowed with what may seem as an ‘ideal’ combination from the perspective 
of the ruling President: first, a regular military too weak to challenge his 
authority, but contented with relative good salaries in comparison with civilian 
state employees and sufficient opportunities for officers to do business for their 
personal benefit; and, second, a few highly specialised and well-endowed 
combat units able to do actual fighting at the discretion of the President. 
Whether the system will prove sustainable, beyond the present incumbent, is 
an open question. 
4.2.2  Development-support Function 
On the occasion of the country’s 50th anniversary, the Ministry of Defence 
issued a special publication hailing the armed forces’ contribution to the 
                                                             
146 This is what Cameroonian observers suggest by speaking of an armée à plusieur 
têtes 
147 Interview (anonymised) with the former trainer of GP, Douala, June 2012 
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development of the country including provision of security for hydro-electric 
barrages, road construction, the aerial transport of athletes to the national 
pupils’ sports competition, and the transport of the Pope Bennedict XVI’s 
special car, the ‘Papamobile’ during his visit in 2009.148 This was fully 
congruent with the ‘army of development’ concept dear to Central African 
military and political elites. 
That concept, in Cameroon, resulted directly from the early practical 
function of the armed forces, even before the national military was created, 
consisting of waging a civil war in counterinsurgency mode. Winning the hearts 
and minds of the population was part and parcel of the role of the military. 
Road building work performed by military units in central Cameroon was part of 
the anti-guerrilla pacification strategy of the French forces.149 These roads, as 
well as school building, water or sewage system installation could be 
rationalised as a contribution to the material development of the country, as 
opposed to the alleged destructive character of the insurgency. The tradition 
has been carried on as the FAC have been established. In this context, the 
engineer corps has had an important demonstrative role to play and has been 
constantly paraded on official occasions as a tool for development. This 
applies even to the BIR, who, during the large parade on the occasion of the 
50th anniversary of independence, only displayed its collection of construction 
machines, although this force is created for combat only.150 
                                                             
148  Kenmegne, Léandre (2011), Honneur et Fidelité, Ministère de la Défense Division 
de la Communication,, Yaoundé, p.13 
149 See AHM Chateau Vincennes (1958), Report 954 Zone de pacification de la 
Sanaga Maritim of 7 March 1958, Commandant de ZOPAC Lt. Col. Lamberton, No 17/ZPC/S 
in 6H242, Parisnp. According to General Directive No 2 ‘all inhabitants too far from the routes 
carrossables had to give up their home and move to the new streets’. The territory in revolt had 
been divided in five sectors within the zone of pacification (known by its French acronym, 
ZOPAC) in late January 1958; Order Zopac No 1 quoted by Mbembe, Achille (1996), La 
naissance du maquis dans le Sud-Cameroun, 1920-1960, Karthala, Paris, p.349 
150 Cameroon Today, Cameroon Government News: Army Indicates Support To Unity, 




Recent research, however, demonstrates that the impact of the military 
effort on development has been and remains minimal or inexistent.151 The 148 
kilometres of dirt roads, paved roads, and four airfields constructed by the 
Cameroon military engineers over the period 1960-1975 were without 
exception in the regions of the maquis (Bamiléké) and were executed solely 
during the anti-guerrilla operations. Unfinished structures, such as a large 
landing strip for a Boeing 737 at Bafoussam, were even reportedly abandoned 
as military engineers returned to their barracks at the end of the rebellion.152 In 
the more recent period, the BIR, the Presidential Guard, or the army have been 
involved in small scale activities to build schools, dispensaries, bridges or other 
civil engineering works in the countryside. Such events, extensively 
photographed and broadcasted, are meant mainly as ‘marketing’ for the armed 
forces. They involve only a handful of Génie militaire troops and, according to a 
source, ‘there are no aspirations to do more’.153 Senior officers have also 
rejected the Ministry of Defence’s official claim that civilians benefit from the 
military health and sanitary services: Les hopitaux militaires ne sont pas 
ouverts au public.
154
 In other words, the assertion that the armed forces are 
making a significant contribution to development by improving infrastructure in 
remote parts of the country, building roads or air transport facilities, improving 
general hygiene and health services, or supporting the agro-pastoral 
production, are not justified.155 Ironically, although the President was 
emphasising that very contribution in his speech on the occasion of the 50th 
anniversary of the Cameroonian army and inaugurated the construction of a 60 
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room military structure, the medals for the work done went to a company 
belonging of the Chinese PLA.156 
4.3  The soldier, the State, and the Citizen 
Fifty years after independence, the Cameroonian military’s relationship 
with the people remain ambiguous. On the one hand, the military still bears 
some of the scars of its history – the treason committed by the armed elites 
exporting their subjects into bondage in the early colonial period, followed by 
the shaping of the modern military by, and for the needs of, the colonial power. 
On the other, its reputation is much better than that of any other domestic 
security force. Recent research indicates that ‘only’ 64 per cent of 
Cameroonian citizens consider the military as corrupt, as against 81 per cent 
for the justice system and 86 per cent for the police.157 An explanation given to 
this author, who asked the same type of questions to different interviewees, is 
that soldiers have few occasions to be in contact with the population, unlike the 
police and the gendarmerie, who are able to exploit their proximity to the 
people.158 By contrast, the reputation of the police is abysmal, although citizens 
do not seem to have other means of guarding against abuse than continuously 
offering bribes to the force.159 Belonging to the so-called ‘third category’,160 
soldiers are not visible in public and they normally have no permission to carry 
                                                             
156 Biya, Paul (2010), Presidency, Bamenda, 8 December; Ngu Ekigole (2010), np 
157 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer 2013, 
www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=cameroon 
158 Territorial gendarmerie roaming the countryside are much more prone to petty 
corruption than their colleagues in bigger communities 
159 According to a 2011 joint study of the Cameroon National Institute of Statistics and 
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République du Cameroun (2011 ), Mai, Institute National de la Statistique, Yaoundé, p.43. The 
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police. The establishment of independent police training centres has reportedly accelerated the 
decrease in professional discipline, see Titi Nwel (1999), p.53 
160 Based on the presidential decree of 5 April 1986, no. 86/286, the first category 
includes Gendarmerie territoriale, police and auxiliaries under the authority of the civil 
administration, the second category includes Gendarmerie mobile and formed police units 
deployed on request of the administration, and the third category is the military  
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arms (except the Presidential Guard) or to don a uniform in public.161 The 
prospect of a career in the military, a relatively distant and neutral body from 
the perspective of the average citizen, remains attractive if only because of the 
knowledge that the armed forces belong to the happy few who are paid on a 
timely basis.162 A captain receives three times the salary of a university 
professor with 20 years of professional practice. 
Communication between and among civilian stakeholders and their 
military counterparts takes place both at the highest level of governance in the 
form of a political bargain supported by a bargain on resources and also at the 
elite level just underneath in the form of a second bargain, mainly based on 
resource exchange. There is no independent bargain between the community 
of citizens representing the nation and the military below those levels. The 
bargain among the military and civilian elites is therefore a component part of 
the ‘elite power struggle’, which is an intra-elite confrontation about power and 
wealth, rather than a bargain between the rulers and the ruled.163 To these 
internal bargains must be added the bargain between the state as a sovereign 
actor and foreign sovereign actors, including the security apparatus of different 
states involved on both sides of this social confrontation.164  
5 Conclusion 
 
Cameroon has nominally had only one single regular armed force since 
1960. If it comes to the substance, however, one can conceptually differentiate 
between three different quasi-armies which to some extent co-existed or 
chronologically overlapped: first, the pre-independence forces of the 
                                                             
161 The latter prohibitions are not enforced, however 
162 In that context, the GP is ranked first before the land forces, followed by the air 
force, which is trailed by the navy. Prospects for career advancement are limited in the latter 
two services, which together count for less than 3,000 personnel 
163 See Mehler (2008) 
164 The second of these two bargains was described by Burton, Richard Francis (1961), 
The Lake Regions of Central Africa: A Picture of Exploration, Horizon Press, New York 
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transitional government of Cameroon, the Garde Camerounaise; second, the 
neo-colonial Forces armées camerounaises of the first decade of 
independence after 1960; and, third, the same FAC in their quasi-monarchist 
incarnation after 1982. In a way, the army evolved from being an instrument of 
French rule, via an existence as French satellite combat forces, to form a pillar 
of the personal rule system of President Paul Biya. In terms of missions, these 
armed forces also went through three phases. First, they were declared a 
‘people’s army’ to fight the domestic insurgency until about 1975; secondly, 
they grew into a Republican armed force to defend the territory of the state; 
and third they became a tool to project the regional foreign policy and political 
interests of the incumbent regime. Although there is some risk from an overspill 
of instability in the region (Nigeria, the Chad and Centrafrique are clear 
examples), Cameroon has so far found peaceful solutions to border problems 
with all of its neighbours. Lacking the international security environment that 
would justify the maintenance of an army, the armed forces drew their 
legitimacy from their alleged function as an ‘army of development’. As 
demonstrated above, this promise was not fulfilled.  
The level of discipline in the Cameroonian armed forces is much higher 
than that of the other national uniformed bodies.165 The security forces (army, 
gendarmerie, police) serve as the regime’s principal support, used to 
compensate for its lack of popular legitimacy and to satisfy its obsession with 
order and internal stability. But these forces suffer from several weaknesses: 
they are fragmented, with ill-equipped, regular forces on the one hand, and 
privileged specialized units on the other. Some of the forces have also 
developed ties with business or criminal organisations. Trained from the 
                                                             
165 An assessment shared by national and foreign observers throughout, including 
French and US American liaison officers, interviews and conversations with relevant military in 
Cameroon, Libreville, Paris, and London  
228 
 
beginning to represent the regime’s discreet reserve to combat its own citizens, 
the security forces have, since independence, been a key element of regime 
stability in Cameroon. The regime of President Ahmadou Ahidjo used them to 
establish his authority at independence, crushing the UPC, which threatened 
his rule. Their heavy public presence in the 1960s and 1970s amounted to a 
virtual state of war, and they have played an important part in repressing 
opponents of the regime and controlling the country’s citizenry. To fight against 
‘enemies from within’, they benefited from emergency rule for a long period: for 
30 years it was ‘the rule, the norm, and part of daily life’.166 It was only in 1993, 
during the conflict with Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula, that the army 
assumed partially what should be its primary role, namely the defence of the 
national territory. For Cameroon this mainly phony war had the effect of what 
Hans Ulrich Wehler describes as ‘social imperialism’, namely a policy to divert 
internal tensions outwards in order to preserve the political status quo at a time 
when the democracy movement jeopardised Biya’s regime’s monopoly.167  
Over time the armed forces had to adapt from being the main pillar of 
political power during the civil war to becoming one among many chains of 
career and wealth distribution in an increasingly complex power structure, to 
the regret of many individual soldiers and officers who joined in the 1970s and 
early 1980s and have stood firm to the ideological orientation they gained with 
their Cold War era training, defending the dignity of the armed forces and their 
personal integrity against the politically and economically corrupt environment 
of their neo-patrimonial quasi-state.  
Looking at the official army guidelines, in 1984 Paul Biya still described 
the people’s defence concept of the 1960s as necessarily ‘the symbiosis 
                                                             
166 See Eboussi Boulaga (1997), p.66 
167 See Wehler, Hans-Ulrich (1979 (1970)), Sozialimperialismus, in Wehler, Hans-
Ulrich, Imperialismus Athenäum, Königstein, 83-96 
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between the armed forces and the nation’.168 However, the notion of a defence 
by the people faded swiftly from the official discourse shortly after the 
democratisation process begun in the early 1990s. The idea that anyone 
except the ruling power could be responsibly participating in any form of 
defence lost its ideological appeal to the leadership. In a cascade of laws the 
executive’s monopoly on defence related issues was underlined, and 
Parliament side-lined.  
The official justification for this change in policy and doctrine away from a 
‘nation in arms’ was the growing internationalisation of military tasks of the 
army through the increasing regionalisation of military operations in connection 
with the African Standby Force – claimed even if Cameroon never participated 
in such operations in a meaningful way. The new policy was presented as 
necessary to enable the army to face new threats, by transforming it, as it was 
formulated, from a ‘guardian to an avant-garde’.169 To introduce this new 
doctrine officially, which served the desires of external donors more than the 
state of Cameroon, the idea of defence as a national common task had to be 
abandoned. In this way the military could be spared the burden of becoming an 
element of public concern, let alone participation.  
The Cameroonian military perfectly fits into a system that only allows the 
formation of an indirectly ruled state under closed society conditions. It defends 
and maintains a system of networks, which is a refined and sophisticated 
version of patronage, prone to corruption and protected from accountability to 
the population. The military does not form a coherent body at the discretionary 
service at the state. Rather, it is a quasi-army functioning as one of several 
auxiliary tools for the elite to maintain their grip on power – at the expense of 
                                                             
168 Author’s translation from Biya, Paul (1988), Le message du renouveau: discours et 
interviews du President Paul Biya, décembre 1983-novembre 1988, Vol. 1, Société de Presse 
et d'Editions du Cameroun, Yaoundé, p.223 
169 See Messinga (2007) 
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progress towards institutionalisation and the implementation of the rule of law. 
The military is one part of the bureaucracy, which remains among the safest 




Chapter Five: Rwanda  
Three Republics, Two Militaries, One Army 
 
Independent Rwanda has seen three republics and three different regular 
armed forces, but among them just one army in the professional sense of the 
term. Unlike the Congo, Cameroon, and most modern African countries, 
Rwanda has an ancient history as a strong, centralised state. That history is 
characterised by the inseparability of the military from the political order, the 
former providing the narrative and the effective foundation for the latter. 
Rwanda also has a modern history as a weak state coinciding with a large part 
of the colonial period and post-independent years until the 1994 genocide. The 
genocide was a watershed, ushering in a phase of national re-foundation, in 
which the reconstruction of the national identity was pursued in parallel with the 
restoration of a strong state, with the military playing a key role. The genocide, 
therefore, appears both as an element of profound rupture and as a pivotal 
moment in the reversal of the historical drifts toward state and military 
weakening begun with the arrival of colonisation. It will serve as the organising 
principle of the present chapter. Section 1 will therefore cover the evolution of 
the Rwandan state and the coinciding fate of its military until 1994, whereas 
section 2 will address the country’s post-genocide physical and moral 
rebuilding, which would not have been possible without the crucial role played 
by the military, both qualitatively and quantitatively. 
1 The Military in Rwanda’s Pre-genocide History: From Strong 
to Weak State 
For analytical purposes, the history of Rwanda until the genocide and 
including the immediate post-genocide period can be broken into seven phases, 
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which this section will address successively along a single underlying theme: 
the matching evolution of the state and its military.  
1.1 Prelude: Pre-colonial and Colonial Rwanda 
The root of the word Rwanda has been translated by Rwandan scholars 
as ‘drive for expansion’.1 The country’s history has indeed, from its early 
formation in the 12th century to the colonial period, been one of territorial 
extension through conquest, to the point that it cannot be distinguished from its 
military history.2 The implementation of this drive, which is spiritual in essence, 
is entrusted to a mortal king-god, the Mwami, whose role it is to strengthen and 
enrich the kingdom (the state). Rwandan kings were to work in a cycle of four, 
each having to fulfil a certain task during his reign. Each cycle of four started 
with a King of peace, who had to foster the land to strengthen it. His successor 
would have to be a warring king, expected to expand Rwanda’s power. The 
next king would then have to defend the state against any counterattacks that 
would inevitably follow the aggressive expansion. The fourth king was to 
consolidate the country and ‘mop up’ after the violent destruction.3  
In practice, Rwanda’s history spanning from the 14th to the 19th century is 
one of permanent warfare, as part of the country’s perpetual expansion drive, 
but also because of internal strife. Military expeditions were a means to acquire 
wealth in the form of cattle,4 but also ivory and cotton, or women and children, 
who would be sold into slavery domestically or abroad. They were also a 
means to cater for the growing needs of the – increasingly competing – political 
elites.   
                                                             
1 Stemming from the Kinyarwanda concept of Ku-uranda, see Rusagara, Frank K, et al. 
(2009), Resilience of a Nation: a History of the Military in Rwanda, Fountain Publishers 
Rwanda, Kigali 
2 Muzungu, Bernadin (2003), Histoire du Rwanda Pré-colonial, L'Harmattan, Paris, 
p.358 
3 Rusagara, et al. (2009), pp.9ff 
4 Rwanda was already densely populated, unlike the Central African rainforest 
233 
 
Originally, the monarchy was based on two dynastic lineages. However, 
over time, differentiation between family lineages became difficult due to 
intermarriages. Rival contenders to the throne built their networks of buhake 
(or ubuhake) clients in order to promote their relative positions as dauphin.5 A 
primary tool to acquire clients, as this was the key marker of wealth and power, 
was the control of cattle. As cattle were acquired primarily by raids, this led to 
increased warfare. For this reason, ‘war was at least as welcome to the 
aristocrats at court as to the king’.6 
The need for war led to an increase in the number of ‘armies’ over time7 
and to their increased professionalisation. Originally, upon assuming power, 
each king had set up new regiments, whilst those of the previous generation 
were often, but not always, decommissioned. By 1700, however, the standby 
system was replaced with standing formations. More than 20 such formations 
equalling the size of a modern battalion insured the constant readiness of 
about 13,000 men under arms.8 Some small-scale private militias, oriented 
primarily toward the protection of family property, were eventually incorporated 




 Whereas patrimonial situations 
became more and more inherited, the professionalisation of the army was 
relentlessly pursued, opening career opportunities based on merit.10  
Constant warfare necessitated ‘conscription of the whole population into 
the armies organised by the chains of patron-client relations whose supreme 
                                                             
5 Vansina, Jan (2004), Antecedents to Modern Rwanda The Nyiginya Kingdom, 
University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, p.88; progressively the primitive patron client 
relationship manifested as a general feudal order. Similar patronage systems in Burundi and 
Ankole were called bugabire and okutoisha, respectively, Lemarchand, René (1977), Political 
Clientelism and Ethnicity in Tropical Africa, in Schmidt, Steffen W, et al., Friends, Followers, 
and Factions University of California Press, Berkeley, 13-37, p.103 
6 Kagame, Alexis (1963), Les Milices du Rwanda précolonial, Academie Royale des 
Sciences d'Outre-Mer, Brussels, pp.41f 
7 Vansina (2004), p.97 
8 Rusagara, et al. (2009), p.24 
9 Ibid. (2009), p.43 
10 Other pre-colonial standing armies existed in comparable states in the region: 
Buganda, Ankole, and Nyobe, see Wrighley (1996)  
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patron was the king’.11 The congruence of people and army was described in 
those terms by a Rwandan social scientist: ‘Everybody was in the army, the 
men, the women, even the cows.’12 In practical terms, the military capability 
was divided in two: soldier units concentrating on combat only, and the ‘cattle 
army’, caring for the animals that provided the food and logistic basis of the 
combat force. The spouses of the soldiers would form a third force or ‘home 
front’: by fasting, praying and keeping absolute loyalty, they erected an 
invisible protection screen around their fighting husbands. Children were part 
of this ‘social army’, too, as, in pre-colonial Rwanda, all school was military 
school.13 This, in addition, ensured an exceptional linguistic uniformity of the 
people. Historians such as Gamaliel Mbonimana thus advocate the claim that 
Rwanda was a pre-colonial coherent nation state.14 
By about 1850 one of the eight kingdoms on modern Rwandan territory, 
the Nyiginya, had conquered the other seven in a way comparable to the 
ancient Chinese Qin empire during the Warring Kingdoms Era,15 and become 
the dominant state.16 Successive cycles of state formation warfare were 
instrumental in fostering a national identity (a spiritual and social ‘Rwandan-
ness’) as the small core grew into an increasingly larger community 
encompassing the gradually subdued neighbouring groups.17 The extension of 
the Rwandan politico-military clientele system on newly occupied territory 
                                                             
11 Vansina (2004), p.95 
12 Interview RW 12 with Charles Gakumba, Journalist and Historian, Kigali, May 2011 
13 Alexis Kagame coined the term social army for the military completely integrated into 
society 
14 Mbonimana, Gamaliel (1998), Le Rwanda Etat-Nation au XIXe Siecle, unpublished 
paper presented at Butare, December, 1998 
15 See chapter 2 
16 Chrétien, Jean-Pierre (2000), L’ Afrique des Grands Lacs: deux mille ans d’histoire, 
Aubier, Paris, p.160f 
17 Including campaigns against Buha, Bunyabungo (modern Bukavu) to the South-west, 
and extending to Lake Edward to the North, see Newbury, David (1974), Les campagnes de 
Rwabugiri: chronologie et bibliographie, Cahiers d'études africaines, 14, 53, 181-191 
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made every additional subject into a direct or indirect client to the commander-
in-chief and king.18  
Conquest and territorial extension were accompanied by the development 
of a centralised administrative apparatus. Property taxes were introduced at 
the latest during the mid-1900s, amounting to two and a half to three per cent 
for herders, whilst the poor deprived of land and cattle were more and more 
often subject to compulsory work to the benefit of the elites. Military and 
political state-strengthening measures became more and more cohesive, as 
demonstrated for example by the political decision, in 1855, to forego the 
benefits of expanding long distance trade with Gujarat via Arab traders such as 
the Sultan of Zanzibar19 – by then perceived as a long term threat20 – at the 
same time as the Rwandan army defended the country and the population 
against slave traders – which, uniquely among African pre-colonial militaries, it 
did successfully throughout the 19th century.21 At the same time, the total 
inclusion of the community into the military effort of the state led to a 
glorification of militarism and martial violence, which permeated ‘the whole of 
[Rwandan] culture as the armies became the foundation of the administrative 
structure of the realm’.22  
At the dawn of the colonial era, the Rwandan state had thus gone through 
all pre-modern stages of state formation.23 It had become institutionalised in a 
feudal form on the basis of a two-pillar foundation, a political one, linked to 
                                                             
18 Vansina (2004), p.182; the occupation of Silesia by Frederick II of Prussia had a 
similar purpose; in the 19
th
 century the modified uburetwa patronage system increasingly 
started resembling a forced labour relationship, see Mamdani (2002), pp.66ff 
19 Lugan (1997), p.217 
20 Vansina (2004), pp.157f 
21 Although Arab traders and slave hunters had managed to establish small state-like 
constructs on Lunda territory in the Congolese savannah, their attempts to penetrate Rwanda 
were frustrated. See Chrétien (2000); Lugan (1997), pp.168f, 217f; Burton (1961), Vol.2, p.183 
22 Vansina (2004), p.176 
23 Rwanda was not alone in experiencing such a development: an international society 
of mature states such as Buganda and Burundi developed in the vicinity long before Western 
emissaries and Arab merchants arrived, see Mbonimana (1998) 
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expanding dominion over neighbouring zones, and a spiritual one, with the king 
being the keeper of both features of the national identity. The unity of the state 
and the army was inherent in this institutional format, so that the two could not 
be distinguished, either conceptually or in practice. 
Arriving Europeans found a state in place with a territorial core under the 
tight control of the monarchy and a frontier-like periphery where central control 
was episodic.24 The first settlers, the Germans, and then the Belgians, opted 
for indirect rule, using the Tutsi monarchy for their own purposes, but 
reshaping it as needed. The German authorities even reinforced the power of 
the king by mopping up the pockets of resistance to the monarchy, which had 
resulted from intra-elite succession conflicts.25 For some time, Rwandan 
warfare also increased against neighbours who used alliances with other 
European powers to advance their own territorial designs.26 This, however, 
came to an end in 1907 when the German protectorate enforced ‘imperial 
peace’, much to the complaint of the Tutsi king.27 Nevertheless, when conflict 
arose among the Europeans, the Rwandan monarchy stood by its alliance with 
Germany and fought against the Belgian Force Publique (FP), even beyond 
that which had been agreed as its contribution, until the siege of Tabora in then 
Deutsch-Ostafrika, which marked the end of the German presence.28  
Whilst the Germans were content to supervise the monarchy in place, the 
Belgian administrators arriving in 1916 literally had to fight their way in, against 
Rwandan military resistance, and faced a hostile environment from the outset. 
                                                             
24 See Kandt (1901) 
25 This included two expeditions against Bugoyi (Gisenyi province) and one against a 
pretender to the throne, Ndungutse, in 1912, Turner (2007), p.72 
26 Okafor (2000), p.29 
27 The electoral campaign of the year, the so-called Hottentottenwahl focussed on 
German colonial policy after the genocide of indigenous people in Namibia 
28 Most of the German regular soldiers were Sudanese Askaris, who like former 
Egyptian Mahdi fighters were motivated to fight the British, see also Michels, Stefanie (2006), 
Schwarze deutsche Kolonialsoldaten. Mehrdeutige Repräsentationsräume und früher 
Kosmopolitismus in Afrika, Transcript Verlag, Bielefeld, pp.23ff; Morlang (2008), p.17 
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In order to assert their control over the territory, they had to reshape the 
country’s ruling and security systems radically. 
For this, they enlisted the help of Catholic missionaries. Father Léon 
Classe provided valuable intelligence and his document, L’organisation 
politique du Ruanda au début de l’occupation belge, ‘served as a guide to the 
new administrators’.29 For a short period, in 1924, as Rwanda (together with 
Burundi) was entrusted to Belgium by a League of Nations mandate,30 they 
tried the ‘indirect rule’ formula that they had inherited from the Germans in 
Ruanda-Urundi, and with which they were experimenting themselves in some 
regions of Congo, for example among the Luba people of Katanga. However, 
they soon realised that this would not secure them the wished-for degree of 
control.31 As in Congo, they therefore resolved to develop a ‘native policy’, the 
gist of which lay in promoting the emergence of new social and political elites 
owing them their loyalty. For this, each of the two kingdoms (Rwanda and 
Burundi) was divided into chefferies (chiefdoms) and sous-chefferies, placed 
under so-called ‘traditional’ (actually new) chiefs. ‘Schools for sons of chiefs’ 
provided the necessary skills to the new generation of literate administrators, 
who would serve as intermediaries between the colonial administration and the 
African masses.’32 To exploit the colony, the imperial masters ‘relied on the 
support and assistance of three classes of intermediaries: the middle 
bourgeoisie, the petty bourgeoisie and the traditional rulers or chiefs’.33 In the 
course of this effort, Belgium maintained the Tutsi element of the population in 
privileged positions, while dismissing most of the middle ranking Hutu 
notabilities. Most important, Rwanda was demilitarised. First, Rwandan 
                                                             
29 Turner (2007), p.59 
30 The mandate was transformed into an administrative accord by a vote of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations on 13 December 1946 
31 Similarly, in Congo, the various Luba chiefs had acquired a degree of autonomy that 
they were increasingly unwilling to surrender to their nominal sovereign 
32 Turner (2007) p.28 
33 ibid. p.30 
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soldiers who had fought alongside the German army were demobilised; 
second, as Rwanda-Urundi came under League of Nations mandate, as we 
saw in Cameroon, Rwandans were forbidden to join any military force on 
Rwandan territory. This deprived the country of one of the two anchors of its 
social cohesion and pillars of its identity. 
With the new political elites established, the second anchor of traditional 
Rwandaness, the Mvami, was equally to be undermined. Belgium’s 
assumption of the League of Nations Mandate in 1924 was accompanied by a 
letter of submission of King Musinga to the King of the Belgians.34 Although 
Belgian colonisation kept the feudal system in place, the King was significantly 
weakened by the abrogation of his army, made official by the so-called 
Mortehan reforms in 1926. The final blow to Rwanda’s traditional ruling system 
came in November 1931 when the King was deposed by the colonial 
administration because he had refused a baptism, which would have deprived 
him of his spiritual power and destroyed his bond with the people.  
As of the Mortehan reforms, the FP enjoyed the monopoly of violence on 
Rwandan territory. Although composed mostly of Africans (see chapter three), 
the FP was as alien to the Rwandese as their Belgian officers were: it had 
arrived as an occupational force and had disarmed the dynasty and the people; 
and it was commanded from Stanleyville (modern Kisangani) until the 
independence of the Congo in 1960.35 The FP inaugurated a form of colonial 
‘quasi-army’, which would be inherited by its Rwandan successor at 
independence.  
                                                             
34 Obenga, Theophile (1989), Les Peuples bantu: Migrations, expansion et identité 
culturelle, L'Harmattan, Paris, p.27; Musinga was replaced by the Belgians by Mutara III, the 
first Christian king and after his death in 1959 by Kigeli V, who was ousted by the Belgian-
supported 1959 Hutu revolution 
35 Logiest, Guy (1988), Mission au Rwandan - un Blanc dans la Bagarre Tutsi-Hutu, 
Hatier, Bruxelles, p.17 
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Social re-engineering would accompany those military and political 
reforms. Rwandan social stratification had already been simplified by Germans 
by factually eliminating the Hutu chiefs and eventually distributing identity cards 
bearing the label ‘Tutsi’, ‘Hutu’ or ‘Twa’, separating them from other African 
subjects and from one another.36 The Belgians, however, went beyond that by 
categorising these differentiations as ‘racial’, where they were previously 
regarded only as tribal. Rwandans’ racial status therefore became 
administratively and legally ‘frozen’ as of the 1933 census,37 eliminating any 
kind of permeability across the groups. The Hutu and Tutsi were thereafter 
lifelong bound to this denotation, for good or for evil, automatically passing it to 
the next generation. How much the Belgians are to blame for the divisions 
remains in dispute. Recent historiography has argued that lineage and region 
have always been central for Rwandan identity formation38 and that ethnic 
categories already existed in late pre-colonial times and were then exploited to 
divide the population.39 Other observers emphasise that such traditional 
differences between Hutu and Tutsi were reflected by a division of 
administrative labour, where by each group took over certain bureaucratic 
positions according to their economic role in society. Similarly, provincial 
administrations were headed by a diarchy, with a Hutu responsible for the land 
and a Tutsi in charge of defence.40 But Belgium imposed a hierarchy, the 
source of enduring animosity.  In sum, with Belgian colonisation, the nation 
                                                             
36 Turner (2007), p.61 
37 Longman, Timothy and Théoneste Rutagengwa (2004), Memory, Identity, and 
Community in Rwanda, in Stover, Eric and Weinstein, Harvey M, My Neighbor, My Enemy: 
Justice and Community in the Aftermath of Mass Atrocity Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 162-182, p.101 
38 Newbury, David S (1980), Newbury, David S. “The Clans of Rwanda: An Historical 
Hypothesis.” Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 50, no. 4 (1980): 389–403, 
Journal of the International African Institute, 50, 4, 389–403 
39 Morel, Jacques (2010), La France au Coeur du Genocide des Tutsi, Izuba edition, 
Paris, p.17 
40 See Rusagara, et al. (2009) 
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was physically and spiritually disarmed, its social cohesion annulled, and the 
people conquered and divided.  
1.2  Transition to independence 
Until 1962, the year of independence, the Belgian Congo FP was still in 
place in Ruanda-Urundi, although the Belgian Congo did not exist anymore.  
Incorporation of native Rwandans into the Congolese FP coincided with 
Belgian intent to reinforce the defence of the Congolese territory (especially in 
the Bas-Congo area) and started in 1955 with the enlistment of 35 men each 
from Ruanda and Urundi.41 There was noted reluctance, however, from the 
Belgian authorities, to see Rwandans accede to high-ranking military positions. 
For instance, the minister had stated in an exchange of letters that he would 
prefer not to have a Rwandan as the first African in command of the FP.42 Rare 
reports by the mandate authorities did indicate that the small contingent 
deployed to Congo (532 troops in 1944) were sufficiently trained, able to 
maintain public order, and of good military value.43 It was therefore expected in 
1955 that soldiers from Rwanda would swiftly be able to cover the ranks of 
NCOs and officers. However, none of them would complete the necessary 
officer training before 1962. 
However, given the deteriorating security situation, caused by the political 
contest of Tutsi rule as of May 1959, Belgium used a loophole in the mandate 
regulations44 to decree the recruitment of Rwandans as ‘volunteers’ for the FP 
                                                             
41 AA, Africa Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1955), Defense du Congo, Letter 
to the vice Governor General of Rwanda-Urundi FP 2517 239/41, Ministere de Congo Belge et 
Rwanda-Urundi, Brussels 
42 AA, Africa Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1959), FP 2517 269-41 Letter 
Gouverneur to Ministère de Congo Belge et Rwanda-Urundi in copy Vice Gouverneur of 
Rwanda-Urundi, 26 Mai 1959, Leopoldville 
43 AA (1944), 15 January 1945. The report on 1945 is an exact copy of the previous 
year’s, with only the dates adjusted. It is worth remembering that 1944 was the year of a major 
mutiny of the FP in the Congo 
44 Namely articles 84 of the UN Charter, and 5.3 of the mandate agreement 
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on Rwandan territory.45 The Conseil Militaire had indeed by that time come to 
the conclusion that including Rwandan soldiers in the security forces would 
mitigate the character of the FP as an occupying force and therefore increase 
their acceptability.46 The implementation of the plan would be facilitated by the 
presence of a number of Rwandans, some serving at the time in the armed 
forces in Uganda and Tanzania, who would be offered legal access to military 
careers, and some 300 Rwandan FP veterans living in the former Congo 
colony, who could be enlisted immediately.47 A degree of caution remained, 
however: the Conseil Militaire wished to avoid facing the same difficulties as 
the British in Nigeria in 1958, when, once the control of the military had passed 
to local civilian authorities, young African lieutenants demanded quick 
promotion to the rank of general.48 Africanisation was on the agenda, but a 
timeframe of some 15 years was considered healthy to complete the process. 
In 1960, two years before independence, the Belgian mandate forces were 
renamed Garde nationale du Ruanda-Urundi. Initially no single member of the 
force came from one of the two territories appearing in its name; officers were 
Belgian, and NCOs or gradés were Congolese, even if Rwandophone.
49
  
Since its assumption of the mandate in 1924, Belgium had secured its 
dominance on Rwanda-Urundi by supporting, equipping, and educating the 
Tutsi for leadership, at the same time as it had alienated them from their 
indigenous traditions. The Catholic Church, through its monopoly on teaching 
                                                             
45 From 1916 to 1924 the FP in Rwanda was called the ‘Occupational Force in German 
East Africa’ 
46 AA, Africa Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1959), FP 410/452, minutes 
Belgian military council, 12 February 1959 
47 AA, Africa Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1959), Note du directeur general 
du conseiller militaire, 12 Fevrier 1959, FP 2517 410/252, Ministère des Forces Armées, 
Brussels 
48 AA (1955) 
49 In the two decades after 1930 Belgium resettled thousands of Rwandans in Eastern 
Congo to balance the overpopulated agrarian population against the under populated mining 
territories in the Kivus and Maniema. This represented one of the several 20
th
 century 
migrations of Rwandans, called Banyarwandans, as opposed to the earlier so-called 





at the ‘chiefs’ sons schools’ and thanks to its prestige, had been a major 
instrument of that policy of assimilation, and it would continue to be a key force 
in the social and political remodelling of Rwanda in the crucial 1957-1962 
period leading to independence.  
A particularly important figure in Belgian calculations was Grégoire 
Kayibanda, the son of an immigrant Bushi from Eastern Congo, editor-in-chief 
of the Catholic Journal of Rwanda, and the personal secretary to Bishop 
Classe. Kayibanda would become the first president of the independent 
Rwandan Republic. With the 1957 publication of the ‘Hutu Manifesto’, 
Kayibanda’s sectarian Parmehutu50 party (MDR) unleashed a chain of violent 
spasms that would have no end until the 1994 genocide. At its root, the MDR 
crusade was based on a demand for the institution of greater equality in 
Rwandan society, where, as it was claimed, a privileged Tutsi minority would 
systematically reduce the majority of the population to inferiority and a 
subordinate existence.51  
An important turn in Belgian policy occurred when the colonial power 
calculated that it would better serve its interest to side with the Hutu majority 
against the Tutsi elites, so it now supported Kayibanda. However, his 
campaign with the tacit support of Belgium would soon take a clearly racist 
overtone. The MDR (strongly supported by the Church52) energetically 
opposed the elimination of identity cards mentioning ethnic affiliation. With this 
ethnic separation kept in place, it would become possible to establish a 
                                                             
50 Parti du Mouvement de l'Emancipation Hutu also know as Mouvement démocratique 
republicain Parmehutu (MDR) 
51 Obenga (1989), p.28 
52 Rusagara, et al. (2009), pp.89-111, who consider the Bishop as the main architect of 
the demise of indigenous administration 
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‘racially’ defined majority able to perpetuate control of power indefinitely, under 
a democratic guise.53 
Feeling threatened, Tutsi elites began to take up arms. Mediation efforts 
undertaken by the territorial Belgian administrator remained fruitless and could 
not prevent the escalation of violence. One party in the ensuing confrontation 
was primarily Tutsi, but accompanied by numerous Hutu loyal to their patrons; 
they assembled in the pre-colonial way for the Ingabo. In such royal armies’ 
pre-campaign meetings they dressed in traditional uniforms, arming 
themselves with bows and swords. The other side comprised Hutu militias and, 
in Butare, a force of revolutionary activists assembled by the powerful Hutu 
Joseph Gitera Habyarimana. Last ditch attempts by the King to mediate 
between the opponents were foiled by the Belgians, who suspected him to be 
a co-conspirator in the Tutsi cause. The King was eventually driven out of the 
country by the 1959 Hutu Revolution.54  
Order was restored and the killings stopped when Rwanda was placed 
under a military administration, with Colonel Guy Logiest appointed as military 
resident.
55
 A state of emergency was declared and Belgian metropolitan forces 
were deployed to Rwanda. Colonel Logiest took the opportunity to replace 
Tutsi administrators with his Hutu allies.56 Meanwhile, the civil strife had made 
an estimated 50,000, mainly Tutsi, victims turn to direct violence, and it had 
driven about 150,000 of them into neighbouring countries. 
                                                             
53 The theory that Rwandans were divided between Hametic tribes and Bantus was 
coined by a French ethnographer, and was taught in Rwanda until 1994. Newbury, Catherine 
(1988), The Cohesion of Oppression: Clientship and Ethnicity in Rwanda, 1860–1960, 
Columbia University Press, New York; Newbury (2003); Newbury, David and Catherine 
Newbury (2000), Bringing the Peasants Back In: Agrarian Themes in the Construction and 
Corrosion of Statist Historiography in Rwanda, American Historical Review, 105, 3, 832-877 
54 UN General Assembly resolutions 1579 and 1580, which called for a re-installation of 
the monarchy were not responded to, Rauschnin, Dietrich, et al. (1997), Key Resolutions of the 
United Nations General Assembly 1946-1996, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
pp.178f 
55 Logiest (1988), pp.41ff 
56 Reyntjens (1985), p.268 
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With Kayibanda assuming the presidency in 1962, the former colonial 
overlord had secured a new regime that appeared to be born out of a social 
and democratic revolution, and which was definitely more suitable to Brussels 
interests than the unthankful traditional monarchy. In an exchange of letters 
Kayibanda left no doubt of his admiration for Colonal Logiest’s input regarding 
the establishment of his government – calling it a vital contribution to the 
‘liberation of the Rwandese masses’ from Tutsi overrule.57 The new armed 
forces, however, came with the birth defect of the independent state: Tutsi 
remaining in the country were not at all welcome as recruits, and would 
anyway show a low profile; those who had fled abroad during the civil strife 
would later become primary recruiting source for the exile Inyenzi movement, 
which planned the re-conquest of the country. 58  
Overall, Rwanda’s decolonisation went much more smoothly than 
Cameroon’s and Congo’s, as the battle for political power had been fought out 
before independence. The total destruction of pre-colonial indigenous political 
structures had enabled the new Hutu elites surrounding Kayibanda to secure 
their basis of power along ethnic lines. Far from its former role as an integral 
component of pre-colonial state institutions, the military had been separated 




                                                             
57 Translated by this author from his autobiographic account, Logiest (1988), pp.209-
212: in the same section Logiest also gives account of the view of Rwandans content with his 
departure, quoting their pamphlet underscoring his responsibility for the bloody events of 
November 1959 as saying ‘Adieu mon Colonel, finally he leaves!!’  
58 ingangurarugo zyyemmeje kuba ingenzi, one of the classical 19th century Rwandan 
armies, meaning ‘the brave ones serving the king’ with a clear reference to their monarchist 
ideology, later distorted to Inyenzi the pernicious guerrilla cockroach that comes at night, see 
Lemarchand, René (2002), Disconnecting the Threads: Rwanda and the Holocaust 
Reconsidered, Idea Electronic Journal of Social Issues, 7, 1, np 
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1.3 The First Republic  
Congruent with the political platform that he had initiated with his 1957 
‘Hutu Manifesto’, President Kayibanda set out to reconstruct Rwanda on the 
basis of absolute Hutu dominance and the elimination of any residual Tutsi 
influence. For this, he was to use all of the tools at his disposal, including 
authoritarian political power and the security forces. He could benefit from 
continued Belgian support. The installation of the single-party system of the 
MDR was one vehicle of choice to assert his political power.  
Two features characterise the military of the First Republic: first, it served 
the interests of one ethnic group rather than of the nation; and, second, it 
remained largely dependent on the political and military decisions of the former 
colonial power.59 Both characteristics were somewhat inter-related, to the point 
that whether Belgium engaged or abstained from Rwandan politics determined 
the margin of manoeuvre of the Rwandan government, especially as it came to 
decisions on how to deal with the on-going insecurity resulting from the quickly 
launched Inyenzi insurgency attacking from Tanzanian and Ugandan territory. 
At independence in 1962 the Rwandan armed forces comprised a 
general staff and 15 pelotons of about 30 soldiers each, dispersed over the ten 
préfectures (formerly provinces), and commanded by 52 Belgian officers and 
NCOs.60 Gradually the platoons were extended to eleven companies (of about 
160 men each), but the deployment structure of the new Rwandan National 
Guard (GNR)61 was identical to the Belgian Congo FP. 
                                                             
59 For a general discussion of this dependence see Crocker, Chester A (1974), Military 
Dependence: The colonial legacy in Africa, The Journal of Modern African Studies 12, 265-286 
60 Lefèvre, Patrick and Jean Noël Lefèvre (2006), Les militaires belge et le Rwanda, 
1916-2006, Editions Racine, Bruxelles, p.109 




Table 6: Rwandan National Guard – Belgian television broadcast 1 July 196262 
 
Ten of these companies were forces territoriales, while one was a reserve 
company, comparable to the FP’s forces campées. The latter was garrisoned 
in Kigali. By the end of the decade the GNR was 2,500 strong, supported by a 
National police of about 1,200 personnel.63 A battalion-level configuration was 
not in sight before the early 1970s. However, thanks to Belgian cooperation, by 
1970 the order of battle (see table below) was already quite advanced.  
In terms of personnel the army did not represent the whole of the nation. 
In July 2011 the former FAR64 colonel Emmanuel Neretse explained that the 
fact that Northerners had been recruited as cadets mostly was by accident, 
because no other applicants were forthcoming at the time.65 He insisted that 
there was no directive concerning the origin of the prospective cadets; 
however, recruiting occurred in a single recruitment office in Ruhengeri, in the 
                                                             
62 Source EUscreen, 
www.euscreen.eu/play.jsp?id=EUS_46C8DC9CD7F141B6A0CBD207601C3A20 
63 Nyrop, Richard F, et al. (1969), Area Handbook for Rwanda, Government Printing 
office, Washington DC, pp.184f 
64 Forces armées rwandaises (FAR) was the name given to the forces in 1974 
65 The first cohort included five Northerners and two from Kigali, one of them a Tutsi 
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extreme North, where support for the President was strongest, which may 
explain the ‘accidental’ result to some degree.66 
According to the former Rwandan secretary for defence, James Gasana, 
the FAR of 1990 included a number of Tutsi, among them one colonel, two 
lieutenant colonels, and seven majors. Still, given a size of the force of 8,000 in 
1990, these figures rather seem to confirm the tribal selectivity regarding 
military career making rather than contradicting it.67 
The loyalty of the GNR soldiers went primarily to one group, the Hutu, 
and its leader Kayibanda, rather than to the Constitution. The GNR, as stated 
by a high ranking officer of the Rwandan armed forces, saw its ‘endroit’, the 
French term for positioning in time and place, as on the side of one ethnic 
group, which it had to protect and separate from another ethnic group.68 
Although the selection process for the military formation (NCO & officers) was 
in the hand of the Belgians, when the resulting lists of admission examinations 
were sent to the general staff, the names of men suspected to be Tutsi were 
crossed out.69 Few Tutsi made it to officer’s rank, and those who did often hid 
behind false Hutu identities.
70
  
Regarding command and control, the initial plan was to progress slowly in 
the ‘Africanisation’ of the forces. A suggestion made by UN mandate transition 
                                                             
66 Although Neretse is the main military historian of the FAR, from the former regime’s 
perspective, he was refused by the ICTR chamber III against Zigiranyirazo the status as expert 
witness, because he had been a battalion commander during the genocide, see case ICTR-01-
73-T 
67 Gasana, James (2002), Rwanda: du parti-état à l'état-garnison, l’Harmattan, Paris, 
p.33 
68 Interview RW 2 in Kigali June 2011 
69 At the second promotion in 1964, Joachim Muramutsa was barred from studies in 
Belgium because his fiancé was Tutsi, see Rusagara, et al. (2009), p.164 
70 Among the high ranking officers from the first promotion only one was Tutsi: Lt. 
Colonel Epimaque Ruhashyia, a close friend of Habyrimana, and co-conspirator of the coup 
d’état of 1973. Other Tutsi officers hid behind false identities, like Commandant Mugabo, who 
was actually Tutsi but managed to obtain a Hutu ID card. FAR Col. Ruhashya later became 
military advisor to the Rwandan president. He died in exile in Brussels in February 2010, 
interview Be 6 with Colonel Pettiaux, Head  of military cooperation in Rwanda during the First 
and Second Republic, Feb 2012. According to this officer’s estimates about 20 per cent of 
Tutsi used wrong ID documents  
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observers at independence – swiftly to replace Belgian officers with Rwandan 
ones – was rejected by Kigali. The prevailing scheme was to train a new 
generation of Rwandan loyalist officers, thereby ensuring a certain balance 
between former FP and new generation of Rwandan loyalist officers. 
 
Table 7: Rwandan order of battle 1970, courtesy of Colonel André Vincent 
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In practice the troops were under the command recruits.71 In practice the 
troops were under the command of Belgian officers down to company level 
throughout the 1970s.72 
Eventually, the need to intensify the counter-insurgency campaign 
against the Inyenzi made it desirable to speed up the transition of responsibility 
at the level of the military upper echolons. The first Rwandan commander of 
the GNR, Juvénal Habyrimana, took over from his Belgian predecessor 
Vanderstraeten in 1963 instead of 1965 as was originally foreseen,73 and the 
first Rwandan Chef d’Etat-major (CdEM), a lieutenant upon taking up his post 
in 1963, was quickly promoted to captain and then, within less than a year, 
reached the rank of major.74  
A general evaluation of the armed forces of Rwanda between 1962 and 
1975 gives a mixed picture. According to contemporary witnesses, the soldiers 
were generally disciplined and obedient and there was no corruption.75 They 
were, however, not very effective militarily. Combat experience did 
compensate to some degree for the poor quality of the training when the GNR 
fought back against the low density guerrilla incursions of the Inyenzi, 
eventually defeating them by 1967.76  
In sum, Rwanda’s First Republic was an unruly era. President 
Kayibanda’s attempt to secure his rule on the basis of a non-inclusive domestic 
political order set the scene for repeated acts of inter-ethnic violence, pogroms 
                                                             
71 Lefèvre and Lefèvre (2006), p.109 
72 Interview RW 5 with Colonel André Vincent, Brussels 2012 
73 Habyarimana was among the first group of ten Rwandan cadets to be trained as 
officers in Belgium between 1959 and 1962. 
74 The first Rwandan commander of the 1962-founded officer school became Fabien 
Gahimano in 1972 (Exil 1994). ‘Second’ in command remained a Belgian officer, who donned 
a Rwanda uniform, interview Rw 2 with Major General Paul Rwarakabije, Kigali, 2011 
75 By contrast, Rwandan soldiers despised Congolese soldiers as ‘a bunch of 
gangsters’, converstaions with four expatriate military advisors, Brussels, February 2010 to 
May 2011, anonymised 
76 Belgian military coopérants confirmed (Be 6) that during four promotions, the military 
academy (Ecole supérieure) did not function properly 
250 
 
and counter strikes, whereby not only the Tutsi but also oppositional Hutu 
monarchists were hunted down.77 Whilst the military was easily 
instrumentalised to carry out the ethnically divisive policies of the political 
leadership, it gradually built grievances against the regime in other areas, 
eventually leading to the removal of President Kayibanda in 1973, using the 
continuous tension between Hutu and Tutsi ethnicies as a pretext.  
1.4  The Second Republic 
The takeover of the Government by the commander of the armed forces 
since 1963, Major-General Juvénal Habyarimana, in 1973, established the 
Second Republic. Habyarimana consolidated his rule by further concentrating 
power, reinforcing and hijacking the one-party state he had inherited from his 
predecessor by creating his own party, the Movement for Development 
(MRND).78 Parallel state and party structures to monitor and control the 
population reached down to the most local level. Membership in the party 
became compulsory in 1975. Simultaneously the Interahamwe, a youth 
organisation, was created to mobilise support for the party,79 Communal work 
was widely reintroduced. The late 1970s to early 1980s were the closest that 
pre-genocide Rwanda came to direct rule conditions. The MRND, however, as 
much as it was an instrument of political control, increasingly became the 
channel to establish and maintain a clientele hierarchy and concentrate wealth 
in the hands of the party elite.80  
Over the years the rings of the patronage system became ever narrower, 
with power and wealth increasingly concentrated in the hands of a small group, 
called the ‘little house’ (akazu in Kinyirwanda), consisting of the inner circle 
                                                             
77 Especially members of the constitutional-monarchist party UNAR, Logiest (1988), 
p.47 
78 Turner (2007), p.37 
79 The Interahamwe, later armed and trained, would become (in)famous for its role in 
the subsequent genocide, but originally it was merely an instrument of political mobilisation 
80 Gasana (2002), p.342 
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personal clientele of the president and his wife. Some of the key military actors, 
not surprisingly, were part of this inner core, as the army’s main recruiting 
ground, the North Eastern region of Ruhengeri, was also the home region of 
the President’s family. As an important consequence, this power shift 
jeopardised the delicate balance among Hutu elites which had controlled the 
country since independence. The North of the country, which traditionally 
provided the military leadership, while the South was home too much of the 
political, economic and intellectual elite. Intra-regime criticism therefore began 
simmering, with those left-out lamenting the creeping nepotism in the 
economy, bureaucracy, and important religious institutions.81 But tensions, 
pitted not just the North against the South. Ancient sub-regional intra-elite 
confrontations, some of which dated back to pre-colonial melees, awoke. For 
instance, the former Foreign Secretary, Lt. Col. Alois Nsekaliye, a Hutu from 
the North, who belongs to a family rivalling that of president Habyarimana 
since medieval times, at some point joined the RPF forces in Uganda in order 
to continue an inter-family feud.82  
Although the new regime promised an end to violence between Hutu and 
Tutsi it very soon joined into ‘scapegoating’ the Tutsi minority. Throughout his 
reign, Habyarimana was able to maintain his grip on power through a delicate 
‘divide-and-rule’ policy,83 buttressed by the influx of increasingly significant 
support from its new international patron, France, which gradually supplanted 
Belgium as the main provider of both military and non-military assistance to 
Rwanda.  
On the domestic front, holding at bay the discontent of some of the Hutu 
groups whilst neutralising the Tutsi threat and all without alarming international 
                                                             
81 The term in Kinyarwanda to describe the phenomenon, politoiki y’inda literally means 
Politics of the Belly 
82 Interview Co 5 with Colonel André Vincent, Brussels 2012 
83 Turner (2007) 
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backers, meant alternating repression and co-optation. Thus, in 1978 an ethnic 
quota system was introduced for all high level government posts according to 
the proportions of the total population. Tutsis were thus allocated 15 per cent of 
the posts, and Twa a few, as they represented a negligible minority. At the 
same time, witnesses to the period describe recurring ‘Srebrenica-like events’ 
with Tutsi soldiers and civilians being carried away on military trucks, never to 
be seen again.84 Overall, however, to use a European comparison, the 
atmosphere seems to have been closer to the climate under the 1935 German 
‘Nuremberg Laws’ than to that of the 1938 pogroms (‘Kristallnacht’).85 
The massive influx of development aid, especially from France, during 
this period from 1975 to 1985 largely helped maintain social peace in a context 
of bare food sufficiency for the masses and visible enrichment of the few.86  
French military support to Rwanda was inaugurated by the signature of 
an official defence cooperation agreement in 1975. The agreement, the 
clauses of which remained secret (as was the case for most French defence 
agreements across Africa at the time),was to provide the basis for increasingly 
intensive cooperation as of 1981, spurred by the personal friendship between 
President Habyarimana and the family of the French President Mitterrand. As a 
result, French advisors gradually side-lined Belgian ones at the supreme 
command level over the 1980s.87 Meanwhile, important centripetal and 
centrifugal forces had been reshaping the security forces. On the one hand, 
the participation of the top military leadership in the regime clientele system 
trickled down to the lowest level, leading to ever-increasing corruption and, 
                                                             
84 One of the victims was the witness’s aide-de-camp, whom he could not successfully 
shield; Colonel Pettiaux, Feb. 2012 
85 Kristallnacht, German for ‘night of the broken glass, 9 November 1938, which 
represented racist ‘popular pogroms’ actually centrally organised by the government 
86 International assistance amounted to about half of the national budget in the 1980s; 
Wallis, Andrew (2006), Silent Accomplice The Untold Story of France's Role in the Rwandan 
Genocide Tauris, London, p.16 
87 Interview Rw 5 with a Belgian former military advisor  
253 
 
with it, the waning of military discipline. Thus, the quality of military units 
decreased, and criminal acts by soldiers became more and more of a 
problem.88 On the other hand, a concentration of coercive power was 
completed as the national police was incorporated into the military directly after 
the coup of July 1973,89 but a new para-military gendarmerie was 
subsequently created in 1976, basically under French military surveillance.90 
By this means the President made sure that he would directly command all 
security forces separately.  
In the late 1980s Habyarimana’s increasingly vulnerable hold on power 
was shaken from multiple directions. First, a poor harvest and food shortages 
in 1988/89 increased popular discontent at growing wealth inequalities and 
ubiquitous nepotism and corruption, boosting the popularity of opposition 
forces at home and abroad. Second, with the ‘winds of change’ from Eastern 
Europe sweeping Africa, the regime had no choice but to accept the 
transformation of Rwanda's one-party state into a multi-party democracy in 
July 1990. Third, Rwandans who had borne much of the fighting for Yoweri 
Museveni’s successful guerrilla campaign in Uganda were under growing 
pressure to leave the country without the expected reward of Ugandan 
citizenship that they had expected. Sensing at the same time the weakness of 
the government in Kigali, the Tutsi diaspora decided that the moment was 
appropriate to attempt an invasion of Rwanda.91  
                                                             
88 Soldiers occasionally worked as hired guns or in similar mafia-like activities; Interview  
Rw 7 with Major Willem de Kant, former aide de camp of UNAMIR commander Dallaire 
89 Neretse, Emmanuel (2010), Grandeur et décadence des Forces Armées Rwandaise 
Editions Sources du Nil, Lille, p.29 
90 When fighting increased the French overseers were equipped with Rwandan 
uniforms to hide their level of involvement, see Rusagara, et al. (2009), p.161; comparing 
before and after 1970, Belgian arms deliveries went from 6 to 0 per cent whilst French arms 
increased from 16.5 to near 70 per cent of Rwandan imports, figures from Luckham (1982), 
p.62 
91 see Museveni, Yoweri (1997), Sowing the Mustard Seed: the Struggle for Freedom 
and Democracy in Uganda, Macmillan Publishers, London; Waugh, Colin M (2004), Paul 
Kagame and Rwanda; Power, Genocide, and the Rwandan Patriotic Front, McFarland, 
Jefferson NC, chapters 2,3 
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1.5  Civil War and Genocide 
The invading RPA was, according to a Belgian report at the time, an 
experienced, highly motivated, disciplined, logistically autonomous, and well-
equipped force.92 Indeed, the core of the forces penetrating Rwanda under the 
command of Frank Rwigema, a descendent of Rwandese refugees of the 1959 
genocide, carried much combat experience in their bullet pouch. During the 
Ugandan civil war from 1979 to 1987 they had fought for Museveni as 
guerrillas against Kampala’s regular forces. They had then become part of the 
new Ugandan regular army, with Fred Rwigema becoming chief of the 
Ugandan staff.93 The head of Ugandan military intelligence at the time was 
Paul Kagame, who had returned from his studies at Fort Leavensworth, 
Kansas, to take part in the assault on Rwanda.94 Prior to their Ugandan 
experience, some of the Rwandan refugees, including Rwigema himself, had 
also gone through ideological and practical training with Frelimo in 
Mozambique and the South African ANC.  
In contrast to the FAR, which had become a politicised army, the RPA 
was a political army. It was motivated by a high degree of self-esteem as a 
revolutionary organisation.95 The RPA, however, was cautious not to appear as 
a force for the reestablishment of the monarchy. In fact, 30 per cent of the RPA 
forces invading Rwanda were actually Hutu soldiers.96  
In 1990, government forces, including the Gendarmerie, were about 
8,000 strong. According to the Belgian report mentioned above, although their 
                                                             
92 Personal archive of a Belgian officer, the document reads: une force bien entrainée, 
motivée, disciplinée, autonome logistiquement et dotée d’un armement significatif 
93 At the Rwandan MoD footage was presented to this author that showed Museveni 
decorating his second in command Rwigema in presence of visiting president Habyrimana of 
Rwanda. In hindsight this was interpreted by the Rwandan interlocutors as a ‘shot over the 
stern’ of Habyrimana 
94 Waugh (2004), pp.42f 
95 Rw 10 Interview at the Ministry of Defence, Historical Department (CHR), Kigali, April 
2011 
96 Kaarsholm (2006), p.85, Reyntjens, Filip (1994), L'Afrique des grand lacs en crise: 
Rwanda, Burundi 1988-1994, Karthala, Paris, p.91 
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doctrine was oriented at interstate warfare, they did not possess any of the 
material means and soft skills actually to implement it. The report points to 
insufficient logistics, lack of flexibility in command and control, vulnerability of 
forces, and low reaction and responsiveness.97 Even after the FAR ballooned 
to 30,000 personnel, forming 28 new battalions by 1993, this could not 
compensate for a relative lack of efficiency. Even if the Belgian assessment 
tends to over-estimate the strength of the RPA and underestimate the FAR’s, 
the central argument that the invading force was much more combat effective 
than the defending FAR holds. 
Actually, the initial attack in the North took the FAR by surprise, as only 
units considered less reliable were garrisoned in that part of the country, and 
the initial onslaught could only be repelled thanks to the French.98 Expatriate 
and Rwandan observers were very surprised when this armed force had to be 
rescued by French forces. After all, the fact that the FAR was trained and 
supported by French, and German military advisors had been taken as an 
indicator of reputable military capacities.99  
With the death of General Rwigema on day two of the fighting, 2 October 
1990, Paul Kagame took command. The RPA, which had tried to battle as a 
conventional force, was repulsed and had to withdraw to the Rwandan 
Ruhengeri wilderness, reverting to guerrilla warfare. As a guerrilla force, it had 
experience from earlier overmastering the regular Ugandan force of Milton 
Obote.  
                                                             
97 In the original: moyens logistiques et élément de transmission lourds et vulnérables, 
procédures de commandement peu réactive et lentes 
98 Conversation with an RPA veteran on relevant intelligence gathered before the 
attack; see also on French Opération Noroît, Admiral Lanxande, René (2001), Quand le 
monde a basculé, Editions Sources du Nil, Paris, pp.162ff 
99 The fact that the FAR troops garrisoned in the remote border region next to Uganda 




The RPA was able to establish a foothold to regroup for a protracted 
asymmetric campaign which remained relatively successful until 1993, as the 
FAR leadership followed the ill-adapted French advice to wage a Maginot-line 
style defence war, which was outmanoeuvred by more flexible RPA tactics.100 
French support was vital to enabling the FAR to build up and to resist RPA’s 
attacks. France reportedly pre-financed military aid amounting to a total of 
$US100 million.101 
From 1990 onward, two armies had been claiming to represent the 
country.102 Tellingly both sides used pre-colonial regimental names for their 
combat units – the FAR even did so despite its anti-monarchist pro-Hutu 
orientation. For its part, the RPA chose the traditional regimental name 
Inkonotanyi, which means ‘those who fight valiantly’.103 By 1993, both sides 
had built up their forces, reaching about 25,000 for the RPA and about 30,000 
for the FAR. 
The political dynamics in the country, however, were to be significantly 
affected by the agreement worked out in Arusha (Tanzania) in August 1993 
under the auspices of the OAU, France, and the USA, to try to put an end to 
the Rwandan civil war. The Arusha agreement had resulted in a power sharing 
accord with important military and political consequences. On the military front, 
the agreement foresaw a merger of the two armies and representation of both 
sides in command structures, thus granting a disproportionally high number of 
command positions to RPA officers. The rank and file themselves had to be 
                                                             
100 Interview with a Belgian military contemporary witness, May 2013, Brussels 
101 Austin, Kathi (1999), Light weapons and conflict in the Great Lakes region in Africa. 
, in Boutwell, Jeffrey  and Klare, Michael T, Light weapons and civil conflict: controlling the 
tools of violence Rowman and Littlefield, New York, 29-47, p.34; French extraordinary support 
was attributed to Mitterrand’s strong Fashoda Complex, a form of inferiority complex resulting 
from French frustration about being second to England in Africa 
102 See Mills, Greg (2008), The Boot is now on the Other Foot: Rwanda's Lessons from 
Both Sides of Insurgency, RUSI Journal, 153, 3, 72-78 
103 Their enemies preferred to call the Inyenzi Inkonotanyi to make the link with the 
1960s generation of Tutsi incursions. The name stuck. 
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integrated in a relative proportion of 60 per cent government forces and 40 per 
cent RPA forces. As regards high government posts, the incumbent party and 
the RPF each were assigned five ministers; other oppositional parties would 
obtain eleven posts in total, including that of Prime Minister. This meant the 
loss of a large number of senior civilian and military positions by the ruling 
MRND.  
In general, the kind of power-sharing envisaged by Arusha went much 
beyond the kind of proportionality the government had paid lip service to in the 
past, as the Tutsi represented less than 20 per cent of the population. This was 
unacceptable to broad circles among the Hutu, whose existence depended on 
access to power and wealth via the state. Emerging opposition parties, some 
expressively Hutu, quickly organised into a coalition and negotiated the 
installation of an oppositional Prime Minister.104 The moment was perceived as 
a warning by the inner akazu circle, who saw the establishment of a more 
institutionalised system of checks and balances as a threat to its privileges. 
Although the opposition was blamed for destroying the nation’s unity and 
peace, it is obvious that the wave of political unrest that ensued was 
deliberately unleashed by the government and the party’s youth organisation, 
the Interahamwe.105 The security forces, including both the military and the 
police, played an important role in enacting the violence.106 For January 1993 
alone, Human Rights Watch counted ‘more than 300 Tutsi and members of 
political parties opposed to [the] Rwandan President’ killed by private militia, 
with another 147 civilians killed by the Rwandan military. Hundreds more 
                                                             
104 See Reyntjens (1994), pp.89-130; see also Newbury, Catherine (1992), Rwanda, 
Recent Debates over Governance and Rural Development, in Hyden, Goran and Bratton, 
Michael, Governance and Politics in Africa Lynne Rienner, Boulder, , pp.193-219 
105 Kinyarwanda for ‘those who work together’ 
106 ADL (1992), Rapport sur les droits de l’homme au Rwanda, Septembre 1991 - 
Septembre 1992 Association rwandaise pour la défense des droits de la personne et des 
libertés publiques, Kigali 
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civilians were reportedly ‘beaten, raped or arrested’ by FAR personnel.107 
Actually, the military had started collecting lists of Tutsi as early as 1991, and it 
provided Interahamwe militias with arms and training.108 This would later 
enable the génocidaires to act with upmost efficiency once the ‘go ahead’ for 
the killings had been given.  
On 6 April 1994, President Habyarimana was killed – in circumstances 
that remain controversial – the Arusha Accord collapsed, and hardliners in his 
government committed a coup, ordering the killing of moderate members of the 
cabinet, which gave the starting signal for a long-prepared genocide against 
the Tutsi minority.109 The FAR and the MRND youth militia Interahamwe started 
systematic killings, whereby selective targets were attacked by FAR, whilst the 
militia aimed as the Tutsis of their respective neighbourhoods. Members of the 
Presidential Guard, members of the Para-Commando Battalion and the A-
company of the Reconnaissance Battalion killed Prime Minister Agathe 
Uwilingiyimana and the ten Belgian peacekeepers deployed for her 
protection.110 During the unfolding mass slaughter 937 000 identified civilians 
were murdered within 100 days.
111
 
The Interahamwe was based on the nationwide MRND structure, at 
national, prefectural and communal levels. Although there was no official link 
between the Interahamwe and the Rwandan military, members of the Army 
and Presidential Guard trained, guided and supported the militia112 and the 
                                                             
107 See HRW (1993), Beyond the Rhetoric - Continuing Human Rights Abuses in 
Rwanda, News from Africa Watch, 5, np 
108 Against a widely perceived image, most victims of the genocide were not killed by 
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109 For a more detailed account of the genocide, see Braeckman, Colette (1994), 
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central role of the FAR in the mass murder is beyond doubt. UN Special 
Rapporteur Bacre Ndiaye reported already in April 1993 that FAR was 
committing massacres and giving logistic support to extra-judicial killings.113 
Later on, the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda (ICTR) collected 
ample evidence of FAR soldiers and units participating in massacres against 
Rwandan civilians or coordinating with militia killings at roadblocks.  
A typical case may illustrate this. On 11 April, thousands of Tutsi fled from 
the École Technique Officielle (ETO) grounds in Kigali after the Belgian 
peacekeepers had withdrawn their protection. The refugees were stopped by 
members of the Para-Commando Battalion. Members of the battalion and 
Interahamwe then marched the refugees several kilometers to Nyanza hill, 
where they were shot. Interahamwe then killed the survivors with edged 
weapons, butts and clubs. The next day the pattern was repeated with the 
killing of 60 civilians at an educational institute in the adjunct Remera area.114 
Most notorious among the military personnel involved is probably Théoneste 
Bagosora, who had a career in high command positions before he was 
appointed Cabinet Director to the Minister of Defence in 1992. He remained 
chief organiser of the Interahamwe militias until he fled the country in July 
1994. With Bagosora in place, the military belonged to the core of those who 
masterminded the genocide and then facilitated its execution. Bagosora 
himself gave the order for the killing of cabinet members via the military chain 
of command.115 A majority of those accused of responsibility for coordinating 
                                                             
113 See Ndiave, Bacre Waly (1993), United Nations Report by the Special Rapporteur 
on his Mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993, E /CN.4 /1994/ 7/Add.1, 11 August,  
114 The events at L’Institut Africain et Mauricien de Statistiques et d’Economie belong to 
the few reported of Rwandan gendarmerie defending people against the génocidaires, even if 
only temporarily successful, Desforges (1999), p.314  
115 According to the evidence, he ordered Major Ntabakuze, the commander of the 
Battalion Para-commando, Major Nzuwonemeye, the commander of the Battalion de 
reconnaissance, and Lt-Col Nkundiye, a commander of the Presidential Guard units, to work 
up a list of politicians to be executed 
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genocide, however, were civil servants, mostly bourgmestres, who depended 
on the cooperation of the military and militias.116  
Among the 38 closed cases of the Arusha tribunal, active soldiers at the 
time of the genocide, for example Ildephonse Hategekimana, were a 
minority.117 During the events in 1994, this soldier was a lieutenant and 
commander of the Ngoma Military Camp in Butare préfecture.118 His military 
co-conspirators had either fled to the DRC out of reach of legal prosecution or 
were put on trial directly in Rwanda. Other cases of soldiers allegedly involved 
in the killings were suspended, including for example that of General Léonidas 
Rusatira, who was accused of having organised death squadrons to kill 
opposition politicians. Tracing former FAR after 1994 is difficult. The only 
detailed list with information of the whereabouts of 401 ex-FAR officers from 
the rank of general down to chief warrant officer has circulated since 2009 
among oppositional Rwandans.119 It names 17 officers and one NCO as 
‘political prisoners of the UN in Arusha’, meaning the International Tribunal on 
Rwanda. Of the remaining officers, 291 were either ‘killed by RPA’ between 
1994 and 1996 or perished due to exposure in refugee camps of Eastern 
Congo or bad living conditions in exile elsewhere.120 Twenty-two were reported 
killed in action during the civil war and six as having died in so-called 
‘operations to liberate Rwanda’ between 1997 and 2001, which points to their 
involvement in post-war incursions from Congolese territory. Sixty-five of the 
officers listed sooner or later joined the RPA.  
                                                             
116 See the case of Juvenal Kajelijeli ICTR-98-44A 
117 ICTR-00-55 
118 Butare, now Huye, is an important case because of their strong resistance against 
the killing. The army had to be brought in to finish what poorly armed militias were not able to 
achieve against determined resistance 
119 For example of internet sites like Urwatubayaye and Amahoro Iwaku, see 
http://amahoroiwacu.blogspot.com.es/2010/12/situation-des-officiers-des-ex-far-et.html 
120 Most were victims of retaliatory attacks from Rwanda into the Congo in this period 
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When the RPA/RPF eventually gained control of the country and the state 
by force, it established itself as the armed institution of the state. The FAR, 
having lost its war and the state, became a displaced military, waging a 
guerrilla campaign from Congolese territory.121 Over time, the FAR and other 
génocidaire militia would form the FDLR, remaining to this day a thorn in the 
flesh of the Rwandese state and a permanent bone of contention in 
Rwandese-Congolese relations (see Chapter Three).  
1.6  Rwanda’s Post-genocide Armed Forces 
The decade following the genocide was an unruly one for Rwanda, as the 
RPF/RPA strove to consolidate its control over the country.  
Foremost among the threats to the new regime was the presence of an 
estimated one million refugees spread in camps along Rwanda’s eastern 
border that were providing the strategic reserves and the political backing to 
the former FAR. Neutralising this threat would be Kigali’s number one security 
policy priority in the post-genocide years, explaining the country’s involvement 
in the First and Second Congo Wars, from November 1996 to May 1997 and 
from August 1998 to July 2003, respectively. This included backing the AFDL 
of Laurent Désiré Kabila against the regime of President Mobutu, who was 
suspected of protecting the FAR, and repatriating more than a million civil war 
refugees, who constituted an almost unlimited potential recruitment reserve for 
the FDLR.122 This also included, in an almost immediate subsequent stage, 
taking sides against AFDL, using the proxy force of Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC. 
The second Congo war (1998-2003), initiated by Rwanda and Uganda, 
                                                             
121 See Mills (2008) 
122 See Afoaku, Osita (2002), Congo's Rebels: Their Origins, Motivations, and 
Strategies, in Clark, John F, The Africa Stakes of the Congo War Macmillan, New York, 109-
128; Reyntjens, Filip (2009), The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics, 1996-
2006, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge; the analogy of the Palestinian refugee camps 
was pointed out by Luttwak (1979), p.42 
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developed into what has been called the African Great War,123 involving half a 
dozen states, eventually leaving eastern Congo in a state of chronic 
insecurity.124 
During the Second Congo War, the Rwandan regular army numbered 
about 40,000 troops (external estimates range up to 64,000). While there had 
been some demobilisation after 1996, troops had also been recruited in about 
equivalent numbers to the demobilised soldiers (about 15,000).125  
The role of the post-genocide Rwandan armed forces, renamed Rwandan 
Defence Forces (RDF) in 2002, however, has not been limited to defending the 
nation against external aggression. It has also played a vital role as an 
instrument for the reintegration of large groups of former combatants or 
sympathisers who could have constituted a threat for the new political and 
security order.  
An important instrument to that end has been an endogenously-
developed Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration process (DDR), 
based on a combination of traditional approaches and modern indoctrination 
methods. Calling upon the pre-colonial Ingando (gathering) tradition, by which 
soldiers preparing for a military campaign would gather to subdue, or mute, 
their eventual disputes before the fight,126 the modern Ingando re-integration 
programme has taken the shape of a re-orientation for those who had left 
Rwanda or had been born in exile in the Congo rainforest and whose 
                                                             
123 A term coined by Shearer (2007), see also Autesserre, Séverine (2008), The trouble 
with Congo - How local disputes fuel regional conflict, Foreign Affairs, 87, 3, 94-110 
124 See Prunier, Gérard (2009), Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, 
and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe, Oxford University Press, Oxford; Prunier, Gérard 
(2009), From Genocide to Continental war : the 'Congolese' Conflict and the Crisis of 
Contemporary Africa, Hurst, London; Turner (2007) 
125 See Sidiropoulos, Elizabeth (2002), Eight Years After the Genocide, African 
Security Review Vol 11 No 3, 2002, 11, 3, np online edition 
126 Interview Rw 3 with Major Nyirimandzi Gerard on DDR, May 2011 
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worldview had been shaped by the FDLR.127 Meant to instil confidence and 
goodwill, the approach is determined, but works through persuasion and 
indoctrination rather than coercion. Camp Mutobo in Ruhengeri, for example, 
where most ex-FDLR soldiers arrive,128 is open. On the first weekend after 
arrival, even before the programme has started, the ex-combatants get some 
pocket money and are allowed to visit family members in Rwanda 
unsupervised. After four days, the person has to return and training starts. This 
demonstrative leap of faith has proven very successful. The process, overall, 
has been quite successful, so that by 2010 the FDR included an approximate 
parity of former FAR or former RPA personnel (also taking into account the 
arrival of new generations of soldiers with no a priori affiliation to one or the 
other side).129 Ingando was an experiment, based on indigenous tools, but 
facing new challenges.130 The first step in Ingando is to help ex-combatants 
and the RDF unburden themselves emotionally. The difficulty of discussing 
what people feel about the conflict and about each other is an important barrier 
that must first be removed. This means, as all ranks were concerned, that a 
former RPA soldier and victor would have to accept orders from a man he 
defeated, and vice versa: any officer might have to accept his own authority 
over the man who defeated him. Joint combat experience was a way to 
overcome such difficulties. 
                                                             
127 This author met several ex-FDLR at a re-education camp near Ruhengeri who were 
16 or 17 and had left the bush only two days earlier. Some of them were illiterate, speaking 
only Kinyirwanda, whilst others could operate computers and spoke French. Interviews at 
Camp Mutobo, May 2011 
128 Disarmament is done by MONUSCO. Child soldiers are brought to a UNICEF 
supported camp at Lake Muhazi, an hour’s drive from Kigali, for similar MINALOC 
programmes, http://blog.unicef.ie/2011/05/sylvains-story-a-former-child-soldiers-on-the-road-
to-a-new-life-in-rwanda/ 
129 Reintegration goes beyond mere demobilisation. Between September 1997 and 
April 2011 18,692 former RPA, 12,969 ex FAR, and 9,215 ex-armed group members from the 
Congo were demobilised. 26,585 RDF soldiers were demobilised since 2002, Rwanda 
Demobilisation and Reintegration Commission, see demobrwanda.org.rw/background.html 
130 Interview RW 1 General Rusagara, London, March 2013 
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The integration process had started from the first assault in 1990 on, and 
it continued throughout the wars that Rwandan soldiers participated in until the 
joint Congolese-Rwandan operation Ujoma Wetu in 2009. Captured, 
repatriated, and otherwise convinced former FAR in large numbers joined the 
RPA and then the RDF. They actually represented the majority of Rwandan 
soldiers fighting in the Second Congo war between 1998 and 2003. By the end 
of the Second Congo war 60 per cent of the Rwandan fighting force comprised 
former FAR and militias, while the rest were RPA and new recruits. Ingando 
has had three finished phases so far, the first from 1995 to 1997 with a total of 
8,097 FAR and militias reintegrated into the new regular armed forces; phase 
two in 1998 and 1999 with 26,092; and phase three with 11,159 reintegrated 
respectively (a total of 45,348 soldiers in seven years).131 Once these soldiers 
returned from service to their more hesitant – as will be discussed below – 
civilian communities, they carried strong support for reconciliation and the new 
narrative of Rwandaness. The army thus becomes a spearhead of the 
progress. 
The reintegration process, however, has not been conceived with a 
military focus alone. First, civilians have also been sent to reintegration 
courses (at Knumba). Second, those former FDLR fighters who have been 
redirected to civilian life have also received a high degree of attention. 
Integration in a military environment is much easier than in a civilian one, 
because it cannot so easily be controlled. Incentives are more practical in 
nature because, among returnees and occupants of once abandoned property, 
economic resources are at risk, a fact that does not apply among soldiers. As a 
result the abolition of old settlement structures through villagisation was a way 
                                                             
131 Data from research files of F. Rusagara’s thesis project at SOAS London  
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to avoid this struggle (see 2.1.2). It remains a task to be fulfilled because 
economic inequality cannot be wished away.  
2 The Military in Rwanda’s Post-Genocide History: from Weak to 
Strong State 
The contemporary Rwandan political project is to overcome, once and for 
all, the inter-ethnic division that brought the country to the abyss in 1994. All 
forces at the leadership’s disposal have been mobilised at the service of this 
project, focussing on national reconciliation, consolidation of direct rule as a 
core state-building strategy, and the economic modernisation of the country. 
Among them, the military has played a particularly important role as it was for 
some time the only tool available. Twenty years after the genocide, defence 
forces continue to play an important role as a pillar of the state, but they are 
gradually emancipating themselves from their political role as the state is 
acquiring an identity distinct from that of the party.  
2.1  Re-founding the Nation and (re-)building the State 
 
Post-genocide Rwanda is an experiment in state building, but also in 
social and cultural change. That change has been carried out under the 
leadership of a determined military and political leader, Paul Kagame.132 Post-
genocide Rwanda is only understandable taking in account Kagame’s role, 
however, being closer to that of a charismatic revolutionary statesman like 
Atatürk who similarly lifted his country from its collapse than to Mobutu, who led 
his into chaos. 
 
 
                                                             
132 See Kinzer, Stephen (2008), A Thousand Hills: Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man Who 
Dreamt It, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken; Waugh (2004) 
266 
 
2.1.1 Building a Post-ethnic Identity 
Inkonotanyi, the reconstruction of Rwandan unity has been part of the 
‘Eight point’ constitutive programme of the RPF from the beginning.133 
Accordingly, the eradication of any tribal differentiation in law or in collective 
consciousness has been a priority of the regime as of 1994, at the root of what 
appears to be a true cultural revolution.  
This eradication, first, is anchored in the Constitution, which includes 
among the ‘fundamental principles of governance [...] the fight against the 
ideology of genocide and the eradication of ethnic and regional divisions’.134 
Second, it has been relentlessly pursued via the introduction of a new historical 
narrative aimed at silencing divisive ethnic rhetoric and thereby creating a 
space for interethnic healing. A country-wide Unity and Reconciliation 
Commission conducted numerous public meetings, debates, and lectures for 
some years to spread a common and mainstreamed appreciation of Rwandan 
history, at the same time as it provided a space for dialogue on the legacy of 
bad governance and ethnic cleansing. Since 2002 the national consensus-
building process through dialogue has been pursued in a different form via the 
annual Umushyikirano national consultation. Calling upon the Ingando gathering 
tradition, Umushyikirano begun at an administrative level and was later (2009) 
opened to ordinary Rwandans who can participate via internet, telephone, sms 
and radio.  
Second, the government’s effort ‘to transform how Rwandans understand 
their social identities, to deconstruct ethnic identities and replace them with a 
unified national identity’135 seems to be aiming at the creation of a post-ethnic 
                                                             
133 Homepage of the RPF programme, www.rpfinkotanyi.org/en/index.php/about-
us/political-program?lang= 
134 Constitution of Rwanda, Chapter II, article 9 
135 See Longman and Rutagengwa (2004), online edition, np 
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society.136 Rwandan historians, who originally constructed the new national 
narrative aligning with RPF’s intentions, are aware both of the ambiguities of 
history and of the fact that pre-colonial Rwanda was not a heaven of social 
justice.137 The key idea, however, is to not get it ‘historically right’ but to provide 
elements around which a common post-ethnicity identity can be aggregated. 
This method resembles that of European historians who powerfully contributed 
to the construction of nations in the 19th century direct heritage of ‘ancient 
Germanic’ unity or the universal Roman-Christian Empire.138 Third, genuine 
efforts to overcome the wounds of the genocide have been made, in particular 
through the gacaca process, amply documented elsewhere.139 
Political symbolism, however, has also had its share in this policy. In 
2001 the government adopted a new flag, a new national anthem, and a new 
national seal, claiming that the old national symbols had been tainted by the 
genocide and new symbols were necessary to mark a break with the past.140 
Shortly thereafter (2002) the decision, to change the official name of the armed 
forces from the French Forces armées rwandaises into the British English 
spelling ‘Rwandan Defence Forces’141 was more than symbolic, as it marked an 
important geo-strategic reorientation away from the Francophone world and 
towards East Africa. This reorientation was consummated in 2008 when the 
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official language of education was changed from French to English, in a move 
reminiscent of Ataturk’s decision to abandon Arabic for European style writing in 
Turkey, marking the break with the Ottoman empire. In Rwanda, French had 
been the language of the governing elites from Belgian rule until the end of the 
Habyarimana regime, and there was no more tangible accommodation with the 
charged past other than abandoning it.  
This cultural and political reengineering has been greatly facilitated by 
Rwanda’s deep-rooted practices of state-centred social control. In a way, post-
genocide Rwanda ‘exhibits strong patterns of continuity with pre-genocide 
Rwanda’.142 Somewhat ironically, whereas Rwanda’s strong hierarchism had 
served to anchor patterns of authoritarianism and ethnic differentiation, it is now 
used by the new elites to ‘facilitate cultural change by ordinance’, since a 
population with a ‘deeply-ingrained value of obedience’ is mouldable for better 
or worse.143 One must take into account, however, that in contemporary 
Rwanda, the dogged determination of the regime to overcome a divisive tribal 




2.1.2 Building the State  
Rwanda has been described by Edward Newman as a ‘hyper-Westfalian 
state’, in the sense that it has extremely strong and well-organised 
institutions.145 A in pre-colonial times, and in the First and Second Republics, 
contemporary Rwanda has an extraordinary state apparatus covering five strata 
of administration below the central government level – in a descending order, 
                                                             
142 Straus and Waldorf (2011), pp.14f 
143 Prunier, Gérard (1999), The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide, Fountain 
Publishers Ltd, Kampala, Uganda, p.248 
144 In many conversions Rwandans told this author that they were content with the fact 
that ‘Hutu-Tutsi-talk’ is subdued 
145 Newman, Edward (2009), Failed States and International Order: Constructing a 
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the province, district, sector, cell, and finally village level, all of which have 
elected councils.146 The dynamics of governance, however, have been radically 
transformed since 1994. As it has striven to erase the marks of the old order 
and rebuild the country, the regime has taken a long series of measures that 
appear as many steps to establish a direct-rule system. In many areas, the 
ongoing transformation in Rwanda is actually more reminiscent of the Weberian 
stage of the European state formation process than of contemporary post-
conflict state-building processes.  
An important, early step in this process has been the reconstruction of 
the civil administration. Forced to begin from scratch in 1994, this reconstruction 
has followed a path sharply contrasting with that of the previously prevailing 
patrimonial and nepotistic system. Former civil servants were carefully vetted 
and a minority rehired, but most ministries were staffed by new personnel, many 
of whom being returnees from the diaspora, but also very soon by a large 
number of very young people, recruited from the National University or abroad, 
from North America, Europe or Uganda.  
More important perhaps for the institution of a new social and political 
order has been the resettlement of a large number of rural dwellers – who 
constitute the majority of the population – from the hills to new villages in 
valleys, accompanied by comprehensive land tenure and agricultural reform.147 
The so-called villagisation was undertaken with a combination of objectives in 
mind: first, to satisfy a dire need to house numerous returning refugees;148 
second, as a means to bring the modernity of electricity, sewage systems, clean 
water provision, etc. to the countryside more easily; third, to replace small 
                                                             
146 Elections at the two lowest levels are not secret, a point weakening the democratic 
legitimacy in Western eyes: district and sector level elections are indirect, provincial elections 
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147 Not everywhere, however, does the construction of new homes keep pace with the 
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270 
 
subsistence agriculture with more productive agribusiness and animal 
husbandry; and last, but not least, to facilitate direct control of the government 
over the population.149 Although the experience is too recent to draw definitive 
and comprehensive conclusions,150 it is already evident that the transfer of 
social control from the ‘hill’ to the ‘village’ has had an important impact on 
traditional clientelist structures. For example, with the introduction of land titles – 
meant to put an end to a history of permanent quarrel over the ownership of 
land – local leaders have been deprived of their traditional and informal privilege 
of certifying land ownership by lettre de cachet. Similarly, with the streamlining 
of bureaucratic procedures, the issuing of travel documents is now delegated to 
a one-stop institution and the stamps of village leaders have lost their legal 
value. 151 Local leaders have therefore seen most of their powers (and 
associated fees) escape them to the benefit of a centrally-managed civil 
service.152  
Control, however, also has the meaning of ‘accountability’ and 
‘transparency’ in the new Rwanda, in an overall drive to improve the 
professionalisation and effectiveness of administrative and public services. 
Thus, at the local government level, the government introduced the Imihigo 
process in 2006, by which civil servants are systematically judged according to 
their performance.153 However, it is not the central government that sets the 
benchmarks but the local administration itself, which has to develop realistic 
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150 Some observers, such as Catherine Newbury, consider that such social 
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strategies to achieve its set objectives. The executives at the village level, 
sector, or district sign contracts with the government, and their performance is 
subject to semi-annual public evaluations.  
2.1.3 Rwanda’s Changing Structures of Power and Influence 
The Rwandese leadership’s authoritarian steering of cultural change and 
societal reorganisation, observed uncritically by Western governments, non-
governmental organisations and academics for a good decade of post-genocide 
shame, has been eliciting more and more disapproval in the recent period.
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The focus of the criticism actually bears on two different objects, depending on 
how close the observer is to field reality. More distant or generalist observers, 
mostly concentrate on the illiberalism of the regime, which would forbid the 
expression of free speech, severely sanction opponents,155 and, actually, 
control the public space by constantly occupying it with centrally-staged phoney 
debates.156 In their view, this would jeopardise Rwanda’s transition from a 
doorstep nation to a fully open access order, the sine qua non condition for 
durable social peace.157 Although not insensitive to the criticism,158 the 
government retorts that its priority, in this still sensitive post-war and post-
genocide phase, is economic and social development, pointing to its successes 
in this field and, by contrast, to the fact that the worst cases of mass violence in 
Rwanda coincided with its two more ‘liberal’ periods: at independence and after 
the Arusha accords. Internal and external critiques would therefore be mistaken 
in their appreciation of the factors of sustainable peace and stability in Rwanda. 
                                                             
154 Western governments’ more critical stance is also linked to lingering suspicions, 
based on a series of United Nations reports, that Rwanda keeps playing an important role in 
instigating insecurity and in preventing peace in the Eastern DRC. 
155 For example, opposition leader Victoria Ingabire’s sentencing to eight years in 
prison for propagating ethnic propaganda 
156 Typical of such criticism in the academic world is the series of articles in the volume 
by Straus and Waldorf (2011) 
157 McDoom (2011), p.23 
158 Interviews in London, Kigali, several encounters trough 2011 to 2013 
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Closer observers, external and internal ones, however, focus on another 
aspect. In 2002, the International Crisis Group noted the degree of refugee 
domination of the government at a time when the new Constitution was not yet 
in place.159 According to more recent studies, the trend, rather than fading, has 
consolidated itself over time. Thus, both Gerard Prunier in 2009 and Timothy 
Longman in 2011 describe the ongoing state-building effort as the reflection of 
an undemocratic takeover by a core constituency of former Tutsi refugees 
returned from Uganda, Burundi, Tanzania and Congo.160 The political leadership 
would thus have ‘strongly favoured civic groups run by the returnees’.161 
Rwandan oppositional voices, for their part, claim that refugees were carried to 
power by the RPA, and that the new hierarchy in the country is based on the 
closeness of the respective groups to an English speaking military centre group 
coming from Uganda.162 Accordingly there would be a ‘pecking order’ prevailing 
in all aspects of life according to the following ranking from top to bottom: former 
refugees in Uganda, English-speaking former refugees in Tanzania and Kenya, 
former refugees from Burundi, former refugees from Congo, and those who did 
not leave the country before or during the genocide. A subsequent and 
overlapping layer would put the Holocaust survivors over the large remainder of 
ordinary Rwandans. The persuasion that a ‘caste’ system is developing is 
indeed shared by a diverse range of persons to whom this author talked, and 
academic researchers have made the point of a possible ‘Tutsification’ of 
Rwandese political and economic life.163 How strong and how exclusive alleged 
Tutsification might be, however, remains an open question. The annual 
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handbook of the Great Lakes region published by Stefaan Maryse and Filip 
Reyntjens links the phenomenon to the period of power dominance of the 
political system by the RPF (until 2002-03), an aspect, which is less salient after 
the integration of former refugees in the Rwandan political sphere.164 Others 
consider Tutsification as a logical outcome of the military victory and the 
practical necessities of the post-genocide construction process. An indicator for 
its non-occurrence in the years to come may be the limited extent to which 
English will impose itself as the language of administration and business, as 
many Rwandans rather express themselves in French (for the better educated 
ones) or Kinyarwanda (for the popular classes and beyond) than in the 
language of Shakespeare. So far French remains very prominent at least in 
urban environments and in the administration.  
2.2 Enlisting the Military for National Re-Foundation 
On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Chinese People’s 
Liberation Army in July 2012, Minister of Defence James Kabarebe asserted 
that the RDF ‘believes in and works towards being the foundation for the 
development of Rwanda’.165 Even if the Minister had his Chinese audience in 
mind, this was something of an understatement regarding the role assigned to 
the army in national economic, moral, economic, institutional and political 
fundamental refoundation for some two decades, before it started concentrating 
on more purely military tasks in the recent years. There was a certain logic and 
inevitability to this: in 1994, the RPF/RPA was the only organised force and, for 
most of the next three years, the only working institution in the country.166 The 
political leadership and much of the administrative staff had fled, leaving an 
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emptied treasury and destroying the archives behind them. The army therefore 
had to step in virtually everywhere, be it in terms of basic administration, 
policing of communities and jurisprudence, but also kick-starting financial and 
other economic services, whilst defending the country against the FDLR threat. 
The military arguably contributed to the consolidation of the new political 
leadership but also acted as the main state-strengthening tool in the immediate 
post-genocide years. 
2.2.1 The Army’s Role in Ideological and Social 
Refoundation 
In a way, the RDF’s role in ideological and social refoundation begun in 
the early 1990s, as it was still an armed political opposition in which army (RPA) 
and party (RPF) were undistinguishable. Video footage from the period 1991 to 
1992 (no more specific dating was available) shown to this author reported a 
speech by Paul Kagame to his soldiers doctrinally presenting the RPA as ‘a 
political army – responsible – to know exactly why we attack our own 
country’.167 Throughout the war soldiers were kept under tough military 
discipline through a continuous programme of political indoctrination. Drawing 
explicitly inspiration from the Chinese PLA,168 political commissioners were 
appointed in each fighting unit to fulfil three missions: firstly, to keep soldiers 
informed about the political situation and to remind soldiers for what they were 
fighting; secondly, as liaison with the civilian population; and, thirdly, to address 
complaints from soldiers against their officers.169 The inclusion of political 
commissioners in the structures of the army leadership, as the former 
commander in chief explained, ‘instilled political awareness and responsibility 
                                                             
167 Transcribed from English subtitles to a speech in Kinyarwanda  
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169 See Kinzer (2008), p.84; one RDF political officer told this author in an interview Rw 
11 in 2012 that he was appointed to the post. There was no way to apply for the position or to 
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within the army [and] thus ownership of other national issues beyond defence 
and security’.170  
Political awareness and responsibility within the army, it was hoped, 
would contribute to creating ownership among the soldiers of other national 
issues beyond defence and security. Paul Kagame himself, indeed, has 
indicated that the RPF treated the RPA as a sort of educational facility – a 
“school of the nation”.171 This role, certainly, was facilitated by the exceptionally 
high level of national and international legitimacy enjoyed by the RPA in 1994, 
after it brought the genocide to an end without any meaningful material or other 
support from a paralysed international community.172  
The role of the RPA/RDF in integrating former enemy combatants 
through an indigenously-conceived and run Ingando process has been 
explained above (section 1.7). What is important to note, in relation to Ingando, 
is that it was not only meant as a tool to reduce the immediate threat to the 
security of the country and the regime, but to serve as an ‘impact multiplier’ in 
the sense that reintegrated soldiers are expected to attract their kin to start over 
and commence a new life as part of the new Rwandan nation. The former 
enemy is therefore not only disarmed immediately and physically, but also 
indirectly and psychologically with the hope for a longer lasting and deeper 
effect. Similarly, it is interesting to note that the new, post-genocide historical 
narrative meant to re-found the unity of the nation (see section 2.1.1), was 
originally developed by veteran historians from a special history unit at the MoD 
in Kigali, the Rwanda Defence Forces Department of Information, 
Documentation and Military History.173 
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Accordingly, the RPA/RDF has not only been put in charge of military 
reintegration, but is also deeply involved in the reconversion of former FDLR 
and other fighters into civilian life, as the main implementing agent of a 
programme run under the authority of the Rwanda Demobilization and 
Reintegration Commission. ‘De-doctrination’ of former enemy combatants, to 
use the words of one of the trainers at camp Mutobo, starts with socio-economic 
profiling to adapt each individual’s retraining with regard to his/her working skills 
and professional capacities, talents or priorities. Three months of training 
include many subjects: history, the national economy, corruption and nepotism, 
human rights, good governance and rural sector development, but also 
entrepreneurship, banking services, education, gender, medical insurance, the 
role of the police and the military, and eventually the meaning of citizenship. 
Every trainee receives an initial starter-kit worth about $US100, and another 
one worth $US200 after another two months. Trainee work projects are 
overseen and supported by consultants and regional demobilisation offices. 
Integration in a civilian environment is more complicated than in a military one, 
as it involves practical problems of compensation for lost property, inadequacy 
of skills in a new location or economic environment, etc. The programme, 
however, has been relatively successful. Begun with a group of 1,758 ex-FDLR 
fighters in December 2001, by May 2012 it had benefited a total of 8,621 former 
members of nine different armed groups, and even 288 ex-soldiers of the 
FARDC, who had completed the training cycles in Mutobo and had been 
released to their new homes. 
The military, finally, must be a role model for the remodelling of the 
national identity beyond the boundaries of ethnic affiliation. As younger recruits 
have come on board who were born after the war, the RDF has all but 
eradicated the Hutu/Tutsi divide within its ranks. A single example may illustrate 
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this: as one officer explained to this author, on the occasion of a joint course at 
the Belgian Royal Military Academy, there were several groups of cadets with 
Rwandans and Burundis among them. On such occasions, Burundis always 
come in even numbers in order to ensure the ethnic balance of their delegation; 
however Rwanda sends groups in random numbers with no marked affiliation in 
order to demonstrate its neglect of ethnic issues. According to the officer, 
Burundian participants trying to identify the Rwandans’ ethnic affiliation never 
learned whether they had guessed correctly or not.174 
2.2.2 The Army’s Role in Economic Rebuilding 
The Rwandan army’s involvement in economic activity, unfortunately, is 
better known for its illegal exploitation of the Eastern DRC’s natural resources175 
than for its tremendous contribution to the economic reconstruction of the 
shattered country after 1994. The latter, fortunately, has been recently 
documented by Booth and Golooba-Mutebi in meticulous field research.176 
A UN panel called to investigate the extent of the RPA’s share in the 
DRC’s economic exploitation in 2000-2001 concluded that the RPA financed its 
war in the DRC in five ways: through its own commercial activities, with then 
Colonel Kabarebe177 mentioned as a facilitator in the coltan (source of niobium 
and tantalum) trade; via profits from shares it held in various companies; from 
taxes collected by the ‘Congo Desk’ of the Rwandan External Security 
Organisation (ESO), the foreign intelligence service; and from payments made 
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Patrimonialism? The case of Rwanda, Africa Power and Politics Programme, where 
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by individuals for protection of their businesses by the RPA.178 Using a largely 
theoretical measurement, it appears that resources from Eastern DRC, at one 
per cent of Rwandese GDP financed a little less than one quarter of the 
Rwandese military between 1998 and 2003, the cost of which was estimated at 
the time to represent about 3.8 per cent of national GDP.179 There was in those 
years, the UN panel noted, a great deal of interaction between the military 
apparatus, the state (civil) bureaucracy, and the business community. As the 
economy has been recovering, however, the Rwandan leadership has been 
anxious to lift accusations levered against it and Rwanda has made a point of 
appearing as a role model in Africa and beyond. As a result, direct military 
involvement in DRC natural resources exploitation has been tamed, mining 
activities have been commercialised and the country has striven to adopt the 
most demanding international transparency rules.180  
Away from the limelight of international attention, the military has played 
a tremendous role on the domestic front in Rwanda’s post-genocide economic 
rebuilding. In a way, this role developed organically, from fulfilling the basic 
needs of the RPA as it was still a guerrilla war in the early 1990s to the 
assumption of a major task in lifting the country from devastation after the 
catastrophe. As a lively business sector has emerged and the regime has been 
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keen on demonstrating the professionalism of its armed forces, the involvement 
of the military in economic activity has decreased in relative terms. It 
nevertheless remains an important feature of Rwanda’s ‘developmental 
patrimonialism’ (see below). 
The Rwandan army is involved in almost all economic sectors, from 
banks to insurance, to construction, to agriculture and other domains. It 
operates via large companies and holdings, the most well-known of which are 
the Zigema Credit and Savings Society (Zigema CSS), the Horizon Group and 
Agro-Processing Industries. An emanation of the RDF/RPA’s war experience, 
the Tri-Star holding has also benefitted from the RPA’s capital investment and 
from its networks to grow into one of the most powerful national economic 
actors. All of these companies begun as limited services to fulfil the RPA/RDF’s 
own needs and later developed into comprehensive national services.  
The role of Zigema CSS has been crucial as an all-purpose bank able to 
manage the basic cash flow on which the fledgling economy depended after the 
genocide. Zigema CSS’s anchoring in the security services is unmistakable: 
every soldier, police, ex-soldier and former police has a bank account at CSS, 
and the service number of the soldier is identical with his account number. 
There were 120,000 such accounts in 2011. Besides, seven per cent of the 
soldiers’ salary represents compulsory savings, with each enlistee thus 
automatically becoming a shareholder of the bank. Further, the bank’s general 
assembly is held at Ministry of Defence Headquarters. Zigema CSS is 
reportedly very profitable; for example, a profit of two billion Rwandese francs 
(GBP 2.01 million) for the previous financial year was announced at its general 
assembly in March 2010.
181
 The bank’s credit portfolio reportedly increased by 
an impressive 20 per cent over the same period while deposits grew by nearly 
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27 per cent, indicating a significant improvement in the welfare of its 
cooperative members over the year. Credits were granted for agriculture and 
livestock projects as well as a number of small scale projects like personal 
houses.182  
Similarly to banking services, social security, one of the big 
achievements of the Third Republic, was initiated by the military, with four 
regimes in place: the army-owned and army-focussed Military Medical 
Insurance (MMI); the Caisse Sociale Rwandaise (CSR); the Social Security 
Fund of Rwanda (SSFR) open to all civil servants, including the military; as well 
as a general insurance company, the Mutuelle de Santé, open to all citizens. 
Until the early 2010s, the CSR charged 3,000 Rwandan Franc (Rfr) per person 
annually and the Mutuelle cost 1,000 Rfr (1.12 Euro p/p or 5.60 Euro for a 
family of five) annually. As these rates turned out to be unsustainable in the 
long term, plans to merge and privatise the three non-military insurance 
schemes were being developed in 2012.183  
Horizon Group is the army-owned holding company in the field of 
productive enterprises. It was established with equipment donated by the 
government and a team of military engineers seconded from the army. Even if 
Horizon’s acting director came from Zigema CSS, the army’s bank, it is run as a 
private firm and welcomes private shareholders. Horizon has a policy to recruit 
staff from the diaspora, with business efficiency and the meeting of strategic 
social objectives taking precedence over commitments to local hiring and 
capacity development. Horizon has been involved in the construction of rural 
infrastructure as well as the development of agribusiness with an aim of 
restoring export agriculture to something approaching its pre-war level. Its first 
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tasks included the erection of irrigation dykes, coffee-washing stations for other 
army-owned agricultural enterprises, and manioc-growing farms. Horizon also 
took over the production of biological insecticides at the Sopyrwa plant in 
Musanze when it went bankrupt in 2008. A second important domain of Horizon 
investment has been urban housing, as this became a vital matter when 
competition between returnees and displaced people for access to the limited 
housing stock became acute in the late 1990s. The company also works in road 
and bridge construction, with ‘Horizon Construction’ often implementing projects 
as a sub-contractor of the German company STRABAG as part of a know-how 
transfer arrangement. Horizon serves as a supplier of construction sites to other 
companies thanks to its brick-making plants. Another branch of the company, 
Horizon Logistics, has won contracts to support the Rwandan peacekeeping 
forces in Darfur.  
With Agro-Processing Industries Ltd., the army has grown into an 
important economic actor in contributing to food security, for itself as a priority 
(the army is food self-sufficient), but also, more broadly, to communities in 
need, as a supplier of export cash, and, to some extent, as an agent of 
agriculture sector modernisation.184 Agro-Processing produces maize (20,000 
tons), beans and soya beans at Gabiro (4,000 hectares), manioc (15,000 tons) 
pineapples (100 hectares, with further growth plans), and avocados and 
mangos in a variety of locations; it runs ten coffee factories (500 tonnes) and a 
dairy in Nyanza, which exports to the DRC, Burundi, Kenya, Malawi and 
Uganda.185 Plans are also underway to produce 16 by-products of manioc (or 
cassava), including biofuel and flour. Agro-processing cooperates closely with 
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local farmers, who have learnt how to save money and open bank accounts as 
a side effect of this cooperation.186  
The nucleus of post-war Rwandan economic reconstruction, however, 
has been the RPF’s production department of Tri-star Investments S.A.R.L.. 
Originally funded by RPF’s political supporters in the diaspora, Tri-star has 
grown into a large holding company from a limited economic activity primarily 
meant to ensure the guerrilla’s food security during the civil war. Immediately 
after the fighting stopped in 1994 Tri-Star expanded into road construction, 
housing estates, building materials, fruit processing, other food and drinks 
production (such as bottled water and dairy products, including cheese), metals 
trading, mobile telephony, printing, furniture imports, and security services, 
responding to the acute material post war shortages of the country. The war 
chest of the RPA/RPF was used to import goods and even to pay for newly 
recruited civil servants’ salaries. In the absence of any economic infrastructure 
and know-how Tri-Star organised the kick-start of the recovery. Over time its 
role moved from the initial shoring up the national economy to doing long term 
business on behalf of the party.
187
 
One of the particularly successful undertakings of Tri-Star, from both the 
economic and the social change perspectives has been its investment in mobile 
telephony. Following the failure of an initial joint venture attempt with Libyan 
investors,188 the business partnership signed in mid- 1998 by Tri-Star and the 
South African MTN has had a long lasting effect. Via Tri-Star, the army 
introduced Rwanda to mobile telephony earlier than it would have happened 
otherwise, attracted foreign direct investment, and generated significant taxable 
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revenues.189 Profits could soon be reinvested to establish a mobile network in 
Uganda. In 2007 Tri-Star sold its shares, followed by the government in 2011, 
for a profit of ten and 20 per cent, respectively. 
In sum, the industriousness of the army kick-started the economy when it 
was destroyed. It pioneered corporate production at a time when no foreign or 
domestic investor was available, and built sustainable companies that could be 
taken over by private investors when they appeared.190 In 2012 nine Tri-Star 
companies were still operating successfully against competition from Kenyan 
and Chinese firms (among others).191 Tri-Star‘s gradually decreasing 
importance to the Rwandan economy is still measurable by its contribution of 
nine per cent of direct taxes in fiscal year 2009-10. 
2.2.3 The Army: A Tool of Developmental Patrimonialism? 
David Booth and Frederick Golooba-Mutebi, who have studied the 
Rwandese economic system put in place by the RPF regime closely, categorise 
it squarely as a form of ‘developmental patrimonialism’.192 Developmental 
patrimonialism is distinguished from non- (or less) developmental forms of 
neopatrimonial politics by the fact that the economic activities carried out by the 
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state, party and army-owned economic players (such as Tri-Star) are intended 
to maximise economic rents to their collective benefit and/or that of broader 
groups of citizens in the long run, rather than the personal revenues of their 
members in the short run. In other words, developmental patrimonialism is a 
qualified form of an oligarchic political system, which is in the long term oriented 
toward the common good of society. 
Developmental patrimonialism has a major economic and cultural-political 
consequence: it removes much of the incentive for corruption in the higher 
ranks of the party, the administration or the army.193 As individuals in leading 
positions have legitimate channels to pursue economic interests, they perceive 
high-level political corruption as unnecessary or much less worth pursuing. 
Indeed, from the moment Paul Kagame took the helm at the government in 
2000, he ensured that the system in Rwanda would distance itself from 
traditional African patronage standards and nepotism. The president’s ‘strait-
laced anti-corruption line’ indeed credibly explains why some of his former allies 
eventually fell out with him and went into opposition.194 Others may not go as 
far, but in Kigali an air of discontent can be perceived in conversations with 
Rwandans who are generally favourable to the regime but disappointed that no 
patrimonial-style dividends of victory have materialised into personal riches in 
the past decade.195 
The leadership’s zero-tolerance policy against corruption is said to have 
been enforced in the military even at the height of the interventions in Congo, 
where 'individual military officers were under strong pressure not to acquire 
material benefits personally, and none are known to have done so with 
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impunity’.196 As opposed to the personalised privateering of their Ugandan 
allies, for example, the Rwandan military’s commercial activities in Eastern 
DRC, controversial as they were, have indeed served the state-cum-party rather 
than individuals. Profits from the exploitation of Congolese minerals during the 
Congo wars were channelled through Rwanda Metals, one of the daughters of 
Tri-Star, trading minerals between Congolese brokers and international 
markets. They helped the RPA finance its war and also funded some domestic 
development projects with a larger social/political scope. Because of the 
international critique about exploitation of Congolese natural resources, 
however, Rwanda Metals was sold to a Botswana company after the end of 
combat in Congo in late 2002. 
2.2.4 From a Political to a Professional Army 
 
Until 2002 the armed forces (RDF) and the party (RPF) had been 
factually identical, with the political military being little more than the armed wing 
of the party.197 An important step in the emancipation of the military from politics 
was the civilianisation of the government, following the adoption of a new 
Constitution in 2003 and the holding of the first multi-party election. The 2003 
Constitution banning the combination of the presidential office with any public 
service position, civilian or military,198 paved the way for Paul Kagame to 
‘reinvent himself’ as a civilian leader, nine years after having led the reconquest 
of the country and once he had securely laid the basis for its moral, physical 
and political reconstruction. Given his personal role in the transformation of 
Rwanda, his transfer to a purely civilian position could not but have an impact 
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on the respective roles of the army and the party/regime. Since May 2002, 
when the Rwandan armed forces became the new RDF, they increasingly 
emancipated themselves from the party, and thus from politics, although there 
is still influence through personal unions between party veterans and high 
ranking military officers. 
As of the early 2000s, the priority of the President has been to transform 
the military into an essentially professional force, both in terms of the functions it 
performs domestically and of its international image. Domestically, the military 
remains focussed on its dual roles in economic development and border 
security, in relation to the high level of threat still perceived from the FDLR in 
Eastern Congo. Internationally, the RDF has earned itself in little more than a 
decade the reputation of being one of the most professional, well-equipped and 
combat-hardened armies in Africa. Its performance, as well as the country’s 
confidence, is demonstrated by its high level of participation in peacekeeping 
operations, both in troop numbers and ranking officers, which is on a par with 
African countries with a much longer experience in the domain, such as Nigeria 
and Ghana.
199
 Participation in peacekeeping is of course an important means 
for Rwanda to sustain its army of 33,000 personnel.200 At the same time the 
permanent readiness of about 10,000 peacekeepers deployed or on training 
insures the maintenance of a high operational capacity. 
The military, whilst remaining politically close to the regime, is therefore 
increasingly shifting its attention and priority to purely military tasks. Asked 
about their loyalty by this author in the course of his research in 2011-12, RDF 
                                                             
199 In November 2012 Rwanda had 4108 soldiers in peacekeeping operations. In 
January 2007 Brigadier General (Dr) Ephrem Rurangwa assumed the post of AMIS Deputy 
Force Commander in Darfur, followed by General Patrick Nyamvumba as Force Commander 
of the more than 21.000 strong UNAMID in September 2009. In June 2013 General Jean-
Bosco Kazura took command of the 12.600 strong military component of MINUSMA in Mali 
200 Rwanda receives payments of $US 1.028 per man/month for each soldier deployed 
in UNAMID, see www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/financing.shtml  
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soldiers unanimously stressed their attachment to the state rather than to the 
party.201  
3 Conclusion  
In Rwanda’s pre-colonial age, the strong state was basically an 
instrument to secure and gradually expand the country’s territory, but it also 
served the interests of its people, for example by protecting the population 
against slave hunters in the 19th century. A century later, the gradual 
monopolisation of the power of the state by an increasingly small oligarchy 
following the Hutu revolution of 1959 led to repeated pogroms against Tutsi 
minority groups, culminating in the 1994 genocide: whilst its social and political 
foundations had been weakened, the state had retained its capacity to control, 
repress and in the end exterminate. The drive undertaken by the RPF-
dominated government since 1994 aims to renew the political and social 
foundations of the state as the basis for the restoration of a stable and assertive 
country based not only on the superstructure of strong institutions, but also on a 
renovated moral fabric.  
The military has been associated with each phase of this tortuous and 
often violent history, although with very different roles and relations to the 
political power. In pre-colonial Rwanda as well as in the immediate post-
genocide years, the military had no rationale, and no existence separately from 
the political leadership. Paradoxically, these periods also correspond with a high 
degree of professionalism and performance of the armed forces. By contrast, 
the post-colonial military, even after it had mutated from the original National 
Guard to the FAR, never reached the capacity of a professional army. Rather, it 
remained an essentially tribal force under the First Republic, increasingly 
becoming a factionalist and politicised formation under the Second Republic. As 
                                                             
201 Interviews and conversations with individual soldiers in Rwanda in 2011 and 2013 
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a result, the armed forces had no prospect to become the state’s and nation’s 
army.  
Some two decades after the genocide, the reconstructed national army, 
the RDF, remains a pillar of national economic and moral reconstruction in the 
context of a centrally-steered drive for social change. Unlike in the Congo and in 
Cameroon where the armed forces are linked to the political leadership via the 
bounds of patronage, this linkage in Rwanda is of an ideological nature, born 
out of the common history of resistance, conquest, and revolution. What 
remains unclear is how far the armed force will go in developing a separate 
identity from that of the political leadership as they pursue their state-building 
duty and their quest for military professionalism in parallel. Equally unclear is 
whether Rwanda is moving toward a Huntingtonian type of civil-military 
relationship. As long as President Kagame remains at the helm of power, this 
question will likely remain moot, though: whether in military or in civilian clothes, 
his prestige for having led the campaign to victory that enabled the physical and 
moral resurrection of the country remains so great that he can only be revered 




Chapter 6: Quasi- and Other Armies 
 
The chief foundations of all states are good laws and good arms  




On the basis of the variables defined at the beginning of the study and 
analysis of post-colonial history we can now deduce from our three case 
studies by which political means state-strengthening measures or state 
weakening policies were implemented, and what effect they had on the place 
of the military between the ruling elites and the wider community. This analysis 
reveals both commonalities and differences among the three countries, taking 
into account pre-colonial conditions and historical evolution. Colonial states 
preceding independence were in all cases weak states.1 Few could build on 
the history of formerly existing indigenous organised states with local standing 
armies. In Rwanda and Cameroon, foreign African soldiers were introduced, 
leading to the experience of a double alienation of the people from the military. 
By contrast, in the Congo, indigenous forces led by non-African officers 
provided protection to the alien regime of the colonial state. However, the fact 
that the coercive forces were Congolese people did not mitigate their alienation 
from the people. 
2 The Three Case Studies 
Post-colonial state-building was in none of the cases initiated entirely 
under conditions of uncontested local ownership. This resulted in a much 
                                                             
1 As demonstrated by Young (1994), and Berman, Bruce J (1997), The Perils of Bula 




closer relationship between the new rulers and foreign promoters than between 
these rulers and their people. Still, foreign influence was never strong enough 
to impose new political values that were alien to the local political culture, and 
which had only developed in the Northern ‘mother countries’ shortly before and 
during decolonisation. This circumstance of weak influence endures in the 
context of contemporary security sector reform efforts, pursued by well-
intended donor states since the late 1990s. In no case in our examination 
(which could well be extended to other countries in the sub-region) did the 
creation of a modern army occur by calculated reform or through the dynamic 
of warfare before 1994. In the Congo, as is argued in the first case study 
chapter, post-colonial state-building failed, and without a fall-back position of 
previous statehood the country returned to the condition of non-directed state 
formation with its corresponding Early-Modern warfare. Cameroon reveals a 
history of stalled state-building and a policy of non-reform. In the only case 
where a serious attempt at state-building can be detected after 1994, Rwanda, 
a victorious military was virtually catapulted into the driver’s seat of government 
by its total victory in an extremely ferocious civil war. 
2.1 Congo 
Congolese politicians’ and soldiers’ achievements in state-building can 
only be measured against their own declared aim to represent a proper state 
with its national army. Taking this as a benchmark it is an interesting 
observation that throughout its history, and most notably on day five of 
independence, state-building in the Congo was described as a process of re-
construction. Re-constructing a state would mean to establish a status quo 
ante, identifying the original state and its institutions, making an inventory of 
what would be worth reconstruction, and analysing the reasons for the moment 
of its collapse in order to prevent replicating the failure. So far, whatever 
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embodiment of statehood ordinary Congolese have encountered has been at 
best pockets of inefficient administration and more generally an illegitimate 
predator in the flesh or in the form of an organisation – be this civilian or 
military.2 The Congo is at the stage of the Natural or Tillian state.  
What was left in terms of institutions from the colonial inheritance, non-
systematic and arbitrary in character as it was,3 was abused and turned into a 
means of power and money by the new elites.4 The construct that would have 
come closest to being a state, the Belgian colonial inverted quasi-state of the 
post-World War II era, had neither antecedent nor successor. Under Mobutu, a 
dearth of institutionalised direct rule spread to all sectors of communal life, 
reducing the weak state to complete impotence. After his demise, the creation 
of the FAC under the leadership of Laurent Désiré Kabila was a device to 
establish the new political elite militarily, but it was a technical failure because 
a legitimate monopoly on violence was never achieved. Again, this lack of 
legitimacy of the political leadership resulted in the failure of the would-be 
state. As a consequence of the Congolese aborted state-building process, the 
land and people, to use Jean François Bayart’s words, fell back into the ‘utterly 
haphazard and even confused’ stage of state formation.5  
The non-materialised Congolese state is tantamount to a non-
materialised Congolese army. ‘Monsieur le Président, vous n'avez pas 
d'armée…’ is hence the title of an open letter to President Kabila.6 To cite a 
Congolese voice on this problématique, Godefroid Kä Mana, the president of 
the prestigious Pole Institute in Goma, put it a few days after this city fell under 
                                                             
2 See Doorn, Jacobus Adrianus Antonius van (1975), The Soldier and Social Change: 
Comparative Studies in the History and Sociology of the Military, Sage Publications, Beverly 
Hills, p.79 
3 Trefon (2011), p.74 
4 Devlin, Lawrence (2007), Chief of Station, Congo: Fighting the Cold War in a Hot 
Zone, Public Affairs, New York, p.238 
5 Bayart, Jean François (2000), Africa in the World: a History of Extraversion, African 
Affairs, 99, 395, 217-267, p.246 
6 Hoebeke, et al. (2009) 
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rebel control in November 2012: the FARDC is ‘une armée fantomatique dans 
un pays sans Etat ni gouvernance'; the FARDC is a phantom army in a country 
without state or government.7 
The army has to be a coherent military body, loyal to the constitution, and 
trained and equipped to defend the state and country. Instead, the regular 
Congolese military – claiming to represent a national army without delivering 
on this promise – is something different, even if it carries the proud name 
‘Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic’.  
In the absence of statehood the drive for alternative forms of order 
become an unavoidable necessity.8 If Mobutu’s personal-rule regime survived 
20 years in the Cold War context, the void in direct rule left by Laurent Kabila’s 
regime was quickly filled by other non-state actors.9 Under such conditions the 
‘discourse of violence remain[ed] the sole legitimate expression of political 
change’.10 Violent actors in need of a lawless biotope to flourish are attracted 
by such non-state conditions. This does not mean that warlords are necessarily 
coming from the fringes of society: ‘Nearly all “warlords” [once] occupied 
central positions in the authority structures of regimes that they later 
attacked.’11  
As an outcome, impunity for criminal acts has become a common feature 
among the military, both high and low echelons, estranging it further from the 
civilian population. The political values of human rights and human dignity, 
democracy, civic education and respect for the citizenry are all public goods 
                                                             
7 For Kabarebe see the interview given to Colette Braeckman, Braeckman, Colette 
(2013), Cartes sur table: les quatre vérités du général James Kabarebe, Les cahiers de Nicole 
Braeckman, internet blog, 29 August, np; for the quote see Kä Mana (2012), Comment j'ai 
vécu la chute de Goma et les questions qu'elle nous pose en RDC maintenant  
8 See Trefon, Theodore (2013), Uncertainty and powerlessness in Congo 2012, Review 
of African Political Economy, 40, 135, 141-151 
9 Reyntjens (2011), p.138 
10 Vlassenroot (2006), p.59 
11 Reno, William (2006b), Insurgencies in the Shadow of State Collapse, in Kaarsholm, 




that have been denied to the people by the military and political elites since 
independence. The FARDC with its ‘abysmal record’ sets the lowest standard 
in this regard within the sample of this enquiry.12 
 The Huntingtonian separation, the precondition for Western style military 
professionalism, has not developed in Congo. The often aired aspiration to 
build an ‘African style military’, which would contribute to the general public 
good as an ‘army of development’, has not materialised. Instead, dyadic 
clientelist power structures shape society and the military, whose officers are 
available to take over any role, from arbitrator, to security provider, to criminal, 
to any service distributor to those willing to pay tribute to them. The dominant 
figure in an oligarchic society like the Congo may well be a ‘General’ but he is 
usually also a landowner, an entrepreneur, and a ‘highly personalistic leader 
who […] does not distinguish among his various roles. He, in fact, uses all the 
political tactics, bribery, force, cajolery, threat, [and] popular appeal’.13 Such a 
military does not strengthen the state – it weakens it as the worst form of a 
quasi-army. 
2.2 Cameroon 
Cameroonian state and army building stalled after the initial installation of 
the neo-colonial construct under French supervision. Over time the only two 
presidents of Cameroon emancipated themselves increasingly from foreign 
influence, and they succeeded in building up their domestic power bases and 
diversifying the range of their external partners. Military and civilian 
bureaucracies morphed into shadows of themselves, subordinate to informal 
networks. The state apparatus, increasingly a pervasive sinecure, became the 
most important medium for the distribution of wealth and power among 
                                                             
12 Kippenberg, J (2009), Soldiers who rape, commanders who condone: sexual 
violence and military reform in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Human Rights Watch,  
13 Huntington (1968), p.201 
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constantly evolving networks. The military, as much as the civilian 
bureaucracy, is a section of society with which other patronage systems 
intersect, existing at times in harmony, and at times in competition. The 
Cameroonian proto-Weberian state is a more sophisticated version than the 
Congolese one. It includes pockets of functioning administration and of a 
technically professional military organisation. Although growing military 
expertise can be detected at the tactical level of selected units, the overall 
picture remains that of a privatised instrument at the discretion of the 
President-monarch. 
If it comes to historical evolution one can conceptually differentiate 
between three different quasi-armies that have to some extent co-existed or 
chronologically overlapped. These ‘armies’ were, first, the pre-independence 
forces of the transitional government of Cameroon, the Garde Camerounaise; 
second, the neo-colonial Forces armées camerounaises of the first decade of 
independence after 1960; and, third, their successor under the same name, 
which became a monarchist military in character after 1982. These ‘armies’ 
therefore moved from being a placeholder of French rule, via an existence as 
French satellite combat forces, to eventually form a pillar of the personal rule 
system under President Paul Biya. In terms of doctrine they have successively 
mutated through three phases. Firstly, one finds a ‘people’s army’ to fight a 
domestic insurgency until about 1975; then, a ‘two-speed army’ gradually 
formed, with one minor republican armed force to defend the territory of the 
state and a bigger proportion to be paraded on Independence Day. Thirdly, 
with this gap remaining, part of the military has developed the capacity to 
guarantee external security and internal whilst another part merely serves as a 
tool to project the regional foreign policy political interests of the incumbent 
295 
 
regime.14 Cameroon’s successive armies, in addition, have drawn all of their 
legitimacy from their alleged function as an ‘army of development’. This claim 
to represent a ‘force for the economic good’ of the nation, however, has never 
been honoured. The Cameroonian quasi-army, a patchwork rather than a 
coherent body, is no vehicle to build a strong state but an instrument strong 
enough to mainntain a regime. 
2.3 Rwanda 
The Rwandan pre-colonial army was discharged and followed upon by 
the colonial Force Publique and the National Guard of Ruanda-Urundi. Only in 
1973 did the post-colonial GNR of 1962 become the ‘Rwandan army’ FAR. The 
National Guard had been the first entity that was to be composed of Rwandan 
soldiers and NCOs, still to be commanded by Belgian officers. Regularly 
executed purges within the force aligned it with the successive ruling elites. 
The character of the First Republic’s army was a tribal one; that of the Second 
Republic was a regional factionist and politicised one, further differentiating the 
internal power system within the tribalist regime.  
Post-colonial Rwandan state-building remained short of that which would 
have been necessary to implement a truly institutionalised apparatus, open to 
all citizens and subject to the law. The necessary technical preconditions were 
in place: a history of state formation even if interrupted by colonial quasi-state-
building, administrative experience, and even a culturally homogenous 
population. What was missing to construct the strong state was the political will 
of the elites and their obedient followers. The armed forces thus remained a 
military instrument at the hands of a sectarian regime, technically useful to the 
extent demanded. Without ever having developed the capacity and motivation 
                                                             
14 Cameroonian internal security issues, especially in the Nothern border areas, 
increasingly result from spilover of armed conflict in Nigeria (Boko Haram) and the Chad and 
the Central Aftican Republic (Baba Ladé, Bozizé, Seleca) 
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to be the national armed branch of the bureaucracy, the GNR and the FAR 
remained quasi-armies, which under stress could be turned against the 
population. 
The step from quasi-army to political army was actually a catharsis, 
coinciding with defeat for the former and victory for the latter. After that, the 
Rwandan military undertook a metamorphosis by gradually incorporating 
former FAR and militias into its ranks to create the new regular army RDF.  
The fact that the army can no longer be described as an ethnically 
dominated institution reveals a positive tendency towards the strengthening of 
a domus loyalty of the citizenry over a genus-oriented one along ethnic lines. 
The trend is paralleled on the civilian front where efforts are underway to 
establish a ‘regular process for recruiting and training bureaucrats’,15 as part of 
the state’s consolidation and self-perpetuation. As in the Chinese Tang 
dynasty, the process is meant to prevent the creation of ‘hereditary’ power 
structures in competition with those of the ruler.16 State-building has thus 
overcome an important barrier in advancing the concept of administration as a 
legal abstract entity. 
Overall, national cohesion is more advanced in the army than in the rest 
of society as the former does not experience the same confrontation about 
resources like land and housing as does the latter, and behaviour can more 
easily be ordered in a military organisation. 
Rwandan political culture is as prone to top-down policies as other 
countries in Central Africa. Hierarchical attitudes are historically strong, as is 
submissive behaviour of the population, certainly a fact that facilitated the 
genocide. A similar top-down approach is now helping to press through a 
politico-cultural revolution via a state-strengthening policy. As described in 
                                                             
15 Gurses and Mason (2010), p.141 
16 Van Creveld (1999), p.42 
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Chapter 2 on the basis of the Turkish and Japanese examples, the 
determination of a ruling political elite to depart from the patrimonial order is 
essential to steer a radical change of culture. ‘Managed transition from above’, 
as Bratton/Van de Walle put it, ‘is most likely in a military oligarchy’.17 
Accordingly the Rwandan army has been the initiator and tutor of this course. 
As in Turkey in 1924 the change of official language from French to English is 
a key tool to marshal the propagation of new social and political values. Unlike 
post World War I Turkey, the Rwandan civil war and genocide had pitted 
Rwandans against one another and wounds remain difficult to heal. However, 
the Congo campaigns provided ‘unification wars’ in the Bismarckian sense. 
There are limits, however, to what the army can achieve in terms of state 
transformation. Although the RPA/PRF understood itself as a revolutionary, 
political, force, the new duality of RPF and RDF is still handicapped by the 
closed military culture of its leaders and, naturally so, of its structures.  
One of the government’s tactics is to introduce a new national historical 
narrative laying the blame for ethnic tensions at the former colonialists’ 
doorstep for consolidating the tribal concepts, which they rightly identify as the 
root cause of recurring violent outbreaks. However, even as most citizens 
express their relief that tribalism has vanished from the scene, many of them 
refuse the attempted cultural revolution implying eradication of all tribal 
affiliation.  
Despite much evidence of a state-strengthening society, checks and 
balances on the insufficiently inclusive evolving caste system remain too 
limited to force an opening up of the third Republic. The political elite’s military 
mind and culture is prone to paranoia, as they consider the questionable 
outcomes of historic liberalisation processes in the country. This may slow 
                                                             
17 Bratton and Van de Walle (1994), p.480 
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down the political process of state-building, leaving Rwanda stalled at the 
doorstep of an open-access order. Navigating between Scylla and Charybdis, 
the regime may lose its compass and stray from the course towards an open 
access society. 
In Rwanda the army is not a ‘moderniser’ in the Western sense of 
modernity. Rather it tries to rebalance contemporary African political culture 
against the necessity of a new national narrative and high expectations from 
both Rwandans and international observers. State-building is facilitated by the 
Rwandan army. Its quasi-ness, relative to conventional Huntingtonian armies, 
lies in its high degree of cultural integration in its African parent society. 
3 The Military, the Quasi-army, the Army 
The military comes in manifold manifestations, having done so throughout 
history. It existed before states themselves and was centrally involved in the 
formation of the state. Military bodies exist without affiliation to existing states 
or in affiliation to only theoretically existing states; in competition with the 
regular army of a state; or parallel to, and in cooperation with, the state’s 
regular army. Historically, state formation and military formation went hand in 
hand until the current combination of the Weberian legal rational state and its 
professional army was achieved. During this process the military was the uni-
ovular twin of the state at every stage of this parallel and intertwined 
progression. Whilst the military may have various roles to fulfil in functional and 
socio-political terms, if the main purpose of an armed body is not to defend the 
territorial integrity of the state against an outside actor, then it is not an army. 
Other military formations, like for instance local, tribal, or regional militias, 
belong to a category of sub-state organisations of the community, which are 
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not meant to form a standing army, nor even an element of the state.18 They 
are temporary in character and meant to be so. The decisive variable for a 
military body to qualify as an army is the steady and regular connection to the 
state. The mere claim to represent a state or to loyally serve it is not sufficient. 
In relatively recent states, only the type of empirical research carried out in this 
study can reliably inform us on the army’s real existence.  
4 The Soldier without the State 
The aim of every contemporary SSR programme is to transform an 
existing military into an army in the Huntingtonian sense. Such an army implies 
the existence of civilian state institutions to which the army can relate. Any 
SSR programme is therefore at the same time an endeavour in state-building. 
The state, in turn, is the institutional reflection of a historically evolved 
particular form of political organisation of the community. The people 
acknowledging themselves collectively as citizens of a state represent one 
particularly sophisticated form of an ‘invented community’ grown out of a 
gradually developed sense of togetherness. Its sense of cohesion, usually 
socially constructed from a range of pre-existing narrower communities, is 
defined by its distinction from the ‘othernesses’ of non-members. Historically 
this sense of unity grew into nationalism and then patriotism. In Central Africa a 
form of nationalism exists, related to the idea of the community but not to the 
idea of the state. In a context of amorphous efforts to build state institutions, it 
has not led to the creation of nation states.  
The difference between the African and European or Asian experiences 
lies in the inexistence or the curtailing of the historical process of state 
formation in Africa, followed by a post-independence launch and/or resumption 
                                                             
18 Rouquié (1988), p.133; Even in a functioning and empirically existing state some 
forms of military, especially private organisations, are not part of the army 
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of a state-building process on the basis of untransformed political cultures. The 
discrepancy between the visible institutional constructs (those of the Weberian, 
sometimes democratic state) and the political culture underpinning the way 
they work is crucial to an understanding of the political dynamics and the 
functional/dysfunctional status of state institutions in Africa, including the 
military. It has become clear over time that the micro-level of individual 
attitudes and political modernity are in a dialectic relationship with the macro-
level of political culture. Attitudes and political behaviour are interrelated, and 
political change depends on the cultural permissibility of such change. A 
discrepancy between the visible institutional construct on the ground, which 
may appear as a Weberian or even democratic order, and the political-cultural 
underpinning of clientelism and neo-patrimonialism is also reflected in the 
military domain. 
The political bargain necessary to foster a strong ‘accountability link’ 
between leaders and the population has been further hampered by a political 
culture and structure resting on dyadic relationships, which are a form of 
private arrangements between individuals rather than a force to advance 
coalitions of interests. Dyadic relationships also prevail both within the armed 
forces and between military leaders and their civilian elite peers. A common 
good cannot crystallise in such an environment. Electoral processes, promoted 
to focus attention on collective aims and interests, have so far not generated 
strong links between the state and the citizen. Rather, elected persons 
continue to provide ‘gifts’ to the people from public funds at their own 
discretion, and the public is grateful for such hand-outs. The political culture 
ensures that political support is built around personalities and individual 
favours, rather than policies. This results in a distortion of the important 
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‘accountability link’ between the leaders as representing legal persons and the 
public as the balancing power.19 
5 Conclusion 
The aim of this enquiry was to provide an overview of the role of the 
military as one of the key actors in Central African state-building, in order to 
help identify whether and in which conditions the military can be a vehicle for 
state-building, and where it is an obstacle thereto. This question is important in 
the context of many unsuccessful internationally-sponsored programmes to 
install good governance on the African continent, in particular via major 
security sector reform endeavours.  
We can now critically re-assess the presumptions on which current state-
building policies are based: first, the suggested necessity of the construction of 
a state following patterns of liberal democratic polities; second, the idea that 
change can be organised somewhat mechanically once all of the known 
constitutional and technical conditions have been established; and, third, the 
hope that national ownership of state-building can be deepened. However, 
many actors actually have no interest in changing their country’s mode of 
political regulation. Contemporary emergency state-building, as a project of 
‘social engineering’, generates suboptimal results because of the obvious lack 
of enthusiasm of African political and military superiors to seriously accomplish 
publically self-set targets in the implementation of the rule of law. As was 
demonstrated, differences in political culture are among the profoundly 
underestimated factors leading to mutual misunderstandings on state-building.  
The degree and characteristics of ‘quasi-ness’ of each state in our 
sample correspond to the level of ‘quasi-ness’ of its armed forces. As 
                                                             
19 See Smith, Jennifer (2009), Democratisation and Good Governance in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo: A Case Study of South Kivu Province, International Alert, 
Initiative for Peacebuilding, online edition, pp.5f, for the quote p.23 
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demonstrated, similarities and differences can be observed in historical and 
cultural factors, given the broad variety of stages of statehood that were 
identified, from natural states to doorstep nations to open-access order states 
– or from proto or illian statehood in the Congo and proto-Weberian Cameroon 
to Weberian state-building in post-genocide Rwanda. In each example the 
constructive or counter-productive role of the armed forces has been brought 
to light. The ‘semi-stable’ neo-patrimonial polity of Cameroon co-exists with 
post-genocide Rwanda, which is actually the revivification of a stable pre-
colonial kingdom, whilst after 50 years of official existence the DRC is a mere 
geographical unit awaiting its first experience as a coherently-ruled state entity. 
Hence, whilst historically contemporaneous and partly geographically 
contiguous, these countries exist in different ‘socio-political centuries’.  
The most advanced country in terms of state consolidation, Rwanda, 
started from the ‘pole position’ of having a long history of statehood and 
standing armies. This position, however, had not been exploited positively 
before the caesura of genocide hit the nation; but, thereafter, the local elite 
came to the conclusion that general rather than privatised security, based on 
the law rather than privileges, was the core of its common interest. The 
formation of an open society as the foundation for a lively democratic culture is, 
however, not yet in sight. 
Whilst the character of the state as a coercive apparatus has shifted in 
much of the world towards one of a polity responsible for protecting and 
serving its citizens, the ambiguous attitude of Central African leaders toward 
the pursuance of the common good testifies to their uneasiness with this 
advanced concept of the state. Although the Charter of the African Union puts 
respect for the rule of law at the core of the continent’s values, this has yet to 
be translated into reality.  
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Tilly’s 1975 reflections on the military of then-recently created states 
demonstrate that when an army does not fulfil its constitutional role the military 
rather impedes progress towards democratisation and the advancement of the 
common good, and it presents a strong tendency towards domestic political 
interventionism and praetorianism. This praetorianism, as demonstrated 
above, is the expression of a political culture in which the struggle for power 
and wealth is not mediated through institutions but directly carried out by the 
social actors. In such a confrontation those who can muster the means to 
prevail produce a political disorder prone to violence and corruption.  
With the exception of Rwanda vis-à-vis the other Central African officer 
corps, military legitimacy simply reflects a political reality derived from regime 
legitimacy rather than from an abstract constitutional legitimacy. To the 
ordinary soldiers, who participate as auxiliary clients in the struggle between 
the powerful but who are themselves excluded from many of the benefits of the 
intra-elite power contest, this means that they lurk in a precarious balance 
between two positions: on the one hand, their slightly privileged position 
relative to unarmed non-elite compatriots allows the viewer to describe them as 
a distinct group comparable to Karl Marx’s Arbeiteraristokratie preying on their 
equals; and on the other hand, their insecure stand within their military 
hierarchical milieu, which makes them a rather disjointed Lumpenmilitariat. 
Under current Central African conditions, the military is able to perform 
neither its technical combat role nor its assumed role as a unifying agent and 
pillar of the social contract. Individual soldiers, with either high or low status 
within their wider non-military community are bound up in semi- or non-state 




With different characteristics of quasi-ness of African armies established 
relative to their own claims of Huntingtonian professionalism, each of the 
armed forces of our sample shows its historically and politico-culturally shaped 
form of quasi-ness. It is hence possible to compare the qualitative level of 
quasi-ness between the different armed forces. For this, a scale comprised of 
three main variables can be used. The first variable is the degree of exposure 
to the patrimonial political and economic system of which the armed forces are 
a part; the second is the degree of political engagement the armed forces take 
on as part of the responsibility they assume – on their own initiative or spurred 
by the political leadership – to advance the common good of the community 
(as opposed to politicisation, which implies taking sides in domestic political 
struggles); and the third the degree of professionalism they demonstrate in 
performing their own, military tasks, however these are defined  - crushing a 
rebellion, repelling an enemy, supporting a peacekeeping engagement, etc. 
Using such a scale, the respective degree of quasi-ness of the Congolese, 
Cameroonian and Rwandese armed forces can be illustrated by the graph 
below. 
As part of a profoundly clientelist political and social order and instrument 
of an arbitrary decision-making system, the armed forces of the Congo present 
the highest degree of quasi-ness among the three of our case studies. It has 
been only marginally and occasionally in their fifty years of existence that some 
of their components have contributed to the construction of the state and 
actually helped in defending its sovereignty. Cameroon, as was suggested at 
the start of this survey, is a middle-ground case, in which pockets of 
professionalism and a degree of national pride in the armed forces do 
contribute to supporting a state with fragile foundations, but cannot guard the 
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Table 8: Relative quasiness of African armed forces 
 
In Rwanda, patrimonialism and clientelism have largely been eliminated 
from the armed forces, being replaced by a very strong political involvement at 
the service of a legal person, the state; great strides are also being made 
toward the creation of an internationally recognised professional army. Two 
features of the Rwandese armed forces, however, still distinguish them from 
the Huntingtonian model of the professional military: the non-differentiation of 
the state and the regime at the service of which they have been employed 
since the 1994 genocide, and the inclusion in their tasking of support for 
national economic development. 
 
The Central African military of our samples are quasi-armies of different 
















 Less                                        Degree of Quasi-ness                                      More 
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them is a vehicle, to state-building. Whilst the Cameroonian and Congolese 
military falsely claim to be professional armies, the Rwandan RDF represents a 
kind of quasi-army fostering a new understanding of civil-military relations – 
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